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Game theory was used to analyze compensation systems 
based on individual and group incentives. Payoff formulas 
were developed for these incentives assuming different 
preferences for individual and social outcomes. Two levels 
of contributions were considered: 1) "defection" - the 
minimum acceptable level of contributions, and 
2) "cooperation" - a level of discretionary contributions 
above the minimum. The discretionary contributions 
associated with cooperation were represented as a cost to 
the individual. 
2 
A classification scheme for uniform n-person games was 
developed using the approach of Rappaport and Guyer (1966) 
for 2 X 2 games. This classification scheme defines the 
natural outcome (cooperation or defection) for each game. 
The analysis considered the Individual motive, based on 
maximizing self-interest, and five social motives 
(Collective, Competitive, Altruism, Equity and Aggression). 
These motives reflect preferences for outcomes based on 
payoffs to self and others. The results indicate the natural 
outcome and game category for different values of the 
individual and group incentive factors. satisficing theory 
was also used to analyze the natural outcome for the 
Individual motive. 
Evolutionary game theory was used to develop two 
simulation models for social motives. The models interpret 
social motives as 1) genuine preferences for specific social 
outcomes, or 2) indirect strategies for maximizing 
individual payoffs. These models explore the interaction of 
social motives and the resulting impact on the level of 
cooperation. 
The results were used to develop effectiveness criteria 
for selecting inducement systems which should promote 
cooperation. Additionally, cost curves were used to 
determine the least cost inducement system. Based on these 
3 
results, inducement systems using absolute incentives are 
recommended over systems using competitive incentives. 
Competitive incentives should only be considered when there 
is limited need for coordination between individuals and 
where aggressive andjor competitive behavior is acceptable. 
The study has theoretical as well as practical 
implications. Game theory provides a method for expanding 
expectancy theory to include expectations about the actions 
of others and provides a framework for integrating 
expectancy theory and other theories based on social motives 
(e.g. equity theory). The use of dynamic models from 
evolutionary game theory breaks new ground in the theory of 
motivation. 
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
This study applies the methods of game theory to the 
design of organizational inducement systems. The focus of 
the study is on increasing our understanding of how 
inducement systems motivate individual contributions in 
support of organizational goals. organizational inducement 
systems based on individual and group incentives are studied 
using the methods of game theory. This study is comprised of 
three phases of analysis. The three phases are depicted in 
Figure 1, which shows an overview of the study. 
In the first phase, game theory is used to analyze a 
range of inducement systems to determine the values of 
individual and group incentives needed to motivate 
individuals to contribute their efforts towards the goals of 
the organization. This analysis provides a conceptual 
framework for studying motivation that moves beyond the 
individual as the unit of analysis. The methods that are 
developed allow expectations about the actions of others to 
be used in analyzing an individual's decision to contribute 
to the organization. This phase reflects the Individual 
motive, which is based on a preference for maximizing 
payoffs to self. 
Classes of InduceMents Social Motives 
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In the second phase, the payoffs for the inducement 
systems being studied are reformulated to reflect 
preferences for five alternative social motives: 
3 
1) Collective, 2) Competitive, 3) Altruism, 4) Equity, and 
5) Aggression. The methods developed to analyze the 
Individual motive are used in this phase to determine the 
ability of inducement systems to motivate individuals with 
varying social motives. This work provides a framework for 
expanding expectancy theory to include preferences regarding 
social outcomes as well as individual outcomes. 
In the third phase, a method for studying the evolution 
of social motives is presented. Two dynamic learning models 
are developed using concepts from evolutionary game theory. 
These simulation models provide a basis for determining how 
social motives might evolve in response to the inducement 
system being used by an organization. This method is also 
used to examine the effects of the evolution of social 
motives on the level of group cooperation. 
Drawing from the results of these three phases of 
analysis, criteria are identified for use in selecting 
organizational inducement systems. These criteria can assist 
practitioners in selecting inducements systems that should 
be effective in promoting individual and group cooperation 
with the goals of the organization. Inducement systems 
meeting these effectiveness criteria are then reviewed based 
on the costs of the inducement system to the organization. 
on the basis of these evaluations, recommendations and 
4 
guidelines are given regarding inducement systems which 
should be effective and efficient in gaining the cooperation 
of individuals with the goals of the organization. 
Inducements 
Business organizations, as social systems, are 
characterized by the cooperation of individuals seeking to 
achieve common economic goals. The coordination of the 
actions of individuals to accomplish these goals is the 
primary purpose of business organizations. Barnard (1938) 
viewed business organizations as "cooperative systems" and 
defined the organization as a "system of consciously 
coordinated activities or forces of two or more persons". 
For Barnard, the motivation for an individual to join an 
organization is the access to the economic and social 
rewards which result from coordinated activity. 
Barnard (1938) and Simon (Simon, 1957; March and Simon, 
1958) have been responsible for the development of the 
concept of the inducements-contributions contract. They 
characterize participation in an organization as involving 
an unwritten contract between the organization and the 
individual wherein the organization offers inducements to 
the individual in exchange for the individual's 
contributions to the goals of the organization. Only when 
the value of these exchanges benefit both the organization 
and the individual does there exist a stable basis for 
organizational cooperation. For this to occur, individuals 
must place a higher value on the inducements they receive 
than on their contributions. Similarly, the organization 
must place a higher value on the contributions it receives 
from the individual than it does on the inducements it 
returns in exchange. 
5 
Because inducements are often based on the level of 
contributions, individuals must choose their level of 
contributions based on the inducements they hope to earn. 
Organizations must select the level and types of inducements 
they wish to offer for these contributions. These choices 
will vary depending upon the nature of the organization and 
the needs of individuals within the organization. 
Inducements may be material or non-material (Barnard, 1938). 
Material inducements include pay, benefits and physical 
working conditions. Non-material inducements include 
prestige, recognition, social interaction and satisfaction 
of important personal values. 
A multiplicity of inducements exists within 
organizations. In business organizations, pay is the 
principal material inducement. Because money spent in wages 
or for other incentives is not available for other important 
purposes (e.g. stockholders, taxes, reinvestment), it 
represents a scarce resource. As a result, the management of 
compensation programs is a critical function within most 
business organizations. Paying too much in wages can lead to 
bankruptcy. Paying too little can lead to a failure to 
retain individuals needed to perform the work of the 
organization. 
The business literature contains many examples of pay 
systems designed to increase individual performance 
6 
(Lawler, 1981). In recent years (O'Dell, 1987), a great deal 
of attention has been focused on compensation as a way of 
increasing productivity and responding to growing 
international competition. Pay systems can be considered to 
be made up of three types of incentives: 1) base pay (e.g. 
salary or hourly pay), 2) individual incentives (e.g. piece 
rates, commissions and merit pay), and 3) group or system 
incentives (e.g. profit sharing, gainsharing and bonus 
plans). 
The need to manage the payment of inducements leads to 
the problem of how best to structure inducement systems to 
make them more effective in gaining the cooperation of 
individuals and more efficient in their use of 
organizational resources. This study explores this question 
, ..... 
by using the methods of game theory to analyze different 
classes of inducement systems. 
Motivation 
Pay systems are based on a variety of assumptions about 
what motivates employees to put forth effort towards meeting 
organizational goals. The literature on work motivation is 
extensive (Pinder, 1984). While scores of theories of 
motivation have been proposed, the majority of them find 
their origins in the assumption that individuals are driven 
by self-interest to "seek pleasure and avoid pain" 
(Vroom, 1964). 
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Since the time of Adam Smith (1776), "economic man" has 
been one of the principal models used in understanding human 
behavior. This model of human behavior has led to pay 
systems that have generally been designed around the 
assumption that individuals will choose a level of effort 
that maximizes the value of inducements less contributions. 
This approach is consistent with the majority of the 
theories of motivation, particularly the various forms of 
expectancy theory (Lawler & Suttle, 1973). 
The literature on work motivation has been primarily 
concerned with motivation as an individual (within-person) 
process (Mitchell, 1982). With the exception of equity 
theory (Adams, 1963), the major cognitive theories of 
motivation fail to account for the effects of group 
processes on individual motivation. Equity theory (Adams, 
1964) proposes that individuals are motivated to seek 
equality in the ratios of inducements to contributions 
between themselves and relevant others. 
The human relations school of organizational behavior 
has pointed out that informal groups often exert powerful 
influences on individual motives. This was illustrated in 
the Hawthorne studies (Roethlisberger & Dickson, 1939) and 
the application of a piece rate to individuals working in 
the Wiring Room. In this case, individuals chose to limit 
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their output to levels below those which would have yielded 
the highest net return. These restrictions in contributions 
were based on group norms that defined the appropriate rate 
of work for individuals in the Wiring Room. In that study, 
the work group's actions reflected a belief that their 
collective interests were served by setting productivity 
norms, rather than allowing each individual to pursue a 
level of productivity that maximized the individual's self-
interest. While the work on group processes has not resulted 
in a formal theory of motivation, it does illustrate the 
need for a more expansive theory of motivation - one capable 
of considering social as well as individual motives. 
The Wiring Room study illustrates a problem which is 
common in social settings - the conflict between individual 
and social motives. Hardin (1968) has pointed out how a 
variety of social problems (e.g. overpopulation, pollution) 
can be understood as conflicts between individual and 
collective goals. Dawes (1980) has referred to these 
conflicts as social dilemmas. These dilemmas are of special 
interest to society, since the problem of balancing 
individual and collective interests must be satisfactorily 
resolved if social institutions are to be successful. 
Game Theory 
Game theory has been used to analyze a variety of 
social dilemmas (Hamburger, 1978}. As developed by Von 
Neumann and Morgenstern (1944), game theory is a normative 
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theory. It attempts to explain how individuals should 
behave, rather than attempting to predict how they will 
behave. Von Neumann and Morgenstern base their theory on 
so-called "norms of rationality." These norms follow from 
the assumption that people should behave so as to maximize 
their self-interest. These "norms" or principles of 
rationality are one of the key assumptions of game theory. 
By hypothesizing that human behavior conforms to these 
normative rules, researchers have been able to use game 
theory for descriptive as well as normative purposes. Given 
the widespread acceptance of the view that individuals 
pursue their self-interests, game theory is a useful 
starting point in analyzing organizational inducement 
systems. At the same time, it is important that assumptions 
about rationality be made explicit. Researchers have often 
been guilty of failing to explicitly state their assumptions 
regarding rationality. 
In applying game theory to this study, payoffs to 
individuals are based on the inducement system in use within 
the organization. The inducement system specifies what 
payoffs an individual receives for differing levels of 
contributions. For simplicity, only two levels of 
contributions are considered. Additional levels of 
cooperation could be included in the analysis, but have been 
excluded because they would unduly complicate the 
presentation of theoretical concepts and results. 
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Adopting the language commonly used in game theory, the 
two levels of contributions are labeled "defection" and 
"cooperation". Defection is defined as the minimum 
acceptable level of contributions needed to maintain 
membership in the organization. Cooperation is defined in 
terms of a specified level of discretionary contributions 
over the minimum. As used in this study, "cooperation" and 
"defection" refer to an individual's level of contributions 
towards the goals of the organization. Since other 
definitions of cooperation and defection are commonly used 
in discussing organizations (i.e. "cooperation" may mean 
with other individuals, as opposed to the organization as a 
higher level unit), care must be taken to distinguish those 
usages frorn the context specific definitions used in this 
study. 
The payoffs for each level of contributions depend on 
the difference between the value of contributions and the 
value of inducements, as determined by the individual. since 
inducements and contributions involve a number of differing 
quantities, a common unit of comparison is needed. Game 
theory typically expresses payoffs in terms of "utiles" 
although other units of comparison (i.e. dollars) can be 
used. 
Inducements can include base pay and individual and 
group incentives. These incentives may be positively or 
negatively valued (i.e. rewards vs. punishments). As an 
example, consider the following inducement system for a 
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2-person organization. Each individual receives a base 
salary of $3000/month, which they receive for the minimum 
level of contributions. They also receive a group incentive 
based on their collective contributions. If both individuals 
contribute at the level defined as cooperation, then they 
each receive a $600 group incentive for the month. If only 
one individual cooperates, then they each receive $300. 
Finally, assume that the extra effort associated with 
cooperation has an equivalent cost of $800 to each player. 
The payoffs for this inducement system are as follows: 
DO = $3000 base pay + $0 group incentive - $0 
contributions = $3000 
Note: DO refers to the payoff to a defector when 
the other person also defects. CD refers to the 
payoff to a cooperator when the other person 
defects. 
cc = $3000 base pay + $600 group incentive - $800 
contributions = $2800 
DC = $3000 base pay + $300 group incentive - $0 
contributions = $3300 
CD = $3000 base pay + $300 group incentive - $800 
contributions = $2500 
The payoff matrix for this inducement system is shown 
in Figure 2. For this set of payoffs, each individual 
receives a higher payoff from defection than from 
cooperation. This occurs regardless of the choice (defect or 
cooperate) made by the other person. As such, defection is a 
dominating strategy and would be classified by game theory 
as the rational choice. This outcome can occur in 
organizations where group incentives are set at too low a 
level to offset the added contributions required to earn 
those incentives. 
Player 2 
c D 
2.8 3.3 
c 2.8 2.5 
Player 1 
D 2.5 3.0 
3.3 3.0 
Note: Payoffs are in thousands of dollars. 
Figure 2. Payoff matrix for 2-person inducement 
system using group incentives. 
The first phase of this study examines selected 
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combinations of base pay and individual and group incentives 
to determine which inducement systems lead to cooperation as 
a rational outcome. Using inducement systems similar to the 
one shown above, varying levels of group and individual 
incentives are analyzed to determine their ability to 
promote cooperation. 
As a part of this analysis, a classification scheme for 
uniform n-person games was developed to specify the "natural 
outcome" - the outcome most consistent with the principles 
of rationality used in game theory. This classification 
scheme follows an approach used by Rappaport and Guyer 
(1966) to develop a taxonomy of 2 X 2 games. 
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The majority of the work done in this study is based on 
the analysis of 10-person groups. The 10-person case 
provides insights into how group size influences the results 
and illustrates the general n-person method of analysis. The 
simpler 2-person case is used on occasion to present the 
model in the easily understood format of the 2 X 2 game. 
Where appropriate, generalized n-person formulas are 
developed to present the major results of this phase of the 
study. 
Also included in phase I is a supplemental analysis 
based on the satisficing theory of Simon (1976). Satisficing 
theory hypothesizes that individuals who are receiving 
"satisfactory outcomes" may continue with their existing 
behavior rather than searching for a new and possibly better 
alternative. As a result, an individual receiving a 
satisfactory outcome from a given behavior (e.g. defection) 
might continue that behavior even though game theory 
indicates that another behavior (e.g. cooperation) would 
lead to a superior outcome. 
Returning to our earlier inducement system, suppose 
that in addition to group incentives, the organization also 
has individual rewards of $300 for cooperators. The revised 
payoff matrix is now shown in Figure 3. For this set of 
payoffs, defection is a dominating strategy. Each individual 
receives a higher payoff from defecting than from 
cooperating, regardless of whether the other individual 
cooperates or defects. Unlike the previous case, however, 
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the joint outcome that results when both individuals choose 
to defect is inferior to the payoff each would receive from 
joint cooperation, (i.e. DD<CC). In this example, both 
individuals would be better off if they agreed to cooperate 
rather than seeking to maximize their individual gains 
through defection. This payoff matrix is an example of a 
class of games known as "prisoner's dilemma" games. It is a 
class of games that has been studied extensively (Rappaport 
and Chammah, 1965) because of the conflict between 
individual and collective rationality inherent in the game. 
Player 2 
c D 
3.1 3.3 
c 3.1 2.8 
Player 1 
D 2.8 3.0 
3.3 3.0 
Note: Payoffs are in thousands of dollars. 
Figure 3. Payoff matrix for 2-person inducement 
system using individual rewards and group 
incentives. 
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Social Motives 
Over 1000 papers have been published on the prisoner's 
dilemma. Despite the normative recommendation to defect that 
follows from a narrow technical analysis of this game, the 
experimental literature presents a vastly more complex 
picture of human motives and actions. Of particular interest 
is the research on social motives. Several authors (Pruitt, 
1967 & 1970; Messick & McClintock, 1968) have used the 
prisoner's dilemma and other social dilemma games to 
identify motives beyond individual maximization. Kuhlman and 
Marshello (1975) have identified four motives: 1) self 
maximization (individual), 2) joint maximization 
(collective), 3) difference maximization (competitive), and 
4) other's maximization (altruism). MacCrimmon and Messick 
(1976) have proposed a framework for social motives that 
contains three additional basic motives: 1) difference 
minimization (equity), 2) other's minimization (aggression) 
and 3) self minimization (self-sacrifice). 
While only the first of the motives listed above is 
based on the norms of rationality generally used in game 
theory, they do reflect the strong societal norms evident in 
everyday life. Because individuals often choose apparently 
"irrational" strategies based on their social motives, it is 
important that the designer of organizational inducement 
systems know whether a given inducement system is able to 
promote cooperation in a variegated environment of social 
motives. 
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The second phase of this study examines selected 
inducement systems to judge their ability to promote 
cooperation across a variety of social motives. This 
analysis uses five of the six social motives identified 
above. The motive of self-sacrifice is considered to be 
unrealistic and has been dropped from the analysis. The 
results of this portion of the study identify the levels of 
group and individual incentives that should cause 
individuals to cooperate for each of the social motives 
being considered. 
Behavioral Evolution 
Game theory has also been used in theoretical biology 
to study how behavioral patterns such as altruism and 
reciprocity can evolve (Hamilton, 1964; Trivers, 1971; and 
Maynard-Smith, 1982). Using the evolutionary concepts of 
Darwin (1859), these studies have demonstrated how behaviors 
can be genetically transmitted. More recently, these 
concepts have been extended to cover the evolution of 
learned behaviors (Dawkins, 1976). This approach can be used 
to study the evolution of social motives in an 
organizational context. 
The third phase of this study reviews selected 
inducement systems to determine how a population of 
differing strategies might evolve, and to what extent the 
level of cooperation would be affected. The method used to 
study the evolution of strategies is based on the work of 
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Axelrod (1984), who used a computer simulation to model a 
prisoner's dilemma game for a population of individuals with 
differing strategies. The strategies were submitted by 
theoreticians from around the world. In Axelrod's study, the 
populations for each of the strategies were initially set 
equal, and then adjusted after each round based on their 
relative payoffs in the prior round. The simulation was 
allowed to run until equilibrium populations for each of the 
strategies were reached. 
The approach used in this study is similar to the one 
used by Axelrod. The frequencies of each of the social 
motives are initially set equal, and the simulation is run 
to determine how the frequencies evolved. Two simulation 
models were used. One model treats motives as strategies for 
acquiring material payoffs, while the other treats motives 
as genuine preferences with their own inherent value. 
Additionally, the overall level of cooperation was also 
determined from the equilibrium populations. 
Implications 
The study concludes by discussing the practical 
implications and theoretical significance of the methods and 
the resu;ts. The three phases of analysis are used to 
develop criteria for selecting inducement systems which 
should be effective in promoting individual contributions 
towards the goals of the organization. The most efficient 
inducement systems meeting these criteria are identified 
18 
based on the costs of the inducement system to the 
organization. The results are discussed for each class of 
inducements and recommendations given for applying the 
results to the design of real-world inducement systems. The 
limitations of the study are also presented and suggestions 
given for additional empirical and analytical work. 
The theoretical significance of the study is also 
discussed. The relationship of this work to expectancy 
theory and other theories of motivation is presented. The 
use of game theory to expand the approach of expectancy 
theory is highlighted. This expansion allows expectancy 
theory to move beyond the individual as the unit of analysis 
by including: 1} an analysis of the decisions of others, and 
2) the consideration of social as well as individual 
outcomes. Recommendations are given for future work to 
develop an integrated theory of motivation capable of 
incorporating a range of social motives. 
CHAPTER II 
REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE 
This study is based on work being done in four distinct 
areas: 1) motivation, 2) inducements 3) social motives, and 
4) behavioral evolution. Ideas from research in these areas 
have been brought together using methods from game theory 
and theoretical biology to study how behaviors and social 
motives are shaped by organizational inducement systems. 
The business and industrial psychology literatures have 
dealt extensively with the question of individual 
motivation. A great deal has also been written about the 
role of inducements in business organizations. These 
literatures have tended to deal with motivation and 
inducements using the individual as the unit of analysis. 
A less well known area of work in social-psychology has 
developed around the problem of social dilemmas - situations 
where individual motives conflict with social motives. Game 
theory has been applied to the study of social dilemmas to 
determine the extent to which individual behavior is 
influenced by social motives. Much of the literature on 
motivation and social motives assumes that individual 
preferences are fixed. Recent work in theoretical biology 
has used game theory to show how learned behaviors can 
evolve within a population. The methods of evolutionary game 
theory can be applied to the evolution of social motives 
within an organizational setting. 
Motivation 
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Motivating workers has become one of the dominant 
issues in modern industrial society. Businesses, in 
particular, have found that motivating workers is often 
essential to their profitability and their ability to 
survive in an increasingly competitive world economy. This 
recognition has led to an extensive research literature on 
the topic of motivation. 
Needs Theories. Numerous approaches have been taken to 
the study of motivation. Maslow (1943) and Alderfer (1969) 
proposed theories of motivation based on human needs. Maslow 
(1943) proposed that individuals are motivated by five basic 
needs: 1) physiological needs, 2) safety needs, 3) love 
needs, 4) esteem needs, and 5) self-actualization needs. 
According to Maslow, these needs are arranged in a hierarchy 
of prepotency, such that one level of needs is primary in 
influencing the motivation of an individual at a given time. 
Only when lower level needs are substantially satisfied will 
the individual be motivated by the next level of needs. 
Alderfer (1969) proposed a similar needs based theory 
of motivation. Alderfer's ERG theory specifies three classes 
of human needs: 1) existence, 2) relativeness, and 
3) growth. Rather than proposing a simple hierarchy of 
prepotency, Alderfer suggested that transferability, 
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satisfaction-progression and frustration-regression are the 
three mechanisms determining which class of needs will most 
influence individual motivation. 
Despite the popularity of Maslow's hierarchy, neither 
of these needs-based theories has been supported through 
research studies (Pinder, 1984). As a result, little current 
work is being done in the area of needs-based motivation 
(Mitchell, 1982). 
Reinforcement Theories. Behaviorists, working largely 
from animal studies, have proposed various reinforcement 
theories to explain motivation. Skinner (1969) and others 
believe that motivation could be described as learned 
behavior resulting from an individual's history of rewards 
and punishments. This research has focused on the use of 
positive and negative reinforcement to alter the frequency 
of a given behavior and the role of various reinforcement 
schedules in creating learned behaviors. In general, these 
theories are careful to avoid any assumptions about the 
internal state or cognitions of individuals. Predictions are 
based upon the observable history of reinforcements. A 
substantial body of research in support of these theories 
exists (Pinder 1984). 
Cognitive Theories. The largest area of current 
motivation research includes those theories characterized as 
cognitive theories. The cognitive theories can be subdivided 
into three main theories (Pinder, 1984): 1) equity theory, 
2) goal-setting theory, and 3) expectancy theory. 
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Adams (1963) proposed that individuals are motivated by 
concerns over equity. Underpayment or overpayment can occur 
relative to a standard or to a referent individual. When 
underpayment or overpayment exists, individuals are 
motivated to increase or decrease their effort to adjust for 
the perceived inequity. Research on equity has generally 
supported the predictions of the theory regarding 
underpayment. .The theory has been less satisfactory in 
predicting behavior involving overpayment (Pritchard, 1969). 
Path-goal or goal-setting theories have been proposed 
by Locke (1968) and Latham and Locke (1979) and can be 
traced back to some of the original ideas of Fredrick Taylor 
(Locke, 1982). These theories suggest that individuals are 
motivated when they have specific, difficult-to-achieve 
goals in combination with detailed supervisory feedback. 
Commitment to these goals is enhanced through good 
supervisory relations. Resistance to goals is overcome 
through training, participation in goal-setting and rewards. 
Field research on goal-setting has sometimes documented 
dramatic increases in productivity, although goal-setting is 
often difficult to manage in certain organizational settings 
(Latham and Wexley, 1981). 
The third and most significant of the cognitive 
theories is expectancy theory. First proposed by Vroom 
(1964), expectancy theory has been the most heavily 
researched and accepted of the numerous theories of 
motivation (Pinder, 1984). Vroom described his theory as 
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being based on the hedonistic assumption that individuals 
act so as to "maximize pleasure and minimize pain". Vroom's 
theory defined motivation as a force acting on a person to 
choose a particular action based on the interaction of 
1) the person's expectancy that particular outcomes will 
result from the act, and 2) the valence of these (first-
level) outcomes. The valence of the first-level outcomes is 
a function of the valences of all other second-level 
outcomes and the instrumentality of the first-level outcome 
in attaining these second-level outcomes. 
Expectancy theory proposes that humans make choices 
based on judgments about existing conditions and 
expectations about the future. This contrasts with the 
learning theories which rely solely on the history of 
reinforcements in predicting behavior. In most regards, 
however, there exist few differences between the 
propositions of expectancy theory and those of the learning 
theories (Pinder, 1984). This is not surprising, since 
expectations regarding the future are influenced by what has 
occurred in similar situations in the past. 
Lawler (1971) and others have proposed various 
alternative forms of expectancy theory. Lawler expressed the 
motivational force as [E-->P][P-->O]V, where [E-->P] is the 
expectancy or conditional probability that a given effort 
will result in a given performance outcome and [P-->0] is 
the expectancy that a given performance outcome will result 
in outcomes with valence v. The valence of a set of outcomes 
is the positive or negative value of those outcomes to the 
individual. 
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Various forms of expectancy theory were reviewed by 
Lawler and Suttle (1973). Their review of prior research 
showed moderate support for expectancy theory, with the best 
correlations between effort and motivational force occurring 
for the [E-->P][P-->O]V form of the theory. However, other 
simpler forms of expectancy theory ([E-->P] and [P-->0]), 
were nearly as good at predicting behavior. Valence did not 
improve the predictability of the theory, although this may 
have been a result of a lack of significant differences in 
the valences of the outcomes associated with the 
experiments. 
The work of Lawler and Suttle (1973) is typical of work 
in the field. While numerous forms of expectancy theory have 
been confirmed in a variety of experimental settings, the 
correlations between actual effort and predictions based on 
expectancy measures have generally been modest (0.3 to 0.5). 
The lack of strong empirical support for expectancy theory 
has led researchers to question the methodologies used in 
past research. In their review of methodological problems, 
Campbell and Pritchard (1976) pointed out several problems 
with past research on expectancy theory. These include: 
1) lack of a clear specification of the dependent variable 
(effort), 2) lack of test instruments with reliability and 
construct validity, and 3) improper experimental design 
(between-person versus within-person). In research where 
more attention has been given to correcting these 
methodological problems, the results have generally been 
more supportive of expectancy theory (Wanous, Keon and 
Latack, 1983). 
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Deci (1971) has confronted expectancy theorists with 
another more fundamental problem by proposing that the level 
of motivation due to intrinsically motivating outcomes is 
influenced by the use of extrinsic rewards. As an example, 
an increase in the extrinsic rewards associated with a given 
level of performance might lower the individual's intrinsic 
motivation to perform at that level. If true, changes in the 
motivational force could not be predicted from changes made 
in extrinsic rewards, since levels of intrinsic motivation 
would subsequently change. While not a direct refutation of 
expectancy theory, Deci's propositions would limit the 
application of expectancy theory in designing reward 
systems, since the effects of changing the inducement system 
could not be predicted. Support for Deci's propositions has 
been mixed (Guzzo, 1979; Pritchard, Campbell and Campbell, 
1977). 
Pfeffer (1982) has criticized expectancy theory on the 
grounds that it deals only with the individual as the unit 
of analysis. Pfeffer argues that the limited success of 
expectancy theory may be due to its inability to include the 
effects of the social and environmental context on 
individual behavior. Mitchell (1982) has also pointed out 
that expectancy theorists view motivation as an "individual, 
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intentional" process, with no real attempt to understand how 
group processes enter into the picture. 
Summarizing the existing research on motivation, it is 
clear that despite having a number of methodological 
problems, expectancy theory is the most widely accepted 
theory of motivation. While it has been gained acceptance by 
many theorists and practitioners, the theory has a mixed 
record in term of its predictive ability. More 
fundamentally, however, expectancy theory has focused on the 
individual as the unit of analy~is. While expectancy theory 
is potentially capable of incorporating organizational 
influences on individual expectancies, no clear framework 
for doing this has emerged. One of the challenges facing 
expectancy theorists is to incorporate their work into a 
framework that reflects the influences of the organizational 
environment on individual motivation. 
Inducements 
Barnard (1938) was one of the first authors to 
formulate a theory of business organizations as "cooperative 
systems." Barnard saw organizations as existing to 
accomplish a common purpose. Individuals choose to cooperate 
in seeking these common organizational goals based on the 
satisfaction of personal motives. These personal motives may 
be economic andjor social in nature. 
Barnard was careful to distinguish the goals of the 
organization from those of individuals within the 
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organization. Individuals may be able to satisfy their go~ls 
independent of whether the organization reaches its goals. 
Indeed, individual goals are often in conflict with 
organizational goals (e.g. unionization). 
Barnard saw one of the functions of the executive as 
managing the "effectiveness and efficiency" of inducements. 
Inducements are effective when they gain the required level 
of individual contributions. Inducements are efficient when 
they use a minimum of organizational resources. To gain the 
level of contributions needed to achieve organizational 
goals, individuals must receive sufficient inducements to 
justify their contributions. The types of inducements 
available within an organization may be either material or 
nonmaterial and include pay, benefits, working conditions, 
promotion, prestige, security, social interaction, feelings 
of loyalty, sense of accomplishment and personal 
recognition. 
Based on Barnard's work, March and Simon (1958) 
developed the idea of the inducements-contributions 
contract. According to these authors, individuals make 
contributions to the organization based on a perceived value 
of inducements over contributions. The inducements-
contributions contract involves questions of 1) membership 
and 2) discretionary contributions. When the value of 
inducements associated with membership outweigh the costs of 
the contributions expected by the organization, there is a 
basis for joining the organization. In exchange for joining 
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the organization, the individual agrees to perform specified 
tasks and to submit to the authority of the organization in 
certain matters (e.g. conduct, hours of work, job 
assignments). Individuals often choose from among various 
employment opportunities based on which organization offers 
the most favorable inducements-contributions contract. 
Following the decision to participate in an 
organization, an individual is faced with the choice of what 
level of discretionary contributions to put forth beyond the 
minimum required to maintain membership. Organizations often 
make use of incentive systems to gain these discretionary 
contributions. According to the Barnard-Simons theory, the 
individual's decision regarding level of contributions is 
also based on the comparison of the expected value of 
inducements to the cost of contributions. This approach is 
consistent with the approach used by the expectancy 
theorists. 
A variety of individual and group incentive systems 
have been developed to promote individual contributions 
(Lawler, 1983). Incentives can be either positive or 
negative. The majority of these systems have relied 
primarily on pay or other material inducements. Piece rates 
are an example of one of the simplest forms of incentive 
systems. 
Individual incentive systems have been used extensively 
in business organizations (Lawler, 1983; Bernardin and 
Beatty, 1984). These systems generally involve a comparison 
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of individual performance against established standards. 
These standards can take such diverse forms as commissions, 
piece rates, or performance objectives (O'Dell, 1987). Other 
individual incentive systems appraise performance in 
competitive terms, comparing one individual against others 
in similar positions. Competitive incentives, such as sales 
contests, are often in marketing and sales organizations 
(Colletti, 1988). 
Other incentive systems common in business 
organizations are group bonuses, gainsharing and profit 
sharing plans (Doyle, 1983). These incentive systems are 
based on the performance of the organization or a selected 
group of employees. These plans often base incentives on 
meeting financial, production or cost-reduction goals. 
Rewards are typically distributed on a system-wide basis 
without regard to individual performance. Examples include 
stock ownership, profit sharing and various gainsharing 
plans (e.g. Rucker, Improshare, Scanlon). 
While many different inducement systems have been used 
by organizations, they each involve a combination of base 
pay plus individual andjor group incentives. While pay and 
benefits form the basis of the inducement systems found in 
most modern businesses, other noncash incentives, such as 
gifts, paid vacations, promotion or recognition awards are 
also available. These incentives are generally less easy to 
administer on a system-wide basis (Barnard, 1938). 
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Not all inducements are under the control of the 
organization. As illustrated by the Hawthorne studies 
(Roethlisberger and Dickson, 1939), groups can exert 
powerful influences on individuals within an organization. 
Hackman (1976) credits groups with a range of discretionary 
stimuli which can be used to bring an individual's behavior 
into line with group norms. Hackman sees group stimuli as 
affecting behavior in two ways: 1) directly, when the group 
rewards or punishes an individual, and 2) indirectly, when 
the individual's informational or effective state is 
modified. 
Group norms often act to· influence decision making 
rules for individuals within the group. As Hackman (1976) 
has noted, conveying information to others in the group is 
one of the main reasons for forming group norms. These norms 
allow new entrants into the organization to quickly make 
decisions based on the cumulative experience of the group. 
In addition to contributing to the idea of the 
inducements-contributions contract, Simon (1976) has also 
pointed out that individuals often behave in ways 
inconsistent with maximizing self-interest. In Simon's words 
individuals do not "have the wits to maximize". Instead, 
they adopt decision making strategies that lead to 
satisfactory outcomes, rather than optimal outcomes. This 
"satisficing" behavior leads individuals to choose heuristic 
rules for making otherwise complex decisions. Tversky and 
Kahneman (1984) have done extensive research on decision 
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making heuristics and biases. other authors have shown how 
various biases could have developed in real-world settings. 
Social Motives 
Individuals are often faced with situations where self-
interest conflicts with collective or group interests. When 
this occurs, a social dilemma is said to exist (Dawes 1980). 
In 1968, Hardin wrote his classic essay "The Tragedy of the 
Commons", outlining how problems such as overpopulation and 
pollution could be understood as social dilemmas (Hardin, 
1968). Hardin's essay and the emerging societal concern over 
social problems have led to a heightened interest in finding 
solutions to these social dilemmas. 
Prisoner's Dilemma. Game theorists have dealt 
extensively with social dilemmas (Hamburger, 1978). The most 
famous of these, the prisoner's dilemma, has been used to 
model a number of social problems. The prisoner's dilemma 
has been the subject of a tremendous amount of both 
theoretical and experimental work (Rappaport and Chammah, 
1965). In the simplest form of the prisoner's dilemma, two 
individuals are envisioned to have a choice between 
behaviors labeled as "cooperation" and "defection". A 
typical payoff matrix is shown in Figure 4. 
In this game, each player has a dominating strategy of 
defection, such that regardless of the strategy chosen by 
one player, the other player receives a higher payoff from 
the choice to defect. The prisoner's dilemma has the 
Player 2 
c D 
12 18 
c 
12 0 
Player 1 
0 6 
D 
18 6 
Figure 4. Payoff matrix for a 2-person prisoner's 
dilemma game. 
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property that when both players choose their dominant 
strategy, they each receive a lesser payoff than they would 
by mutually agreeing to cooperate. The prisoner's dilemma 
has the paradoxical result that the individually rational 
choice is collectively irrational. 
Hundreds of experiments have been conducted to 
determine whether individuals will choose to behave in 
accordance with individual or collective rationality when 
confronted by the prisoner's dilemma. In these experiments 
game theory is being used for predictive purposes. The 
results have been highly variable (Rappaport and Chammah, 
1965). In some experiments, the results are consistent with 
individual rationality, while in others collectively 
rational behavior is observed. Attempts to explain why 
individuals choose either defection or cooperation have 
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looked at a number of factors, including group size, sex of 
player, number of players, type of rewards, size of rewards 
and initial instructions. 
Pruitt (1968 and 1970) has published data showing that 
individuals alter their level of cooperation depending upon 
how the payoff matrix is presented to the group. Pruitt 
decomposed the payoff matrix shown in Figure 4 into a series 
of payoff tables that separate the payoffs under the 
player's own control from those controlled by the actions of 
the other player. Figure 5 shows three decompositions of one 
prisoner's dilemma game. 
own other own other 
Figure 5. Three decompositions of a 2-person 
prisoner's dilemma game. 
own other 
Each of these three decompositions can be generated 
from the payoff matrix shown in Figure 4. Pruitt observed 
that when subjects were presented with the three 
decompositions, differing levels of cooperation were 
observed for each. Pruitt suggested that these differences 
might be due to psychological reactions to the 
decompositions into payoffs under one's own control and 
those controlled by the other player. 
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Social Motives. Messick and McClintock (1968) proposed 
that individuals are motivated by social motives beyond 
maximizing payoffs to self (Individual motive), such as 
maximizing joint payoffs (Collective motive) or maximizing 
relative differences between self and other's payoffs 
(Competitive motive). They proposed that social motives 
could be investigated by examining social dilemma games 
where the values of various payoffs cause one or more 
motives to be preferred. Based on these three social 
motives, Messick and McClintock identified six classes of 
games. The six classes differ in what social motives would 
be satisfied by choosing alternative actions 
(e.g. cooperation or defection). Games from these classes 
were used to determine whether differences in the choices 
made by individuals could be attributed to preferences for 
certain social motives. Their empirical results support the 
proposition that individuals are influenced by social as 
well as individual motives. 
McClintock, Messick, Kuhlman and Campos (1974) 
continued this work on social motives and found that the 
likelihood of an action being chosen increased as the number 
of social motives satisfied by that action increased. These 
authors considered the three motives presented in the 
earlier work by Messick and McClintock (1968) plus the added 
motive of aggression (i.e. minimizing payoffs to others). 
The presence of social motives was confirmed in a study 
by Liebrand and van Run (1985). These authors used two 
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methods to determine the social motives of individuals from 
groups of students in the United States and the Netherlands. 
They considered four motives: 1) altruistic (maximize 
other's payoffs), 2) cooperative (maximize joint payoffs), 
3) individualistic (maximize own payoffs), and 
4) competitive (maximize difference between own and other's 
payoffs). After determining the dominant social motives of 
individuals, the individuals were formed into groups (n=S) 
to participate in a simulated social dilemma game that 
allowed individuals to take resources from a common pool. In 
the simulation, taking resources from the pool helped 
individuals in the short run, but led to long-term resource 
problems for the group. As expected, individuals with 
competitive and individualistic motives took more resources 
than individuals with cooperative motives. Individuals with 
altruistic motives took the least amount of resources. 
Maccrimmon and Messick (1976) proposed a framework for 
social motives to aid in understanding social behaviors and 
their impacts on social systems. They identify six basic 
social motives: 1) self-interest, 2) self-sacrifice, 
3) altruism, 4) aggression, 5) cooperation, and 
6) competition. These six motives can be converted into 
mathematical operators of summations and differences of 
payoffs found in the matrix representation of a social 
dilemma game. They go on to suggest that other more complex 
motives, such as conditional motives based on score feedback 
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or other external cues, may be useful in developing a better 
understanding of social motives. 
The work on social motives by the authors discussed 
above has centered on using social dilemma games to verify 
the presence of differing social motives in individuals. The 
games used by these authors were selected for their ability 
to force choices between various social motives. This 
literature differs from the work done in this study in 
several important ways. First, this study is based on a 
specific topic area, organizational inducements. Second, 
this study attempts to find games (inducement systems) which 
promote a single behavior (cooperation) over as wide a range 
of social motives as possible. Finally, the study expands 
the work on social motives by considering how social motives 
might evolve in response to a specific inducement system. 
Evolution of Behavior 
The conflict between individual and collective 
rationality inherent in the prisoner's dilemma undermines 
the belief that the greatest common good will be achieved 
when individuals pursue their self-interest. As a result, 
there have been a number of attempts to find a way to 
overcome this paradox (Shubik, 1970: Rappaport, 1967). These 
attempts often involve a restructuring of the game, such as 
allowing for communications between the parties 
(Schelling, 1963). Hardin (1968) took a more pessimistic 
view, concluding that the only stable solution lies in 
"mutual coercion - mutually agreed upon". 
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The approaches listed above rely upon the addition of 
features not originally included in game theory. Game 
theorists have attempted to resolve the paradox in a 
different manner by considering the game to be one with 
multiple plays (iterative) rat~er than involving·only·a 
single play (Shubik, 1970; Hamilton and Axelrod, 1981). This 
approach allows for conditional strategies based on the 
strategies used by other players in earlier rounds. The 
attempt here is to resolve the paradox by finding a 
conditional strategy where cooperation becomes both 
individually and collectively rational. 
Analyses of this type have shown that in cases where 
the game is of an indeterminate number of plays and where 
the probability of playing an additional round exceeds a 
threshold value (based on the payoffs for cooperation and 
defection), then strategies other than defection are 
rational. The most famous of these strategies is 
tit-for-tat. 
Altruism and Kinship. The approach used to find a 
rational basis for cooperation in the prisoner's dilemma 
follows the approach used by theoretical biologists to 
explain symbiotic and altruistic relationships in nature. 
Hamilton (1964), Trivers (1971) and Maynard-Smith (1982) 
have made extensive use of game theory in developing a 
theory of behavioral evolution. 
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Hamilton (1964) has used game theory to show how 
altruistic behavior on behalf of an individual with a close 
kinship relation could increase the altruist's Darwinian 
fitness - the frequency of one's own genes in the gene pool. 
Hamilton showed that even though the altruistic act may 
reduce the altruist's chance of survival, it can increase 
the likelihood that his genes are passed along through the 
genes of the close kin who benefited from the altruistic 
behavior. 
The strength of Hamilton's theory has been demonstrated 
by its ability to provide an explanation for the evolution 
of social insects. With the exception of termites, all 
social insects from the order Hymenoptera share the common 
reproductive trait that females are diploid (two sets of 
chromosomes) and males are haploid (one set of chromosomes). 
Because of this trait, females are more closely related to 
their sisters than to their daughters. As a result, females 
can best pass on their genetic material by helping in the 
rearing of sisters rather than by raising their own 
daughters. Using these kinship relations, Hamilton was 
successful in providing an explanation for the reproductive 
division of labor in social insects. 
Trivers (1971) extended this approach to include 
reciprocal altruism not based on kinship relations. 
Reciprocal altruism can occur between individuals of the 
same species or between individuals from different species. 
Trivers showed that where individuals come into contact 
frequently enough to allow for multiple opportunities to 
reciprocate altruistic acts on behalf of one another, then 
altruism would increase an individual's Darwinian fitness. 
Trivers has used this approach to explain cleaning 
symbioses in certain species of fish and warning calls in 
birds. Trivers has also proposed an explanation of 
reciprocal altruism in humans. He includes the following 
types of behavior as examples of reciprocal altruism: 
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1) helping in times of danger; 2) sharing food: 3) helping 
the sick, wounded, or very old or very young: 4) sharing 
implements, and 5) sharing knowledge. Trivers finds that 
altruistic behavior generally involves a small cost to the 
giver when compared to the benefit to the beneficiary. 
Altruistic behavior becomes advantageous when there is a 
sufficient probability that the act will be reciprocated in 
the future. 
Trivers goes on to suggest that individuals have a 
tendency towards both altruism and cheating (i.e. not 
reciprocating altruism in the future). Individuals can 
increase reproductive success if they find ways to cheat 
while others engage in reciprocal altruism. Trivers proposes 
that individuals have evolved complex psychological systems 
to uncover and punish cheaters and to identify and reward 
altruists. Elements of the psychological system could 
include friendship, guilt, reparative altruism, moralistic 
aggression, gratitude and sympathy. 
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Maynard-Smith (1978) has made extensive use of game 
theory to explain the evolution of behavior in a wide range 
of species (slime mold to humans). He has developed and made 
extensive use of the concept of an evolutionarily stable 
strategy. Simply stated, an evolutionarily stable strategy 
(ESS) is a strategy with the property that when it is 
adopted by an entire population, it can resist invasion by 
any other mutant strategy. The concept of the ESS is linked 
to the biologist notion of Darwinian fitness. Using the 
concept of the ESS, biologists can make use of principles 
from evolution to describe genetically-based behaviors. 
The approach of the theoretical biologists to the 
evolution of cooperative and altruistic behaviors has 
typically taken a "gene's eye" view. Social behaviors are 
attributed to a genetically determined predisposition for 
the behavior. In most cases, a genetic basis for behavior is 
assumed without any identification of the actual genes or 
mechanisms involved. More recent work has drawn a 
distinction between genetically-based behaviors and those 
based on learning or culture. Much of the controversy 
surrounding sociobiology hinges on the question of genetic 
versus cultural factors in the development of human 
behaviors (Barlow and Silverberg, 1980). 
Learned Behaviors. Dawkins (1976) breaks with most 
biologists by treating cultural evolution as a separate 
phenomena from genetic evolution. Dawkins coins the term 
"memes" to refer to artifacts in the cultural world that are 
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similar to genes in their ability to grow in use through 
replication, fecundity and copying fidelity. While Dawkins 
sees cultural and genetic evolution in analogous terms, he 
does not attempt to provide a genetic basis for cultural 
evolution. In a similar vein, Boulding (1982) distinguishes 
between the sl~w process of genetic evolution and the rapid 
evolution of culture over the past few thousand years. 
In recent years, some theoretical biologists have 
extended evolutionary game theory to cover learning 
processes. These learning processes influence how culturally 
based behaviors are adopted and modified. Harley (1981) and 
Maynard-Smith (1984) postulate that individuals have rules 
for learning new behaviors. These learning rules are thought 
to be influenced by genetic factors such that natural 
selection would lead to an evolutionarily stable learning 
rule. An evolutionarily stable learning rule is a rule for 
learning the ESS in a single generation. Harley showed that 
a learning rule (relative payoff sum) that based its 
selection of strategies on the payoffs from earlier trials 
would be an evolutionarily stable learning rule. The 
relative payoff sum learning rule chooses the strategy it 
will use at each trial based on the relative payoff sums of 
each strategy. It is a stochastic rule in that individuals 
continue to play all strategies with a frequency based on 
their cumulative payoffs from each strategy. Prior payoffs 
are discounted using a memory retention factor. 
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Dawkins (1980) suggests that the concept of the ESS can 
be extended cover learned behaviors. He labels such a 
strategy as a Developmentally stable Strategy (DSS). A DSS 
is a learned behavior that can resist being replaced by 
another behavior based on its increased fitness to the 
individual during his lifetime. 
Axelrod (1984) used a similar approach to investigate 
the evolution of cooperation in an iterated prisoner's 
dilemma game. Axelrod solicited strategies from game 
theorists, economists and others. These strategies were 
entered into a computer based tournament where each strategy 
initially has equal numbers (population) of individuals 
playing that strategy. Individuals were allowed to interact 
with each other on a random basis. Each individual was able 
to recognize each of the other players and had a complete 
history of all prior encounters with each player. At the end 
of each round of the tournament, the population of each 
strategy was adjusted based upon the relative payoffs during 
that round. The simulation was ran until the proportion of 
the population represented by each strategy reached an 
equilibrium. 
Using the computer simulation, Axelrod was able to 
demonstrate the robustness of tit-for-tat (and some other 
strategies) when confronted by a wide range of competing 
strategies. While Axelrod's computer simulation does not 
indicate which strategies are evolutionarily stable, the 
simulation does show what proportion of the final population 
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each strategy would represent. These equilibrium populations 
are important in understanding the overall behavior (i.e. 
cooperation or defection) of the population. 
CHAPTER III 
METHODS 
Game Theory 
The methods used in this study are based on the 
mathematical theory of strategic games developed by Von 
Neumann and Morgenstern (1944). Better known as game theory, 
this branch of mathematics deals with decision making 
situations involving multiple players, where the outcomes 
from each player's choice are influenced by the choices made 
by other players. Game theory has been widely applied in 
economics and other disciplines where agents must make 
choices involving payoffs which depend on the choices of 
others as well as their own. 
The word "game" carries many connotations - football, 
chess, tic-tac-toe, etc. The games dealt with by game theory 
are formal games. They are models of situations, such as the 
nuclear arms race, which may seem to have little in common 
with the games mentioned above. The games dealt with by game 
theory have five basic elements: 1) players, 2) choices, 
3) outcomes, 4) preferences, and 5) strategies. These 
elements define a game within the mathematical framework 
required by game theory. Luce and Raiffa (1957) provide a 
good introduction to the general approach and methods of 
game theory. 
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Players. To be a game, the situation being modeled must 
have multiple players. Players are usually viewed as 
cognitive actors, such as individuals, groups or nations. 
However, game theory can also consider non-cognitive 
entities, such as lower organisms or nature treated as an 
agent. In this study, individuals who are employees of a 
business organization will be of primary interest. 
Much of game theory deals with games involving two 
players, so-called 2-person games. These games are useful 
because they are less complex than games involving multiple 
players where the number of choice combinations which must 
be considered quickly becomes unmanageable. These 2-person 
games are also useful because they can be represented by 
2-dimensional payoff matrices showing the outcomes of each 
combination of choices made by the two players. This study 
uses 2-person games to develop a model of organizational 
inducements in a easily understood and manageable framework. 
A 10-person model is used to present the majority of 
the results from this study. The 10-person model is used for 
two reasons: 1) to show how a larger group size influences 
the results, and 2) to illustrate the method of analysis 
which can be used in the general n-person case. 
Additionally, several of the important results from the 
study are generalized to the n-person case. 
Choices. The second element of a game is the presence 
of choices. Each choice represents an alternative course of 
action on the part of a player. These choices are usually 
~--
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thought of as being made based on principles of rationality. 
However, it is often useful to consider choices made on 
other bases. 
This study examines the choices an individual makes 
about the level of contributions he will make towards the 
goals of the organization. Two levels of contributions are 
considered. The first level represents the minimum level of 
contributions which an individual must make in order to 
maintain membership in the organization. In a business 
organization, this is the minimum level of contributions 
expected of an employee. Failure to provide this level of 
contribution would be reason for termination. Using a common 
label from game theory, this level of contributions is 
referred to as "defection". The defection involves the 
withholding of discretionary contributions above the 
minimum. 
The second level of contributions being considered 
represents a specified level of contributions over the 
minimum. This higher level of contributions might take the 
form of a fixed number of sales, performance against 
established standards, or meeting a budget target. It might 
be easily achieved or might require major effort on the part 
of the individual. This level of discretionary contributions 
is referred to as "cooperation". 
In this study the labels of "defection" and 
"cooperation" are used to describe choices in terms of their 
support for the goals of the organization. Cooperation with 
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the goals of the organization is different than cooperation 
with other individuals within the organization. In some 
cases it may be that cooperation between individuals would 
lead to defection from the goals of the organization. Union 
strikes are an example of cooperation between individuals 
which results in defection from the goals of the 
organization. 
These two levels of contributions are useful to 
consider because they can be used as the basis for providing 
individual rewards andjor punishments to players. Many 
modern compensation practices are based on paying 
individuals based on their level of contributions to the 
organization. Obviously, individuals in real organizations 
are faced with an almost infinite number of choices 
regarding their level of con~ributions. This study considers 
only two choices in the level of contributions. While other 
intermediate levels could be considered, the added 
complexity would detract from the presentation of key ideas 
and results. Nothing in the method, however, requires that 
only two level of contributions be considered. While 
somewhat more cumbersome, this method can be extended to 
multiple levels of cooperation. 
Outcomes. The third element of a game is the set of 
outcomes that occur for each player as a result of his 
choice and the choices made by the other players. The 
outcomes or payoffs can take many forms, such as 
termination, money, effort expended, or promotion. In this 
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study, the outcomes are considered to result from the choice 
by players to defect or cooperate. Outcomes may include a 
negative component and a positive component. These two 
components are: 1) the added effort required to achieve the 
level of contributions labeled as cooperation (negative), 
and 2) the payoffs that the individual receives from the 
organization based on his or her level of contributions 
(positive). These payoffs (inducements) are assumed to take 
the form of extrinsic payments and are represented in terms 
of a utility scale. Organizations typically make use of a 
wide variety of extrinsic inducements. In addition to pay 
and benefits, organizations use recognition, noncash awards, 
perquisites and employee discipline. The relation between an 
individual's payoffs and his contributions is assumed to be 
defined by the organization's inducement system. 
Preferences. The fourth element of a game is the set of 
preferences for each of the players. Players will value 
certain outcomes over others. In game theory, outcomes are 
usually converted to an interval scale, where the least 
valued outcome has zero utility (measured in 11utiles") and 
the highest valued outcome has utility of one utile. 
The outcomes from cooperation includes not only the 
inducements which the player receives from the organization, 
but also the effort associated with the higher level of 
contributions defined as cooperation. This added effort must 
be treated as a disutility or cost to the player. 
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Lotteries are typically used to determine the utility 
of a range of outcomes (Rubinstein, 1975). In this study, a 
common utility scale is assumed for both inducements and 
contributions. This allows the utility of inducements to be 
compared with the disutility of effort. The disutility of 
the effort required to contribute at the level defined as 
cooperation is assigned a value of minus one (-1.0) utiles. 
The utilities of various inducements are then established in 
terms of this interval scale. This allows for the utilities 
of inducements and contributions to be combined into a 
single payoff function. In testing the results of this 
study, researchers will need to use a common measurement 
scale for determining the utilities of contributions and 
inducements. care will also need to be taken to avoid 
scaling problems (i.e. insignificant rewards, nonlinear 
utility functions, etc.). 
This study treats each of the individuals in a given 
game as having identical preferences and choices. This 
assumption allows for considerable simplification of the 
analysis by converting the game to a uniform n-person game. 
In real organizations, individuals vary in their skills and 
the effort needed to accomplish differing tasks. The values 
they place on their contributions and the inducements they 
receive also vary. 
This assumption is not as limiting as it may seem. 
Motivation is an individual process operating within the 
person (Mitchell, 1982). The model of motivation developed 
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in this study allows individuals to make choices based on 
their expectations of how others will behave. The model 
assumes that the individual's expectations about what is 
rational for others are consistent with what he considers to 
be rational for himself. While individuals within a group 
may have differing preferences, an individual may well make 
choices based on the belief that others have similar 
preferences. This "like me" bias is one that is often 
encountered in the real world. It is a useful heuristic bias 
when other information is not available. However, where 
individuals have detailed knowledge about the preferences of 
others, a more expansive analysis would be needed. The 
complexities involved in including multiple players with 
different motives goes beyond the scope of this study. 
strategies. The final element of a game is its set of 
strategies. Individuals often make their choices based on a 
specified strategy. A strategy is a decision rule for 
choosing between alternative actions. Individuals need not 
be conscious of their strategies. Strategies can be habitual 
patterns of behavior based on genetic factors. They may also 
change in response to reinforcement or learning. 
Strategies may be pure (e.g. always defect) or mixed 
(e.g. defect 60% and cooperate 40%). They may also be 
conditional strategies, such as defect if the majority 
cooperated on their last play. The social motives being 
considered will generally result in a pure strategy for a 
given inducement system. In some cases, however, mixed 
strategies must also be considered. 
Inducement System Model 
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To apply game theory to the study of inducements, it is 
first necessary to build a model of the inducement systems 
being studied. The inducement system specifies the positive 
and negative inducements that individuals receive in 
exchange for their contributions to the organization. 
Inducements can be broken down into three components: 
1) base pay, 2) individual incentives, and 3) group 
incentives. In developing this model of inducement systems, 
a number of symbols will be used. Table I shows a list of 
symbols used in this study. 
Base pay is that portion of an individual's 
compensation which is independent of both the individual's 
level of contributions and the contributions made by others 
in the organization. Base pay is of limited interest in this 
study because it is not linked to the individual's choices 
about his level of contributions or to the choices of 
others. Base pay becomes important when the individuals 
assess whether their total compensation is satisfactory. For 
the purposes of this study, it will be assumed that total 
compensation is perceived as satisfactory when it is set at 
the market rate for the position. In the real world, 
individuals might expect to be compensated above market if 
Symbol 
c 
d 
n 
r 
p 
g 
C(c) 
D(c) 
i or j 
k 
f(i,k) 
EPC(i,k) 
EPD(i,k) 
b(i,k) 
PC(i,k) 
PD(i,k) 
P(i,k) 
TABLE I 
LIST OF SYMBOLS 
Definition 
# of cooperators 
# of defectors 
group size (n=c+d) 
reward factor 
penalty factor 
group incentive factor 
payoff function for cooperation 
payoff function for defection 
subscript for social motives 
# of rounds in simulation model 
frequency of motive i in round k 
expected payoff for cooperation for 
motive i in round k 
expected payoff for defection for 
motive i in round k 
behavior of motive i in round k 
actual payoff for cooperation for 
motive i in round k 
actual payoff for defection for 
motive i in round k 
maximum possible payoff for 
motive i 
minimum possible payoff for 
motive i 
relative payoff for motive i in 
round k 
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the firm is notably successful. Conversely, individuals 
from a failing company might expect less compensation. 
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The second component of inducements is individual 
incentives. These incentives can be either positive 
(rewards) or negative (penalties). Many modern compensation 
systems for nonunion employees make use of some form of 
individual incentives for employees (O'Dell, 1987). Lawler 
(1983) and others have proposed that an individual's pay be 
based on his level of performance (i.e. contributions). 
Lawler has been active in recommending "pay for performance" 
as the basis of inducement systems for business. A recent 
survey (O'Dell, 1987) showed that 28% of Arnerican firms use 
some form of individual incentives. Under many individual 
incentive plans, the incentive is linked to a specified 
level of contributions. Piece rates and sales commissions 
are examples of this type of incentive. 
In this study, the term "absolute11 is used to refer to 
individual incentive systems that tie rewards and/or 
penalties to a specified level of contributions. Absolute 
rewards are positive incentives given to individuals who 
contribute at the level defined as cooperation. The size of 
the reward is determined by the reward factor (r) which 
gives the value of the reward relative to the cost of the 
added effort associated with cooperation. Absolute penalties 
are negative incentives assessed against individuals who 
contribute at the level of contributions defined as 
defection. The size of the penalty is determined by the 
penalty factor (p), which gives the value of the penalty 
relative to the cost of the added effort associated with 
cooperation. 
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A second form of individual incentives are those that 
are based on the individual's performance relative to others 
in the organization. Unlike absolute incentives, the payoffs 
from competitive incentives depends on the level of 
contributions of others. As an example, sales organizations 
sometimes pay bonuses to individual sales representatives 
who sell more than their peers. The term "competitive" is 
used in this study to refer to incentive systems that link 
individual rewards and penalties to the relative 
contributions of other individuals. While intra-
organizational competition is common, it is not generally a 
formal part of the inducement system (except in sales 
organizations). Individuals compete for recognition, job 
assignments, promotions and other perquisites. Even in 
organizations where absolute incentives are used, the 
expected level of contributions is influenced by 
competition. Where competitive incentives are a formal part 
of the inducement system, they often take the form of 
special cash and noncash incentives or recognition rewards. 
Sales organizations sometimes use sales contests to 
create internal competition between sales representatives. 
These contests can be based on achieving quotas, competing 
against others, team competition or improving on past 
performance. A recent report on sales incentives (Colletti, 
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1988) indicated that while quotas were the most popular 
basis of competition, the second most common basis was 
competing against others. The report notes that this 
preference for quotas (versus competing against others) may 
be due to the increasing need for cooperation between sales 
representatives across product lines. 
competitive rewards can be formulated in a number of 
different ways. Because they are infrequently used and often 
only included as an informal part of the inducement system 
or as special incentive/recognition programs, there is 
little in the literature on the design of competitive 
incentives. In many cases, managerial discretion plays a 
major role in how competitive incentives are distributed -
with regard to both size and frequency. O'Dell (1987) 
indicates that the majority of recognition awards typically 
go to only 5% of the population. 
The payoff formulas developed for this study base the 
size of competitive rewards and penalties on the difference 
between the discretionary contributions of the individual 
and the average level of discretionary contributions by the 
group. When only a few cooperate the reward is large, while 
when many cooperate the reward is small. Conversely, when 
only a few defect the penalty is large, while when many 
defect the penalty is small. The reward to each cooperator 
is defined as r(1-(cjn)) and the penalty to each defector is 
defined as p(O-(c/n)) or -p(c/n); where: 
r = reward factor 
p = penalty factor 
c = # of cooperators 
d = # of defectors 
n = # of individuals in group (n=c+d) 
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While other formulations are possible, this formulation 
has the common sense feature that the size of the reward 
(or penalty) increases as the difference between the level 
of contributions by the individual and the level of 
contributions by the group increases. Additionally, these 
formulas are easily analyzed because of their simple form 
and because they yield payoff functions that vary linearly 
with the number of cooperators. 
The third component of inducements is group incentives. 
These are incentives that are paid to each individual based 
on the overall performance of the group or organization. 
Unlike individual incentives, each individual receives the 
group incentive regardless of his contributions to the 
group's performance. A number of group incentives have been 
used in business organizations - profit sharing, Scanlon 
Plan, Rucker Plan, Improshare and others. While the 
administrative details of these plans differ, they each make 
incentive payments based on the overall performance of the 
group. 
In this study, the aggregate level of contributions 
(number of cooperators) is used as a surrogate for group 
performance. The size of the group incentive increases with 
the number of cooperators and the size of the group 
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incentive factor (g). Each individual in the group receives 
a group incentive equal to g(c/n), where: 
g = group incentive factor 
c = # of cooperators 
n = # of individual in group 
Like the reward and penalty factors, the group 
incentive factor is given relative to the cost of the added 
effort associated with individual cooperation. When g equals 
one (g=l.O) and each individual in the group cooperates 
(c=n), the group incentive payment to each individual just 
offsets the cost of contributing the added effort. 
Inducement systems make use of base pay, individual 
incentives and group incentives in differing combinations. 
Ignoring base pay for the moment, we can identify two types 
of inducement systems 1) inducement systems based on 
absolute individual incentives and 2) inducement systems 
based on competitive individual incentives. These two types 
of inducement systems may or may not include group 
incentives. Within each of these types of inducement 
systems, we can classify inducement systems based on whether 
they make use of rewards, penalties or both. This results in 
six classes of inducement systems as shown is Table II. 
Included in Table II are the formulas for the payoffs 
to cooperators and defectors for each of the six classes of 
inducement systems. Group incentives are included in the 
formulas, but can be removed by setting the group incentive 
factor (g) equal to zero. An infinite number of inducement 
TABLE II 
CLASSES OF INDUCEMENT SYSTEMS 
Classes Formula 
Absolute 
Rewards C(c) = g(c/n)+r 
D(c) = g(c/n) 
Penalties C(c) = g(c/n) 
D(c) = g(c/n)-p 
Both C(c) = g(c/n)+r 
D(c) = g(c/n)-p 
Competitive 
Rewards C(c) = g(c/n)+r(l-c/n) 
D(c) = g(c/n) 
Penalties C(c) = g(c/n) 
D(c) = g(c/n)-p(c/n) 
Both C(c) = g(c/n)+r(l-c/n) 
D(c) = g(c/n)-p(c/n) 
C(c) = Payoff Function for Cooperators 
D(c) = Payoff Function for Defectors 
Note: The above formulas show inducements only and 
the total payoffs for cooperators must be 
decreased to reflect the cost of contributions. 
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systems can be defined for each of the six general types by 
varying the values of r,p and g. These six classes of 
inducement systems have two main variables, 1) individual 
incentives (rand/or p), and 2) group incentives (g). These 
two variables will form the axes for mapping the analytical 
results of each class of inducement systems. 
Figure 6 shows the payoff functions for an inducement 
system using absolute rewards (r=1.2) and group incentives 
(g=l.l) and a group size of ten (n=lO). Figure 7 shows the 
same data, but in the format normally used in game theory. 
In Figure 7, the two lines have been shifted to illustrate 
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Figure 6. Payoffs for absolute rewards 
(r=l.2, g=l.l). 
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Figure 7. Payoffs for absolute rewards using game 
theory format (r=1.2, g=1.1). 
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the payoffs one would receive from changing strategies. To 
show how Figure 7 is used, suppose that a player is one of c 
cooperators. This player can continue to cooperate or choose 
to become a defector. Changing from cooperation to defection 
increases the number of defectors from d to d+1. The 
question in the player's mind is, therefore, whether he 
would receive a better payoff as one of d+1 defectors or as 
one of c cooperators. The format used in Figure 7 allows for 
a quick comparison between these two payoffs. By making this 
comparison for each possible outcome (i.e. c=1 to c=n), this 
format can be used to see if one strategy dominates the 
other. If the two payoff curves do not cross, then the upper 
curve is a dominating strategy. 
Social Motive Formulation 
The model of inducement systems developed above 
specifies the players, choices and outcomes based on the 
class of inducement system and the values of the incentive 
parameters r, p and g. Because the outcomes have been 
converted to a utility scale, preferences could normally be 
ignored assuming that individuals would prefer their maximum 
outcome. In this study, however, we consider the possibility 
that individuals will make choices reflecting social motives 
which go beyond self-maximization. 
Two interpretations of social motives occur in the 
literature. The first, from the social-psychology literature 
(Messick and McClintock, 1968), considers these motives to 
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reflect genuine preferences for various social outcomes. 
Viewed in this way, outcomes which satisfy the social 
motive(s) of the individual are preferred. The second 
interpretation of social motives comes from the literature 
on evolutionary game theory (Trivers, 1964). Social motives 
are treated as strategies for optimizing outcomes (i.e. as 
strategies whose "real" purpose is still self-maximization). 
These strategies have varying success in gaining outcomes 
that increase the fitness of the individual. In this study, 
both of these interpretations are considered. 
Six social motives are considered in this study 
1) Individual, 2) Collective, 3) Competitive, 4) Altruism, 
5) Equity, and 6) Aggression. These motives are taken from 
the social-psychology literature (Maccrimmon and Messick 
1976). Figure 8 depicts these motives in terms of the 
relationship between payoffs to self and payoffs to others. 
To apply game theoretic methods to these motives, it is 
necessary to reformulate the payoffs for these motives in 
terms of the payoffs which resulted from the model of 
inducement systems developed earlier. 
The Individual motive is based on a preference for 
maximizing the payoff to self. The Individual motive is 
typically the only motive considered by game theory. This 
motive is sometimes referred to as "self-maximization". This 
motive serves as the basis for most models of "economic man" 
and is consistent with the approach of expectancy theory. 
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Figure 8. Graphical representation of social motives. 
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The payoff formulas developed in the previous section 
(see Table II) for the six classes of inducement systems are 
given in terms of their utility to the individual. As such, 
they are also the correct formulas for the Individual 
motive. These payoffs for the Individual motive can also be 
used as the basis for defining the payoffs for the other 
social motives. Table III gives the relationship between the 
payoffs from the Individual motive and the other social 
motives. These formulations are equivalent to those used by 
MacCrimmon and Messick (1976). 
TABLE III 
MATHEMATICAL REPRESENTATION OF SOCIAL MOTIVES 
Social Motive 
Individual 
Collective 
Competitive 
Altruism 
Equity 
Aggression 
Formula 
Cindiv. = C 0 Indiv. = D 
Ccoll. = (cC+dD)/n 
Dcoll. = (cC+dD)/n 
Ccomp. = c-((c-1)C+dD)/(n-1) 
Dcomp. = D-(cC+(d-1)D)/(n-1) 
CAltru. = ((c-1)C+dD)/(n-1) 
DAltru. = (cC+(d-1)D)/(n-1) 
CEquity = -ABS(C-((c-1)C+dD))/(n-1) 
DEquity = -ABS(D-(cC+(d-1)0))/(n-1) 
CAggr. = -((c-1)C+dD)/(n-1) 
DAggr. = -(cC+(d-1)D)/(n-1) 
Note: The argument has been dropped from the 
payoff functions for cooperation (C(c)=C) and 
defection (D(c)=D). 
65 
The preference reflected in the Collective motive is 
the maximization of the overall outcome for the group. This 
is accomplished by maximizing the joint (or collective) 
payoffs to the individuals in the group. 
The Competitive motive reflects a preference for doing 
better than others in the group. The size of the monetary 
payoff is unimportant, so long as one does better than 
others. This motive can be characterized as maximizing-the 
difference between the individual's payoff and the average 
payoff to other players. 
The Altruism motive is based on the preference of 
increasing the welfare of others. This motive attempts to 
maximize the payoffs to others, while disregarding payoffs 
to self. While similar to the Collective motive, there are 
important differences between these two motives. In 
particular, the altruist will sacrifice his own interests if 
it benefits others. This self-sacrificial behavior becomes 
important when considering group incentives and competitive 
rewards and penalties. 
The preference reflected in the Eguity motive is 
equality of payoffs. The payoffs for this motive are based 
on minimizing the difference between the payoff to the 
individual and the average payoff to others. Both 
underpayment and overpayment are of concern in this motive. 
As a result, the mathematical representation of the Equity 
motive is based on the absolute value of the difference 
between payoffs to self and payoffs to others. Because game 
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theory usually deals with maximization (vs. minimization), 
the payoff formula shown in Table III includes a minus sign 
to convert the formula to an equation to be maximized. The 
Equity and Competitive motives are closely related, CEquity 
is equal to -ABS(Ccomp.> and DEquity is equal to 
-ABS(Dcomp.). 
The Aggression motive is based on the preference to 
have others achieve their worst outcome. As such, it is the 
opposite of the Altruism motive. It is represented by 
minimizing the average payoff to others. The minus sign 
included in the formula shown in Table III is used to 
convert the payoffs to an equation to be maximized. Except 
for this minus sign, the payoff functions for the Altruism 
and Aggression motives are identical. 
Analysis 
With the players, choices, outcomes and preferences 
defined, it is possible to apply the methods of game theory 
to the problem of strategic choice. Game theory makes its 
recommendations about what choices a player should make 
based on assumptions about how a rational individual would 
behave. These assumptions are often referred to as 
principles of rationality (Rubinstein, 1975). 
The first of these assumptions is that the other 
players are rational and that they make their choices based 
on the same principles of rationality. The second principle 
is the maximin criterion. This criterion states that each 
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player should make a choice that guarantees the player his 
maximin payoff. The maximin payoff is the maximum of the 
minimum payoffs a player can secure through his own action. 
Consider the payoff matrix shown in Figure 9. This payoff 
matrix shows the payoffs to player 1 only. Player 1 can 
choose action A or action B. By choosing action B, player 1 
can guarantee a payoff of 4 utiles. In contrast, choosing 
action A only secures a payoff of 2 utiles. Choosing B 
guarantees the maximum of the minimum possible payoffs. This 
is the maximin choice. 
Player 2 
A B 
A 2 9 
Player 1 
B 6 4 
Figure 9. Example of maximin strategy for a 2-
person game. 
The maximin criterion is one of the central assumptions 
of game theory. Other decision making criteria might be used 
in studying inducement systems (e.g. maximax, minimax, 
Laplace, minimum regret, etc.). These alternative decision 
making criteria are described by Rubinstein (1975). Because 
this study follows the approach of game theory, the maximin 
criterion is of primary importance. These other criterion, 
while of interest, are beyond the scope of this study. 
Using the maximin criterion it is possible to find the 
equilibrium solution for zero-sum games. In a zero-sum game, 
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the size of the total payoff is fixed, so that gains by one 
player come at the expense of other players. The games this 
study deals with are nonzero-sum games. Indeed, it is the 
possibility that individuals will share in the value created 
through their coordinated actions that causes individuals to 
join business organizations. For nonzero-sum games, some 
added principles are needed to find the maximin solution. 
To understand the additional principles of rationality used 
in this study, it is first necessary to define several 
concepts from game theory (see Raiffa and Luce, 1957). 
The first of these concepts is that of dominance. One 
strategy dominates another strategy if and only if the 
payoffs for using that strategy are no worse and in at least 
one case better than the payoffs for the other strategy, 
regardless of the choices made by the other players. In the 
inducement systems shown earlier in Figure 7, cooperation is 
a dominating strategy over defection. Regardless of the 
level of cooperation of others, an individual receives a 
higher payoff from cooperation than from defection. By 
contrast, there is no dominating strategy for the inducement 
system shown below in Figure 10. 
The second concept of importance is that of an 
equilibrium outcome. An equilibrium outcome is one where no 
player can unilaterally change his strategy without 
diminishing his own payoff, assuming that the other players 
maintain their strategy. In Figure 7, the equilibrium 
outcome occurs when all players use the dominating strategy 
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Figure 10. Example of inducement system with no 
dominating strategy. 
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(c=10). This is a boundary equilibrium, since all of the 
players adopt this strategy. Because there are no defectors 
left to move to the dominating strategy, no one can improve 
their payoff. In Figure 10, there are two boundary 
equilibria outcomes 1) all cooperators (c=lO), and 2) all 
defectors (d=lO). Note that for both of these equilibrium 
outcomes, no player can change his strategy without lowering 
his payoff. 
An equilibrium can be either Pareto optimal or 
deficient. An outcome is Pareto optimal if there is no other 
outcome where at least one player is better off and where no 
players are worse off. Conversely, a Pareto deficient 
outcome is one for which at least one other outcome exists 
which is better for at least one player and as good for all 
other players. The inducement system shown in Figure 7 has 
one equilibrium outcome (c=10) and that equilibrium is 
Pareto optimal. Figure 10 shows an inducement system that 
has both a deficient equilibrium (d=10) and a Pareto optimal 
equilibrium (c=10). 
The presence of an equilibrium does not ensure that the 
equilibrium is Pareto optimal. Figure 11 shows an inducement 
system that has a single deficient equilibrium (d=10). In 
this figure, defection is a dominating strategy and the 
equilibrium outcome occurs when all players defect. This 
equilibrium outcome is deficient because each player 
receives a higher payoff when all players cooperate (c=10). 
Figure 11 is an example of an 10-person prisoner's dilemma. 
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dominating strategy and a deficient equilibrium 
outcome. 
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Taxonomy of Games 
Rappaport and Guyer (1966) developed a taxonomy of 
2 X 2 games to describe the strategic features of these 
games. In building their taxonomy, they made use of an 
ordinal scale (versus interval scale) for defining payoffs. 
The use of an ordinal scale allowed them to build a concise, 
yet comprehensive taxonomy. However, the absence of an 
interval scale required that they abandon the concept of a 
mixed strategy. As a replacement, they developed the concept 
of the natural outcome to describe these games. In 
developing the concept of the natural outcome, several added 
principles of rationality were used by these authors. They 
are as follows: 
1) If a player has a dominating strategy, he will 
choose it. 
2) If only one player has a dominating strategy, then 
the other player will select the strategy that maximizes his 
outcome assuming that the other player chooses their 
dominating strategy. 
3) If the game has a single Pareto optimal equilibrium, 
then each player will choose the strategy that contains it. 
4) If a dominating strategy does not exist, and there 
is no Pareto equilibrium or more than one, then each player 
will choose the strategy that contains his maximin outcome. 
After defining the natural outcome, the above authors 
used the concept to develop a taxonomy of the 78 possible 
2 X 2 games. Of these 78 games, only the 12 symmetric games 
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are of relevance to this study. Figure 12 shows the types of 
games wbich are possible in this study and the category of 
game into which they fall. The natural outcome is always 
shown in the upper left corner of the payoff matrix. 
GAMES WITH DOMINATING STRATEGY 
No Conflict Games 
4,4 3,2 4,4 3,1 4,4 2,3 
2,3 1,1 1,3 2,2 3,2 1,1 
Single Pareto Equilibrium Games 
3,3 4,2 3,3 4,1 
2,4 1,1 1,4 2,2 
Single Deficient Equilibrium Game 
2,2 4,1 
1,4 3,3 
GAMES WITH NO DOMINATING STRATEGY 
No Conflict Games 
4,4 2,1 4,4 1,3 4,4 1,2 
1,2 3,3 3,1 2,2 2,1 3,3 
Two Equilibria Games with Non-equilibrium outcome 
3,3 2,4 2,2 3,4 2,2 4,3 
4,2 1,1 4,3 1,1 3,4 1,1 
Note: 4 = Best, 1 = Worst. 
Figure 12. Taxonomy of symmetric 2-person games 
(from Rappaport and Guyer 1966). 
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For the present study, the 12 general games types shown 
in Figure 12 result in 24 actual games - 12 where 
cooperation is the natural outcome and 12 where defection is 
the natural outcome. These games fall into the following 
categories (Rappaport and Guyer, 1966): 
1) pominating Strategy - No conflict. These are games 
where there is a dominating strategy that results in an 
equilibrium that yields the best outcome for all players. 
This equilibrium is absolutely stable. 
2) Dominating Strategy - Single Pareto Eguilibrium. 
These games have a dominating strategy that results in a 
single equilibrium which is Pareto optimal. Games in this 
category are extremely stable. 
3) Dominating Strategy - Single Deficient Eguilibrium. 
These are games where the dominating strategy results in an 
equilibrium which is a deficient outcome. The only game in 
the category is the prisoner's dilemma. Games in this 
category are strongly stable. 
4) No Dominating Strategy - No Conflict. These are 
games where there is no dominating strategy and there are 
two equilibria, one of which yields the best outcome to both 
players. These are no conflict games and the natural outcome 
for these games is absolutely stable. 
5) No pominating Strategy - Two Eguilibria Games with 
Non-eguilibrium outcome. These are games where there is no 
dominating strategy and where there are two Pareto 
equilibria, neither of which is the natural outcome. Games 
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in this category are unstable. The non-equilibrium outcome 
for these games may be either a pure strategy of a mixed 
strategy. In a mixed strategy, individuals ensure their 
maximin payoffs by varying their choice of action with a 
specified frequency. The optimum frequency for each action 
is dependent on the actual values of the payoffs (interval 
scale). 
Because Rappaport and Guyer (1966) use an ordinal 
scale, they are unable to determine which games have a mixed 
strategy. Instead, they use the maximin outcome (based on 
the outcomes from the pure strategies) to define the natural 
outcome for these games. This is a weakness in their 
classification scheme. They recognize the problem of the 
mixed strategy and appropriately label the natural outcome 
for such games as "unstable". 
For the purposes of this study, the classification 
scheme of Rappaport and Guyer (1966) must be modified to 
apply to uniform n-person games. These modifications are a 
part of the work done is this study. The modified game 
categories are shown below. 
1) Category I - Dominating Strategy - Single Pareto 
Equilibrium. These games have a dominating strategy that 
results in a single equilibrium which is Pareto optimal. 
Games in this category are extremely stable. 
This category includes the first two categories used 
above to describe symmetric 2-person games. These two 
categories are closely related; the only difference being 
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that for the no conflict games, the Pareto equilibrium 
results in the maximum possible payoff. Collapsing these 
categories also allows for a clearer presentation of 
results. Figure 13 shows four Category I games. Two of these 
games have linear payoff functions and two have nonlinear 
payoff functions. The games included examples of both 
cooperation and defection as the natural outcome. 
2) Category II - Dominating Strategy - Single Deficient 
Equilibrium. For this category, the dominating strategy 
results in an equilibrium which is a deficient outcome. The 
games in the category are the prisoner's dilemma games. 
Games in this category are strongly stable. Figure 14 shows 
four examples of Category II games. 
3) Category III - No Dominating Strategy - Pareto 
Equilibrium outcome. These are games where there is no 
dominating strategy and there are two boundary equilibria, 
one of which is Pareto optimal. Figure 15 shows four 
examples of category III games. Each of the Category III 
games shown in Figure 15 have an intersection point for the 
two payoff lines. Below the intersection point, defection is 
a dominating strategy with a boundary equilibrium at d=10. 
Above the intersection point, cooperation is a dominating 
strategy and there is a boundary equilibrium at c=10. 
While the natural outcome for these games is extremely 
stable, it is potentially less accessible in the n-person 
case than in the 2-person case. In 2-person games, an 
individual can unilaterally adopt the strategy containing 
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Figure 13. Examples of Categozy I games. 
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the Pareto optimal equilibrium. The other player is then 
faced with a choice of moving to the Pareto equilibrium or 
choosing an inferior outcome. This property makes the Pareto 
equilibrium very accessible in 2-person games. For n-person 
games, however, a coalition of individuals is generally 
needed to move the group from one equilibrium to the other. 
The change in accessibility of the natural outcome makes 
games in Category III less desirable in the n-person case 
(n>2) than in the 2-person case. 
For the inducement systems and social motives 
considered in this study, one of the boundary equilibria was 
always found to be Pareto optimal. While this is always the 
case for linear payoff functions, it is not necessarily the 
case for nonlinear payoff functions. For nonlinear payoff 
functions, it is possible that both boundary equilibria are 
deficient (i.e. there is a nonboundary outcome that is 
Pareto optimal). According to the decision making rules 
proposed by Rappaport and Guyer (1966), the individual would 
choose the strategy that contains the their maximin outcome. 
If interval scales were considered the maximin rule might 
lead to a mixed strategy for these games. While these games 
are not relevant to this study, they may occur in other 
analyses of n-person uniform games. These types of games can 
be treated as a new category - games with no dominating 
strategy and deficient boundary equilibria. 
4) Category IV - No Dominating Strategy -
Non-equilibrium outcome. These are games where there is no 
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dominating strategy and where there are multiple nonboundary 
equilibria, none of which is the natural outcome. Figure 16 
show four examples of games form this category. Like 
Category III games, there is an intersection point for the 
payoff functions. However, below the intersection point 
cooperation is a dominating strategy and above the 
intersection point defection is a dominating strategy. This 
creates an equilibrium outcome at the point of intersection. 
Because individuals can be either cooperators or defectors, 
there are multiple equilibria at the intersection point. 
Note that Rappaport and Guyer's use of an ordinal scale 
makes it impossible for them to determine whether the 
maximin solution involves a mixed strategy or a pure 
strategy for 2-person games from this category. Instead, 
they determine the natural outcome based on which pure 
strategy contains the maximin outcome. The maximin solution 
based on the outcomes from the pure strategies may be 
different than the maximin solution when mixed strategies 
are considered. Because the natural outcome for games in 
this category do not involve an equilibrium, these games are 
considered to be unstable. 
The four categories of games can be considered to form 
a hierarchy based on the stability and accessibility of the 
natural outcome. These properties influence the 
effectiveness of the game in reaching and maintaining the 
natural outcome. From a game theoretic perspective, 
Category I games are the most stable, since they have a 
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Figure 16. Examples of Categozy IV games. 
82 
n 
n 
83 
dominating strategy that leads to a Pareto optimal 
equilibrium. Reaching this equilibrium only requires that 
individuals pursue their self-interest. Therefore, for 
inducement systems where cooperation is the natural outcome, 
Category I games are preferred over the other categories of 
games because of their effectiveness in achieving the 
natural outcome. Conversely, Category I games are the least 
preferred when defection is the natural outcome. 
Category II games are second most preferred games, 
since they have a dominating strategy and the equilibrium is 
reached when individuals pursue the dominating strategy. The 
third most preferred games are Category III games. This 
category of games has two boundary equilibria, one of which 
is Pareto optimal. The difficulty with this category of 
games is that the presence of the second boundary equilibria 
may keep the system from reaching the natural outcome. For 
2-person games, the preferences for categories II & III 
would be reversed, since the Pareto equilibrium is readily 
accessible in the 2-person case. The least preferred 
category of games is Category IV. These games have a natural 
outcome that is not an equilibrium outcome. As a result 
there is always a temptation for individuals to defect from 
the natural outcome. 
Phase I Analysis 
In the first phase of analysis, the modified 
classification system shown above was used to map the 
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natural outcomes and game categories for the six classes of 
inducement systems previously developed. This phase of the 
analysis is based on the Individual motive. The values of 
the parameters r, p and g were used as inputs into the 
payoff formulas shown in Table II. The resulting payoffs 
define a specific game, which can be classified in terms of 
its natural outcome and game category. As an example, 
consider the inducement system with absolute rewards and 
group incentives and with the system parameters set at n=2, 
r=0.5, and g=1.2. Because the inducement systems dealt with 
in this study involve symmetric games, the payoffs for only 
one of the players need to be indicated to define the 
payoffs for all other players. The payoffs for player 1 from 
this inducement system are shown in Figure 17. 
Player 2 
C D 
c 0.7 0.1 
Player 1 
D 0.6 0 
Figure 17. Payoff matrix for a 2-person inducement 
system using absolute rewards (r=0.5, g=1.2). 
In this game, cooperation is a dominating strategy. The 
single equilibrium (c=2) is Pareto optimal and also gives 
each player his best outcome (0.7 utiles). This game falls 
within Category I - games with a dominating strategy and a 
single Pareto equilibrium. 
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By altering the values of r and g, it is possible to 
map the natural outcome and category of game over a range of 
values. This results in a graph showing the regions over 
which differing categories of games occur and whether 
cooperation or defection is the natural outcome. Figure 18 
shows such a mapping for 10-person inducement systems based 
on competitive rewards and penalties plus group incentives. 
This analysis was done for the same classes of inducement 
systems shown in Table II. A complete set of mapping for the 
10-person case for each of the six classes of inducement 
systems is shown in Appendix A. 
satisficing. Two variations to the Individual motive 
were also analyzed. These variations are based on the 
decision making theory of satisficing developed by Simon 
(1976). Under Simon's theory, individuals only search for 
alternative actions when their payoffs fall below a 
threshold (satisfactory) level. In this analysis, the 
threshold value is considered to be met when the value of 
inducements exceeds the value of contributions. 
Satisficing theory assumes that individuals do not 
search for a new behavior as long as their outcomes remain 
satisfactory. Because individuals begin as either 
cooperators or defectors, two variations must be considered 
1) initial cooperators, and 2) initial defectors. These two 
initial behaviors require separate analyses. After selecting 
the initial behavior, the analysis then determines whether 
cooperation or defection is the natural outcome. Note that 
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10.0 
Reward/ 
Penally 
Factor 
r=p 
5.0 
1.0 
0 
0 1.0 5.0 10.0 
Group Incentive Factor (g) 
Cooperate Natural Outcome Defect 
Dominating Strategy- Pareto Equilibrium (Category I) 
-Dominating Strategy- Deficient Equilibrium (Category II) 
-No Dominating Strategy- Pareto Equilibrium (Category III) -
No Dominating Strategy- Non-equilbrium (Category IV) 
Figure 18. Map of natural outcomes for the Individual motive 
based on competitive rewards and penalties. 
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the initial behavior and the natural outcome may be 
different. The "satisficer's" payoff for the inducement 
system being considered is then checked to see if it is 
positive (satisfactory) for the satisficer's initial 
behavior (cooperate or defect). If the payoff is positive, 
the satisficer's initial behavior continues. If the payoff 
is negative, the individual searches for a new behavior that 
improves his outcomes. This search is assumed to result in 
the individual changing his behavior to match the natural 
outcome. Because this study is interested in the question of 
how to promote cooperation, the focus of the satisficing 
analysis is on determining when satisficing theory would 
predict that individuals would depart from cooperation as 
the natural outcome. Regions where defection is the natural 
outcome are ignored in this portion of the analysis. 
The analysis of initial cooperators differs slightly 
from the analysis for initial defectors. In looking at 
cooperation as the initial behavior, the important question 
is whether cooperators receive a positive outcome from 
cooperation. The analysis assumes that all other individuals 
choose to cooperate when calculating whether c~operation 
results in a positive outcome. When looking at defection, 
however, the question is whether there is alltY possibility 
that a defector would receive a positive out:come when 
cooperation is the natural outcome. The ana.lysis, therefore, 
considers all possible levels of cooperation and defection 
to determine whether defectors could receive a positive 
outcome. 
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Figures 19 & 20 show the results of this analysis for 
inducement systems using competitive rewards and penalties. 
In Figure 19, the initial behavior is defection. The cross-
hatched area shows the inducement systems where defectors 
could receive a positive payoff, even though cooperation is 
the natural outcome. In Figure 20, the initial behavior is 
cooperation. The cross-hatched area shows the inducement 
systems where cooperation is the natural outcome and where 
cooperators receive a positive payoff. The complete set of 
results for the satisficing analysis is included in Appendix 
A. Two maps are included for each of the six classes of 
inducement systems based on cooperation and defection as the 
initial behaviors. 
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Figure 19. Map of saisficing behavior of initial defectors 
based on competitive rewards and penalties. 
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C88883 Satisficing Behavior based on initial cooperation/defection 
Figure 20. Map of satisficing behavior of initial cooperators 
based on competitive rewards and penalties. 
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Phase II Analysis 
The first phase of analysis was based on the payoff 
formulas from Table II. These payoffs are equivalent to the 
Individual motive (self-maximization). The second phase of 
analysis uses the same methods to analyze five additional 
social motives 1) Collective, 2) Competitive, 3) Altruism,_ 
4) Equity, and 5) Aggression. Table III gives the payoff 
formulas used to represent these motives. A typical set of 
results for the five motives are shown in Figures 21-25. 
These results are based on the use of competitive rewards 
and penalties and a 10-person group. Similar maps were 
developed for each of the six classes of inducement systems 
and the five social motives considered in phase II. The 
complete set of results for the second phase of analysis are 
shown in Appendix B • 
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0 1.0 5.0 10.0 
Group Incentive Factor (g) 
Cooperate Natural Outcome Defect 
Dominating Strategy- Pareto Equilibrium (Categozy I) 
-Dominating Strategy- Deficient Equilibrium (Categozy II) 
-No Dominating Strategy- Pareto Equilibrium (Categozy III)-
No Dominating Strategy- Non-equilbrium (Categozy IV) 
Figure 21. Map of natural outcomes for the Collective motive 
based on competitive rewards and penalties. 
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Figure 22. Map of natural outcomes forthe Competitive motive 
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Figure 23 . Map of natural outcomes for the Altruism motive 
based on competitive rewards and penalties. 
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Figure 24 . Map of natural outcomes for the Equitr motive 
based on competitive rewards and penalties . 
96 
10.0 
Reward/ 
Penal1y 
Factor 
r=p 
5.0 
1.0 
0 
0 1.0 5.0 10.0 
Group Incentive Factor (g) 
Cooperate Natural Outcome Defect 
Dominating Strategy- Pareto Equilibrium (Category I) 
-Dominating Strategy- Deficient Equilibrium (Category II) 
-No Dominating Strategy- Pareto Equilibrium (Category III) -
No Dominating Strategy- Non-equilbrium (Category IV) 
Figure 25. Map of natural outcomes for the Aggression motive 
based on competitive rewards and penalties. 
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Phase III Analysis 
The third phase of the analysis uses ideas from 
theoretical biology to examine the evolution of social 
motives in response to the environment created by the 
inducement system of the organization. Theoretical 
biologists have made use of evolutionary game theory to 
provide explanations for the social behavior of animals 
(Dawkins, 1976~ and Maynard-Smith, 1982). In applying 
evolutionary game theory to the study of organizational 
inducements, the approach used by theoretical biologists 
must be modified to reflect the differences between the 
organizational environment and the natural environment. The 
most significant of these differences is that organizational 
behaviors occur over a short period of time when compared 
with the multitude of generations associated with genetic 
evolution. These organizational behaviors are considered to 
be primarily shaped through organizational learning. 
Because behaviors are considered to evolve through 
learning rather than reproductive success, an organizational 
fitness measure must be found to replace Darwinian fitness 
(the frequency of a gene in the population). The fitness 
measure used in this study is the frequency with which 
individuals use a particular social motive in choosing 
between cooperation and defection. 
In the model developed for this study, learning 
replaces natural selection in transmitting behaviors. This 
leads to the question of how this learning occurs. Earlier, 
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it was discussed that social motives could be interpreted as 
1) genuine preferences, or 2) strategies for maximizing 
material payoffs. These alternative interpretations lead to 
differing assumptions about how individual learning occurs 
in response to an organizational inducement system. 
When social motives are interpreted as preferences, 
this study assumes that individuals continue to make use of 
a motive as long as they find that motive's social outcomes 
to be satisfactory. This occurs when individuals receive 
favored outcomes, as defined by the motive's preferences. As 
an example, a player with the social motive of Altruism 
might be "satisfied" with a smaller personal payoff 
(inducements less contributions) provided that his actions 
resulted in a larger payoff to the group. If social motives 
reflect preferences, then such a player might continue to 
adopt this motive, even though a larger material payoff 
might result from another social motive. In this study, we 
will assume that the degree of satisfaction with a motive 
will influence the frequency with which it is used during 
the next inducement period. A player will be satisfied when 
he receives the best possible outcome and unsatisfied when 
he receives the worst possible outcome. 
When social motives are interpreted as strategies for 
maximizing personal payoffs, the frequency of motives will 
be assumed to depend upon the actual payoffs to the 
individual (inducements less contributions). Under this. 
interpretation, the fitness of a social motive depends only 
upon its relative success in maximizing inducements less 
contributions when compared against other motives. This 
measure of fitness does not depend on whether the 
preferences of the motive are satisfied. 
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simulation Models. In developing simulation models for 
these alternative interpretations of social motives, the 
organization is considered to be populated by individuals 
making choices between cooperation and defection based on 
the Individual motive and the five social motives described 
earlier. The frequencies with which these motives are used 
to choose between cooperation and defection are variable. 
The models do not assign the motives to individuals, but 
treats them as frequencies within the entire population. As 
an example, if a given motive had a frequency of 0.5 in the 
population, it might be used all of the time by half of the 
population or might be used by each individual half of the 
time. 
Each round (k) in the simulation represents one 
inducement period for the organization. The frequency 
(f(i,k)) with which each motive (i) is used can be set from 
0.0 to 1.0. The initial values of f(i,k) are set such that 
all six motives start out with an equal frequency (i.e. 
f(i,0)=0.167). The expected payoffs for successive rounds 
are calculated using the level of cooperation from the 
previous round, with no memory of prior results. The 
calculation of the expected payoffs for cooperation 
(EPC(i,c(k-1))) and defection (EPC(i,c(k-1))) is based on 
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the level of cooperation in the prior round. The calculation 
assumes that the level of cooperation of others remains 
unchanged from the previous round. 
Using these expected payoffs, a comparison is made 
between the expected payoffs for cooperation (EPC(i,c(k-1))) 
and defection (EPD(i,c(k-1))) for each of the motives. The 
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choice to behave as a cooperator (b(i,k)=1) or a defector 
(b(i,k)=O) is based upon whether cooperation or defection 
has the larger payoff. The initial values of b(i,k) for each 
motive are based on the natural outcome from the analysis 
done in phases I and II (i.e. b(i,0)=1 if the natural 
outcome for motive i is cooperation, otherwise b(i,O)=O)". 
The new level of cooperation (c(k)) is then calculated 
using the prior frequencies for each of the motives and each 
motive's choice to cooperate or defect for this round. Using 
this information the actual payoffs for cooperation 
(PC(i,k)) and defection (PD(i,k)) are calculated for each of 
the motives. These calculations are based on the equations 
shown earlier in Tables II and III. 
The model then determines the relative payoff for each 
motive compared to the payoff for the other motives during 
that round. The relative payoffs are based on a scale (0.0-
1.0) derived from the best and worst possible outcomes 
(Pmax(i) and Pmin(i)). Pmax(i) is the maximum payoff for 
motive i from either cooperation or defection for all 
possible levels of cooperation. For cooperators, the 
relative payoff P(i,k)=(PC(j,k)-Pmin(j))/(Pmax(j)-Pmin(j)). 
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For defectors, P(i,k)=(PD(j,k)-Pmin(j))/(Pmax<j)-Pmin(j)). 
Note that the relative payoff scale can be based on the 
payoff functions for the motive being analyzed (i=j) or the 
payoff functions for a different social motive. 
Two models were developed in this study which use 
different payoff functions in determining the relative 
payoffs. The first model is based on interpreting motives as 
preferences. This model calculates the relative payoff for 
each motive based on the payoff functions for that motive 
(i=j). The second model interprets motives as strategies for 
maximizing individual payoffs. This model calculates 
relative payoffs based on the Individual motive (i.e. based 
on what individuals receive themselves, with no regard to 
the payoffs to others). 
The first model is referred to as the "Satisfaction 
Model", since individuals adopt motives that are successful 
in satisfying the preferences of the motive. The second 
model is labeled the "Fitness model", since individuals 
choose motives that succeed in acquiring personal rewards 
linked to the individual's future fitness. These relative 
payoffs (P(i,k)) are then used to determine the frequencies 
of the six motives for the next round. The formula used to 
calculate the new frequencies is shown below: 
f(i,k)=f(i,(k-l))*P(i,k)/SUM(f(i,(k-i))*P(i,k)). 
Figure 26 shows the flowchart and formulas used in 
developing the two simulation models. 
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Motive Evolution. The two simulation models shown in 
Figure 26 were used to determine the evolution of each 
motive and the steady-state level of cooperation. The 
frequencies (f) of the six motives were initially be set 
equal to one another (f=0 •. 167) and then allowed to evolve 
based on each strategy's payoffs. At the end of each round, 
the relative payoffs for each social motive was determined 
and the frequency of that motive adjusted. Each simulation 
was ran until equilibrium frequencies for each of the 
motives were reached. The steady-state level of cooperation 
was also determined for each of the simulations. 
Figure 27 illustrates the results from one such 
simulation. The results are for the Satisfaction model and a 
10-person inducement system using competitive rewards and 
penalties (r=1.25, p=1.25, g=0.5). In this simulation, the 
level of cooperation increased from 0.5 to 1.0. In the 
process, the Aggression motive displaced the other motives. 
The complete set of results for phase III are shown in 
Appendix c. 
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Start Round 
I 
Input model parameters (r,p,g) and initial 
values of cooperation, c(O), b(i,O) 
and frequencies of motives, f(i,O) 
I 
Calculate expected payoffs for cooperation 
and defection for each motive based on the 
prior level of cooperation; EPC(i,c(k-1)) 
and EPD(i,c(k-1)) 
I 
Determine behavior (cooperate or defect) 
for each motive, 
b(i,k)=1 if EPC(i,c(k-l))>EPD(i,c(k-1)) 
b(i,k)=O if EPC(i,c(k-l))<EPD(i,c(k-1)) 
I 
Calculate actual level of cooperation, 
c(k)=SUM(f(i,(k-l))*b(i,k)) 
I 
Calculate payoffs (P(i,k)) for motives 
based on choice of simulation model 
I 
I 
Satisfaction Model 
If b(i,k)=l, 
P(i,k)=(PC(i,c(k))-Pmin(i)) 
/(Pmax(i)-Pmin(i)) 
If b(i,k)=O, 
P(i,k)=(PD(i,c(k))-Pmin(i)) 
/(Pmax(i)-Pmin(i)) 
Fitness Model 
If b(i,k)=l, 
P(i,k)=(PC(Indiv.,c(k))-Pmin(Indiv.)) 
/(Pmax(Indiv.)-Pmin(Indiv.)) 
If b(i,k)=O, 
P(i,k)=(PD(Indiv.,c(k))-Pmin(Indiv.)) 
/(Pmax(Indiv.)-Pmin(Indiv.)) 
I 
I 
Adjust frequencies of each motive, f(i,k)= 
f(i,(k-1))*P(i,k)/SUM(f(i,(k-l))*P(i,k) 
I 
End Round 
Figure 26. Simulation flowchart and formulas. 
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Figure 27. Evolution of social motives for 
satisfaction model based on competitive rewards 
and penalties (r=l.25, p=1.25, g=0.5}. 
CHAPTER IV 
RESULTS 
The results from the three phases of analysis outlined 
in Chapter III are presented in this chapter. The results of 
the first two phases of analysis define the regions where 
cooperation and defection are the natural outcomes for the 
six classes of inducement systems being considered. The 
results from phase I of the analysis cover the Individual 
motive and two variations based on the theory of satisficing 
(Simon, 1976). The results from phase II cover the other 
social motives 1) Collective, 2) Competitive, 3) Altruism, 
4) Equity, and 5) Aggression. 
The results of the third phase of analysis show the 
evolution of motives in response to a particular inducement 
system. These results illustrate how the frequencies of the 
social motives might evolve and what the net effect would be 
on the steady-state level of group cooperation. Results are 
presented for two models, one based on motive fitness 
(Fitness model) and the other on motive satisfaction 
(Satisfaction model). 
Inducement systems 
Six classes of inducement systems were developed for 
use in this study (see Table II). These six classes make use 
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of group incentives in combination with rewards and/or 
penalties. The rewards and penalties are based on either 
absolute or competitive standards. While these inducements 
systems can be used to represent a wide variety of real-
world inducements, they are not inclusive of all possible 
types of inducement systems. The equations used to develop 
the six classes of inducement systems are based on idealized 
incentives. Real-world inducement systems are rarely as 
well-defined as the equations for the various inducement 
systems would indicate. Competitive incentives, in 
particular, are often based on subjective judgements and 
ill-defined payoffs. While a more complete analysis would 
consider more classes of inducement systems and alternative 
formulations for individual and group incentives, the 
classes of inducement systems presented in this study are 
useful in understanding 1) how various incentives work 
together to influence motivation, and 2) what behaviors 
might follow from the choice of competitive incentives over 
absolute incentives. 
While a comprehensive analysis of inducement systems is 
beyond the scope of this study, it is important to know 
whether the six classes of inducement systems being studied 
describe a sufficiently diverse cross-section of inducement 
systems. A partial answer to this question can be obtained 
by checking to see if the four categories of uniform 
n-person games discussed in Chapter III occur for the 
Individual motive. Table IV summarizes the diversity of game 
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categories that occur for each of the six classes of 
inducement systems based on an analysis of 10-person groups 
for the six classes of inducement systems being considered. 
TABLE IV 
GAME CATEGORIES 
FOR THE SIX CLASSES OF INDUCEMENTS SYSTEMS 
BASED ON 10-PERSON GROUP 
Class 
Absolute 
Rewards 
Penalties 
Both 
Competitive 
Rewards 
Penalties 
Both 
Natural 
Cooperate 
I 
I 
I 
I,IV 
I,III 
I,II 
outcome 
Defect 
I,II 
I,II 
I,II 
I,II,IV 
I,II,III 
I,II 
Note: The same categories of games occur for the 2-person 
case. 
As can be seen from Table IV, each of the four 
categories of games is included under at least one of the 
six classes of inducement systems for both the natural 
outcome of cooperation and defection. While other formulas 
for the incentives could be considered, they would not 
result in any new categories of games. This is at least a 
suggestive argument that the six classes of inducement 
systems are adequate for the general investigation being 
done in this research. 
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Phase I Results 
The cornerstone of this research is the analysis of the 
Individual motive. The mathematical representation of this 
motive is based directly upon the payoffs to the individual 
from the inducement system under consideration. This motive 
finds its basis in the classical view of economic man as a 
utility maximizer. This approach is consistent with the 
approach of expectancy theory. 
Absolute Rewards and/or Penalties. Three classes of 
inducement systems based on absolute incentives were 
considered: 1) absolute rewards, 2) absolute penalties, and 
3) absolute rewards and penalties. These inducement systems 
use fixed incentives to reward andjor penalize individuals 
based on their contributions relative to a fixed standard of 
contributions defined as cooperation. 
Figures 28 & 29 show the payoff functions for the 
Individual motive for two inducement systems using absolute 
rewards andjor penalties (r=1.5, p=O.O, g=O.S and r=O.O, 
p=1.5, g=0.5). The payoff functions for these two inducement 
systems are quite similar, the only difference being an 
offset resulting from the use of rewards in one case and 
penalties in the other. From a game theoretic perspective, 
this offset is unimportant. Because game theory is based on 
an interval scale, games that differ by a fixed offset are 
equivalent to one another. In general, the game theoretic 
analysis of any two inducement systems using absolute 
rewards andjor penalties will be equivalent if the sums of 
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Figure 28. Payoffs for absolute rewards 
{r=1.5, g=0.5). 
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the reward and penalty factors are equal (e.g. r=1.5, p=O.O 
is equivalent to r=o.o, p=1.5) and the group incentive 
factors are equal. This finding is reflected in the results 
shown in Appendix A for the Individual motive. 
Figure 30 shows the results of the analysis of the 
Individual motive for the 10-person case. Three categories 
of games occur for the Individual motive for inducement 
systems based on absolute rewards andjor penalties - two 
where defection is the natural outcome and one where 
cooperation is the natural outcome. 
To simplify the discussion of the regions that come out 
of this study, a shorthand notation is used to label the 
natural outcome and category of game associated with each 
region. This shorthand uses the letter "C" or the letter "D" 
to indicate whether cooperation or defection is the natural 
outcome. The letter is followed by a Roman numeral 
indicating what game category is involved. As an example, an 
inducement systems from a CII region would have cooperation 
as the natural outcome and would be a category II game. 
Two regions have defection as the natural outcome. The 
first region (DI) has values of r,p and g such that 
(r+p+g)<1.0. For inducement systems within this region, 
defection is a dominating strategy and the equilibrium 
outcome is Pareto optimal. This inducement system can be 
represented by a Category I game. 
An example of an inducement system from this region is 
shown in Figure 31 (r=0.125, p=0.125, g=0.25). Note that the 
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payoff line for cooperation lies below the payoff line for 
defection. This means that regardless of the level of 
cooperation of others, an individual always receives a 
higher payoff by choosing to defect. As a result, defection 
is a dominating strategy. Because defection is a dominating 
strategy, the natural outcome is for each individual to 
defect. This leads to a single equilibrium (c=O) and that 
equilibrium is Pareto optimal (i.e. there is no other 
outcome where each individual receives an equal or better 
payoff). 
The second region (DII) where defection is the natural 
outcome includes the area with values of r,p and g such that 
(r+p+g)>1.0 and r+p+(g/10)<1.0. Inducement systems in this 
region fall within Category II, games where there is a 
dominating strategy that leads to a deficient outcome. As an 
example, consider the inducement system with r=0.25, p=0.25, 
g=2.0 as shown in Figure 32. For inducement systems in this 
region, defection is the dominating strategy. The 
equilibrium outcome occurs when each individual defects 
(c=O). Unlike the region discussed above, this equilibrium 
is deficient (i.e. there is another outcome (c=10) where 
each individual receives a better payoff). Inducement 
systems in this region fall within the class of games 
commonly known as "prisoner's dilemma" games. 
outside of these two regions of defection, cooperation 
is the natural outcome. Inducement systems with absolute 
rewards and/or penalties lead to cooperation as the natural 
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Figure 32. Category II game with defection as the 
natural outcome and based on absolute rewards and 
penalties (r=0.25, p=0.25, g=2.0). 
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outcome when r+p+(g/10)>1.0. These inducement systems fall 
within category I. An example of an inducement system in 
this region (CI) is shown in Figure 33 (r=0.75, p=0.75, 
g=1.0). As can be seen, cooperation is a dominating strategy 
and the equilibrium outcome (c=10) is Pareto optimal. 
The regions defined above are based on the analysis of 
inducement systems where the group size is ten (n=10). To 
determine the region where cooperation is the natural 
outcome for the general n-person case, consider the payoff 
functions for cooperation and defection shown below: 
C(c)=r+g(c/n)-1 
D(c)=-p+g(c/n) 
Note: The payoff functions are taken from 
Table II. The cost of contributions (-1.0 utiles) 
has been included in the payoff for cooperators. 
For cooperation to be a dominating strategy, the payoff 
for cooperation must exceed the payoff for defection for all 
levels of cooperation and therefore: 
C(c)>D(c-1) 
r+g(cjn)-1>-p+g((c-1)/n) 
r+p+g((c-(c-1))/n)>1 
r+p+(g/n)>1 
Note: If the level of cooperation of others is c, 
a cooperator's choice to defect decreases the 
level of cooperation to c-1, while the choice to 
continue to cooperate does not alter the level of 
cooperation. 
The above equations show that for inducement systems 
based on absolute rewards andjor penalties, cooperation will 
be a dominating strategy when the value of r+p+(g/n) exceeds 
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Figure 33. Category I game with cooperation as the 
natural outcome and based on absolute rewards and 
penalties (r=0.75, p=0.75, g=1.0). 
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the cost of the added effort for cooperation. In this study, 
the cost of cooperation has been used to define the utility 
scale. It is defined as having a value of -1.0 utiles. 
Competitive Rewards. The analysis of the three classes 
of inducement systems based on competitive rewards andjor 
penalties is more complex than the analysis of inducement 
systems using absolute rewards and/or penalties. Unlike the 
case with absolute rewards andjor penalties, competitive 
rewards result in different game categories than do 
competitive penalties. Figures 34 & 35 show two inducement 
systems (r=1.5, p=O, g=O.S and r=O, p=1.5, g=O.S), with 
values of r,p and g found earlier to lead to equivalent· 
games for inducement systems using absolute rewards and 
penalties. Note the dissimilarities between these two 
inducement systems when compared to Figures 28 & 29. These 
differences occur because competitive rewards shift the 
slope of the payoff line for cooperators, while competitive 
penalties shift the slope of the payoff line for defectors. 
Recall that absolute rewards and penalties do not change the 
slope of either payoff line. Because of these differences, 
it is necessary to discuss the three classes of inducement 
systems based on competitive rewards andjor penalties 
separately. 
The use of competitive rewards leads to five regions, 
three where defection is the natural outcome (DI, DII & DIV) 
and two where cooperation is the natural outcome (CI & CIV). 
These regions are as shown in Figure 36. Two of the regions 
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Figure 34. Payoffs for competitive rewards 
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of defection (DI & DII) are similar to the regions of 
defection which occur for the inducement systems based on 
absolute rewards and penalties. This should not be 
surprising, since when the values of r and p approach zero, 
the payoffs for systems based on absolute rewards and 
systems based on competitive rewards are approximately 
equal. 
The first of these regions (DI) has values of r and g 
such that r<(10-g)/9 and g<1.0. This region has a dominating 
strategy of defection and the natural outcome is Pareto 
optimal. The second region (DII) has values of r and g such 
that r<(10-g)/9 and g>1.0. This region has a dominating 
strategy of defection and the equilibrium outcome (c=O) is 
deficient. 
The third region (DIV) includes Category IV games, 
where defection is the natural outcome. This region has 
values of g between o.o and 1.0 and values of r such that 
r>(10-g)/9. While defection is the natural outcome for this 
region, it is not a dominating strategy. Consider, for 
example, the inducement system shown in Figure 37 
(r=1.5, g=0.5). When the level of cooperation exceeds 0.366, 
defection has a higher payoff than cooperation. Conversely, 
when the level of cooperation is less than 0.366, 
cooperation has the better payoff. 
In addition to there being no dominating strategy, 
neither pure cooperation (c=10) or pure defection (c=O) is 
an equilibrium outcome. In general, the payoff lines for 
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Figure 37. category IV inducement system with 
defection as the natural outcome and based on 
competitive rewards (r=1.5, g=0.5). 
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payoff 
inducement systems in this region intersect when cjn is 
equal to 1-(1-g/n)jr. This result is found as follows: 
C(c)=D(c-1) 
g(cjn)+r(1-c/n)-1=g((c-1)/n) 
r(1-c/n)=1-g/n 
cjn=1-(1-g/n)/r 
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Note that this is an equilibrium outcome, since 
changing from cooperation to defection or defection to 
cooperation does not affect one's payoffs. It should also be 
noted that the equilibrium outcome is different than the 
outcome where both cooperators and defectors receive equal 
payoffs. The payoffs for cooperation and defection are equal 
when cjn=1-1/r. 
Because there is no dominating strategy and neither 
pure defection or cooperation is a Pareto optimal outcome, 
the choice of the natural outcome is based on the maximin 
strategy. The maximin strategy chooses the outcome that 
gives the best of the worst possible outcomes. For the 
inducement system shown in Figure 37, the worst outcome from 
defection (c=O) is preferred over the worst outcome from 
cooperation (c=10). Defection is the maximin strategy and 
the natural outcome for inducement systems in this region. 
The concept of the natural outcome was developed by 
Rappaport and Guyer (1966) as a tool for classifying games. 
Their classification system is based on the ordinality of 
payoffs (ordinal scale) and does not rely on the actual 
values of the payoffs (interval scale). As a result of using 
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an ordinal scale, these authors were unable to make use of 
the concept of a mixed strategy. This limitation is 
particularly apparent when dealing with games falling within 
category IV. 
While neither pure strategy results in an equilibrium 
outcome, a solution does exist if mixed strategies are 
considered. A mixed strategy is one where alternative 
choices are made with a specified probability or frequency. 
The solution for the mixed strategy for an inducement system 
from this region (r=1.5, g=0.5) is shown graphically in 
Figure 38. Refer to Rubinstein (1975) for a discussion of 
this graphical method of analysis. 
The two vertical axes show the payoffs for cooperation 
C(c) and defection D(d+1) for all possible values of c 
(i.e. c=O to c=10). The connecting lines show the mixed 
strategy payoffs for choosing cooperation (C(c)) with a 
frequency of f and choosing defection (D(d+1)) with 
frequency 1-f. The mixed strategy is found by determining 
the value of f that yields the highest maximin payoff from 
the mixed strategy payoff lines (see Figure 38). For the 
inducement system being shown (r=1.5, g=0.5) the mixed 
strategy occurs when individuals cooperate with a frequency 
of f=0.33 and defect with a frequency of f=0.67. Note that 
this is a nonequilibrium outcome, since defectors would do 
better by switching to cooperation (see Figure 37). 
The payoff lines shown in Figure 38 are somewhat unique 
in that each line intersects at a common point. This is a 
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Figure 38. Graphtcal solution of the mixed strategy for 
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general result that can be shown by considering the solution 
for the intersection of the payoff lines for any two 
successive levels of cooperation, c and c+1. The 
intersection point (f) is found as follows: 
fC(c)+(1-f)D(d+1)=fC(c+1)+(1-f)D(d) 
f(g(c/n)+r(1-c/n)-1)=f(g((c+1)/n)+r(1-(c+1)/n)-1) 
+(1-f)g(c-1)/n +(1-f)g(c/n) 
fg(cjn)+fr-fr(c/n)-f=fg(c+1)/nfr-fr(c+1)/n-f 
+f(c-1)/n-fg(c-1)/n f(c/n)-fg(c/n) 
fg(c/n)-fr(cjn)+g(cjn)=fg(c/n)+fg/n-fr(c/n) 
-g;n-fg(c/n)+fgjn -fr/n+g(cjn)-fg(c/n) 
-gjn=-fr/n 
fr=g 
f=g/r 
Because the mixed strategy payoff lines for any two 
successive levels of cooperation intersect at gjr, it is 
also the case that the mixed strategy payoff lines for every 
level of cooperation intersect at gjr. As a result, the 
maximin strategy has a value of f equal to gjr. 
In addition to the three categories of games where 
defection is the natural outcome, this class of inducement 
systems has two regions where cooperation is the natural 
outcome (CI & CIV). The easier of these two regions to 
understand occurs when the value of the group incentive 
factor is greater than the number of individuals in the 
group (i.e. g>10). Cooperation is a dominating strategy for 
this region (CI) and the resulting equilibrium outcome is 
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Pareto optimal (Category I). This result occurs regardless 
of the value of the reward factor (r). 
The boundaries of this region in the n-person case are 
found by determining what values of r and g are needed for 
cooperation to be a dominating strategy. For cooperation to 
be a dominating strategy, the payoff for cooperation must 
exceed the payoff for defection for all levels of 
cooperation and therefore: 
C(c)>D(c-1) 
g(c/n)+r(1-c/n)-1>g((c-1)/n) 
gc+r(n-c)-n>gc-g 
r(n-c)+g>n 
Since (n-c)>O and r~o, the value of r(n-c)~o.o. Because 
dominance requires that C(c)>D(c-1) for every level of c and 
because the minimum value or n-c is zero, it is true that: 
g>n 
This is a general result for all group sizes. It should 
be apparent, however, that when the size of the group is 
large, the organization must use equally large group 
incentives (g>n) to fall within this region. Note that when 
the value of g is equal to n, then gjn=1.0 and the cost of 
contributing is compensated for by the group incentive. 
The second and more interesting region of cooperation 
(CIV) is the area with values of r such that r>(10-g)/9 and 
values of g such that 1.0<g<10. This region contains 
inducement systems which fall within Category IV - games 
with no dominating strategy and a natural outcome that is 
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not an equilibrium outcome. consider the inducement system 
with r=3.0, p=O.O, g=2.0 as shown in Figure 39. When the 
level of cooperation (c/n) exceeds 1-(1-g/n)/r, then it is 
preferable to defect. However, when the level of cooperation 
is less than 1-(1-gjn)/r, then it is better to cooperate. 
Neither pure cooperation or pure defection_ is an equilibrium 
outcome and the natural outcome is based on choosing the 
strategy that gives the maximin outcome. 
The maximin solution for this region is more complex 
than for the DIV region discussed earlier. The mixed 
strategy for the DIV region was found to occur when the 
frequency of cooperation (f) was equal to gjr. The same 
solution for the mixed strategy holds for the CIV region. 
However, a portion of the CIV region has values of gjr>1.0. 
Since a mixed strategy must have a value of f between o.o 
and 1.0, the natural outcome for this area is a pure 
strategy. Figure 40 shows an inducement system 
(r=1.5, g=2.0) with gjr>1.0 and Figure 41 shows the 
graphical solution for the same inducement system. The 
maximin payoff (0.55 utiles) occurs when each individual 
cooperates (f=1.0). 
Games from the CIV region are preemption games. The 
most famous of these is "chicken" (Kahn, 1965). Figure 42 
shows the payoff matrix for a 2-person game of chicken based 
on an inducement system using competitive rewards (r=1.2, 
g=1.5). Both CD and DC are Pareto optimal equilibrium. These 
games are called preemption games because the first person 
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to defect receives the best payoff. Note that the natural 
outcome cc is also Pareto optimal, but that it is not an 
equilibrium outcome. It is also interesting to note that cc 
is Pareto optimal when g>r. 
Player 2 
C D 
c 0.5 0.35 
Player 1 
D 0.75 0.0 
Figure 42. Payoff matrix for a 2-person category 
IV game based on competitive rewards (r=1.2 
g=1.5). 
Finding the boundaries of the category IV regions 
(DIV & CIV) for the n-person case involves two steps. The 
first is to find the boundaries with the two regions with 
dominating strategies must be determined. The region where 
cooperation is the dominating strategy (CI) was found 
earlier to be g>n. The region where defection is a 
dominating strategy is found as follows: 
C(c)<D(c-1) for c=1 to c=10 
g(c/n)+r(1-c/n)-1<g(c-1)/n 
gc+r(n-c)-n<gc-g 
r(n-c)<n-g 
r<(n-g)/(n-c) 
Since C(c)<D(c-1) must be true for all levels of 
cooperation (c=1 to c=10) and because (n-c) is largest when 
c=1, then: 
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r<(n-g)/(n-1) 
The second step is to determine when cooperation is the 
maximin strategy. For cooperation to be the maximin 
strategy, the minimum payoff for cooperation must be greater 
than the minimum payoff for defection. Because this 
inducement system has no penalties, the minimum payoff for 
defection occurs when c=O, D(O)=g(O/n)=O.O. For the minimum 
payoff for cooperation to exceed o.o, then: 
C(c)>O.O 
g(cjn)+r(1-cjn)-l>O.O 
g(cjn)+r(l-cjn)>l 
When g>1.0, C(c) will be greater than 0.0 for all 
values of c and, therefore, cooperation will be a dominating 
strategy. When the value of g<l.O, then the minimum payoff 
for cooperation will occur when c=n. But when c=n, then 
cjn=1.0, and therefore: 
g(1)+r(1-1)-1>0.0 
g>1.0 
Therefore, cooperation is the natural outcome when 
g>1.0. In summary, the region with Category IV games has 
values of rand g such that, l.O<g<n and r>(n-g)/(n-1). When 
g<1.0 defection is the natural outcome (DIV), and when g>l.O 
cooperation is the natural outcome (CIV). 
Competitive Penalties. The use of competitive penalties 
leads to inducement systems which fall within five regions 
as shown in Figure 43. The boundaries of these regions are 
identical to the boundaries of the regions that arise from 
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136 
the use of competitive rewards. The categories of games and 
natural outcomes are also the same for three of the regions 
1) the DI region where r<(10-g)/9 and g<1.0, 2) the DII 
region where r<(10-g)/9 and g>1.0, and 3) the CI region 
where g>10. 
There are two regions (DIII & CIII) where the game 
categories for inducement systems using competitive rewards 
differ from those using competitive penalties. The first is 
the DIII region with values of g between o and 1.0 and 
values of r such that r>(10-g)/9. These are inducement 
systems where there is no dominating strategy, but where 
there is a Pareto optimal equilibrium (d=10). Figure 44 
shows a typical inducement system from this region (p=2.0, 
g=0.5). 
The point at which the payoff lines for cooperation and 
defection intersect in Figure 44 occurs when C(c)=D(c-1). 
The value of cjn is found as follows: 
C(c)=D(c-1) 
g(c/n)-1=g((c-1)/n)-p((c-1)/n) 
-1+g/n=-p((c-1)/n) 
c;n-1/n=(1-g/n)/p 
cjn=1/n+(1-g/n)/p 
Note that when the value of cjn is greater than 
1/n+(1-g/n)/p, then the payoffs for cooperation exceed the 
payoffs for defection. Defectors should, therefore, be 
expected to switch to cooperation. This causes the system to 
move towards the deficient equilibrium at c=10. conversely, 
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defection as the natural outcome and based on 
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when the level of cooperation is less than 1/n+(1-g/n)/p, 
then defection is preferable to cooperation and the system 
should move towards the second equilibrium point at d=10. 
For the Inducement system shown in Figure 44, the 
choice of defection as the natural outcome hinges on the 
fact that defection leads to a Pareto optimal equilibrium 
(d=10). It should be noted, however, that the argument for 
the Pareto optimal equilibrium as the natural outcome is 
weaker for the n-person case (n>2) than for the 2-person 
case. Consider as an example, the payoff matrix for a 
typical 2-person game from Category III as shown in 
Figure 45. 
Player 2 
C D 
c -0.5 -0.75 
Player 1 
D -0.75 0.0 
Figure 45. Payoff matrix for a 2-person Category 
III game based on competitive penalties 
(p=2.0, g=0.5). 
For this game, the Pareto equilibrium occurs when both 
players choose to defect. This outcome is easily reached in 
the 2-person case, since when either player defects the 
other player is reduced to choosing between the second best 
outcome (defect) and the worst outcome (cooperate). Unless 
the second player violates norms of rationality, the first 
player's defection should result in both players defecting. 
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Contrast this situation with what happens when only one 
player defects (d=l) in the inducement system shown in 
Figure 44. As can be seen, the remainder of the players will 
to do better by continuing to cooperate than by switching to 
defection. This will continue to be true until enough 
individuals defect to cause the level of cooperation to 
exceed 1/n+(1-gjn)jp. At that point, any remaining 
cooperators will be better off by defecting. The Pareto 
optimal equilibrium will be reached as these cooperators 
switch to defection. While the choice of the Pareto optimal 
equilibrium as the natural outcome has strong appeal, the 
accessibility of this outcome in the n-person case for 
Category III games can be problematic. This is a situation 
where the presence of strong group norms might help the 
group to reach a better outcome than might be possible 
through individual actions. 
The last region to be discussed for inducement systems 
based on competitive penalties is the CIII region. This 
region has values of g between 1.0 and n and values of r 
such that r>(10-g)j9. The boundary of this region for the 
n-person case can be found using the same steps used to find 
the boundaries of the category IV region for inducement 
systems using competitive rewards. Using this approach, the 
CIII region has values of p and g such that p>(n-g)/(n-1) 
and 1.0<g<n. Like the DIII region, the payoff lines for 
inducement systems from the CIII region have an intersection 
point at 1/n+(1-g/n)jp. When cjn<1/n+(1-gjn)/p defection is 
140 
a dominating strategy. When cjn>1/n+(1-g/n)/p cooperation is 
a dominating strategy. 
Competitive Rewards and Penalties. Competitive rewards 
and penalties can be used jointly as well as singly to 
create inducement systems. When considering inducement 
systems using both rewards and penalties, the relative 
values of the reward factor (r) and the penalty factor (p) 
must be established. For the purposes of this study, the 
reward factor is taken to be equal to the penalty factor 
(r=p). This results in inducement systems that are furthest 
from the two classes of inducements considered earlier. It 
also results in payoff lines for cooperation and defection 
which are parallel. As a result, there is always a 
dominating strategy (unless the payoff lines are equal) and 
all inducement systems are either Category I or Category II 
games. 
Figure 46 shows the map of game categories that occur 
for the Individual motive for inducement systems with 
competitive rewards and penalties. Four regions occur, two 
of which have defection as the natural outcome (DI & DII). 
These regions have the same boundaries and game categories 
that occur when either rewards or penalties are used. 
The remaining two regions (CI & CII) have cooperation 
as the natural outcome. When the value of g is greater than 
1.0 (g>1.0) and the values of r and p are such that 
(r+p)/2>(10-g)/9, then cooperation is a dominating strategy 
and the equilibrium outcome (c=10) is Pareto optimal. This 
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Figure 46. Map of natural outcomes for the Individual motive 
based on competitive rewards and penalties. 
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is a CI region. Figure 47 shows an inducement system from 
this region, r=1.0, p=1.0, g=2.0. For the n-person case, the 
CI region has values of r,p and g such that 
(r+p)/2>(n-g)/(n-1) and g>1.0. 
The remaining region (CII) also has a dominating 
strategy of cooperation. However, unlike the other region of 
cooperation (CI), the equilibrium outcome for this CII 
region is deficient rather than Pareto optimal. The 
boundaries of the CII region are g<1.0 and (r+p)/2>(10-g)/9. 
For the n-person case, the region has values of r,p and g 
such that (r+p)/2>(n-g)j(n-1) and g<1.0. 
The interesting result from this region is that the 
behavior labeled as "cooperation" is a dominating strategy 
that results in a deficient outcome. This is an apparent 
reversal of the normal prisoner's dilemma, where "defection" 
is the dominating strategy that leads to a deficient 
outcome. One explanation for this role reversal is the fact 
that ••cooperation", as used in this study, means cooperation 
with the organization rather than cooperation with other 
individuals. To an extent, the reversal is an artifact of 
the way game theoreticians label choices in the prisoner's 
dilemma game. Nevertheless, there are few real-world 
examples of situations where the pursuit of group or 
organizational goals is individually rational but 
collectively irrational. Before adopting an inducement 
system from the CII region, organizations should consider 
the ethics and long-term practicality of using an inducement 
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Figure 47. category I inducement system with 
cooperation as the natural outcome and based on 
competitive rewards and penalties 
(r=1.0, p=1.0, g=2.0). 
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system that sets organizational interests against the 
collective interests of individuals. 
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A summary of the regions where cooperation is the 
natural outcome for each of the six classes of inducement 
systems is shown in Table V. The game categories and 
boundaries for each region of cooperation are given based on 
the n-person case. 
TABLE V 
GAME CATEGORIES AND BOUNDARIES 
FOR REGIONS WITH COOPERATION AS THE NATURAL OUTCOME 
FOR THE INDIVIDUAL MOTIVE 
Class 
Absolute 
Rewards 
Category 
Penalties 
Category 
Both 
Category 
Competitive 
Rewards 
Category 
Category 
Penalties 
Category 
Category 
Both 
Category 
Category 
I 
I 
I 
I 
IV 
I 
III 
I 
II 
Boundaries 
r+(g/n)>l.O 
p+(g/n)>l.O 
r+p+(g/n)>1.0 
g>n 
1.0<g<n and r>(g-n)/(n-1) 
g>n 
1.0<g<n and p>(g-n)/(n-1) 
g>1.0 and (r+p)/2>(g-n)/(n-1) 
g<1.0 and (r+p)/2>(g-n)/(n-1) 
Inducement System Costs. To apply the results from the 
preceding section to real-world organizations, it is 
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necessary to understand the costs of achieving a given level 
of cooperation for a specific inducement system. 
Organizations are typically interested in increasing the 
level of individual cooperation with organizational goals at 
the minimum cost to the organization. It is assumed, 
therefore, that the organization will search for those 
inducement systems that result in cooperation as the natural 
outcome and which have the lowest costs to the organization. 
Figures 48 & 49 show the cost isocurves for inducement 
systems based on 1) absolute rewards and/or penalties, and 
2) competitive rewards and/or penalties. These cost curves 
assume that the natural outcome is cooperation and that each 
individual cooperates. Because each individual in the group 
is assumed to cooperate, penalties can be ignored. These 
curves represent the costs per cooperator and are valid for 
any group size (e.g. n=2, n=10, n=135). 
For inducement systems that make use of absolute 
rewards and/or penalties (Figure 48), the costs per 
individual are equal to the sum of the reward factor (r) and 
the group incentive factor (g), costs=r+g. For those 
inducement systems utilizing competitive rewards andjor 
penalties (Figure 49), the costs depend only upon the group 
incentive factor (g), costs=g. This result is due to the 
fact that for inducement systems using competitive rewards, 
the size of the reward is equal to zero when all individuals 
cooperate, reward=r(l-c/n)=O when c=n. 
Reward 
Factor 
(r) 
Reward 
Factor 
(r) 
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From these curves, the least cost inducement system for 
each region of cooperation can be identified. For inducement 
systems based on absolute rewards andjor penalties, the goal 
is to find the inducement system with the minimum value of 
r+g. For inducement systems based on competitive rewards 
andjor penalties, the goal is to find the inducement system 
with minimum value of g. 
The cost curves shown in Figure 48 & 49 assume that 
each individual cooperates. As discussed in the previous 
section, for inducement systems based on competitive 
rewards, there is a CIV region where the maximin criterion 
leads to a mixed strategy over a portion of the region. As a 
result, the level of cooperation predicted by game theory is 
less than 1.0. Figure 50 shows the costs per cooperator 
based on the level of cooperation (g/r) that results from 
the mixed strategy. These cost curves are applicable to 
inducement systems using competitive rewards when the1 values 
of r and g are such that O<g<n and r>g. 
The costs per cooperator for this region are calculated 
as follows: 
costs=[f(g(c/n)+r(1-c/n))+(1-f)g(cjn)]/(c/n) 
costs=[g/r(g(g/r)+r(1-g/r))+(1-g/r)g(gjr)]/(g/r) 
costs=g(g/r)+r-g+g-g(g/r) 
costs=r 
For this region, the only factor affecting the costs 
per cooperator is the reward factor. Therefore, since the 
minimum costs (r) and the maximum level of cooperation (g/r) 
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Figure 50 . Cost isocurves for regions having a mixed 
strategy. 
both occur when r=g=l.O, this will be the preferred 
inducement system from this region. 
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The cost curves developed above for the CIV region are 
based on the concept of the mixed strategy. A different set 
of cost curves might also be developed using the equilibrium 
outcome to define the level of cooperation. This would 
result in a slightly different set of cost curves. The mixed 
strategy was chosen because of its close association with 
game theory and the maximin criterion. 
The cost curves shown in Figures 48-50 assume no change 
in base pay. Organizations can adjust base pay in 
conjunction with changes in incentives to control the 
overall cost of inducements. While lowering base pay is 
often difficult, most organizations can move to a higher 
reward and group incentive factors by freezing cost-of-
living increases over a period of several years. However, 
during periods of low inflation or financial emergency, it 
may be necessary to lower base pay to meet targeted base pay 
and incentive levels. 
Implications for organizations. With the goal in mind 
of achieving a high level of cooperation at a low cost, it 
is possible to identify specific inducement systems of 
interest to the organizational practitioner. These 
inducement systems can be identified by using the cost 
curves presented above to select the least cost inducement 
system for each region of cooperation. 
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As an example, consider the class of inducement systems 
based on competitive rewards and penalties which is shown in 
Figure 46. This class of inducement systems has two regions 
(CI & CII) where cooperation is the natural outcome. The CII 
region contains the least cost inducement system for this 
class of inducement systems. These costs are minimum when 
the group incentive factor (g) is zero and the reward factor 
is greater than 10/9. In this case, the cost of gaining each 
cooperator's added contributions would be 0.0 utiles. 
The CI region is also of interest because of the fact 
that Category I games have a Pareto optimal equilibrium, 
while Category II games have a deficient equilibrium. The 
least cost inducement system for this region occurs when the 
values of r and g both approach one. The costs of this 
inducement system would be 1.0 utiles. 
The least cost inducement system for any region is the 
inducement system(s) having the lowest cost of any 
inducement system from the region. Finding the least cost 
inducement system for regions where cooperation is the 
natural outcome is an important starting point in choosing 
an inducement system for use in an organization. Table VI 
lists the costs per cooperator and design parameters for the 
least cost inducement system for each region where 
cooperation is the natural outcome for the six classes of 
inducement systems being studied. The level of cooperation 
for each of these regions is assumed to be 1.0. Note that 
the level of cooperation for the least cost inducement 
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system from the CIV region should also be 1.0, since cjn is 
equal to gjr. 
Class 
TABLE VI 
LEAST COST INDUCEMENT SYSTEMS 
FOR THE INDIVIDUAL MOTIVE 
AND N-PERSON GROUPS 
Absolute r p g cost 
Rewards 
Category I 1.0 o.o 1.0 
Penalties 
Category 1.0 0.0 o.o 
Both 
Category I 0.5 0.5 0.0 0.5 
Competitive 
Rewards 
category I 0.0 n n 
category IV 1.0 1.0 1.0 
Penalties 
category I o.o n n 
category III 1.0 1.0 1.0 
Both 
Category I 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 
category II nj(n-1) n/(n-1) o.o o.o 
Table VI summarizes the least cost inducement system 
for the Individual motive. The most costly regions of 
cooperation are the CI regions for inducement systems based 
on competitive rewards or competitive penalties. The least 
cost inducement systems in these regions have a cost of n 
utiles, where n is the group size. For large groups, this 
level of costs will likely be prohibitively high. The least 
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costly inducement systems occur for the CI region based on 
absolute penalties (p=1.0, g=O.O) and the CII region for 
inducement systems based on competitive rewards and 
penalties (r=n/(n-1), p=n/(n-1), g=O.O). These inducement 
systems result in no additional costs over base salary. 
The preceding analysis is based on what is rational for 
individuals within the organization. What the analysis does 
not indicate is how these outcomes compare with payoffs that 
might be available outside the organization. As an example, 
the least cost inducement system using absolute penalties 
results in a payoff of -1.0 utiles to cooperators. Unless 
the base pay is sufficiently high, individuals may be able 
to improve their payoff by moving to another organization. 
Even if individuals are unable or unwilling to move to 
another organization, the perception that they are not being 
compensated for their contributions can affect morale and 
lead to other problems in the organization. 
satisficing. As part of the work done in Phase I, an 
additional analysis of the Individual motive was made based 
on the theory of satisficing developed by Simon (1976). This 
analysis provides answers to two questions. First, "Is the 
outcome from cooperation satisfactory to the individual?". 
The answer to this question is important, because an 
individual may search for alternatives outside the 
organization if no satisfactory outcomes are available 
within the organization. The results of the analysis provide 
information that can be used to resolve the problem of 
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unsatisfactory outcomes noted above for inducement systems 
based on absolute penalties. 
Second, 11Will a defecting individual receive a 
satisfactory outcome? 11 • This question is critical, since if 
a defector receives a satisfactory outcome, he may not 
engage in the search behavior needed to discover whether 
cooperation is preferable to defection. Such an individual 
might continue to defect, even though the principles of 
rationality would indicate that cooperation is the natural 
outcome. 
Figures 51 & 52 show the results of the satisficing 
analysis of the· Individual motive for inducement systems 
using competitive rewards and penalties. Results for the 
other classes of inducement systems are shown in Appendix A. 
This analysis makes use of the prior analysis of the natural 
outcomes for the Individual motive. For regions where 
cooperation is the natural outcome, the payoffs are reviewed 
to answer the two questions listed above. First, a review is 
made to see if cooperation results in a positive 
(satisfactory) outcome. This review is made assuming that 
all individuals are cooperators (c=n). Second, a review is 
made to see if defectors receive a positive payoff for any 
other level of cooperation (i.e. c=O to n-1). 
Figure 51 shows the results of the satisficing analysis 
for initial cooperators (n=10). The cross-hatched area 
(light background, dark cross-hatching) shows where the 
cooperation is the natural outcome and individuals receive a 
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positive payoff from cooperation. This region (labeled 
11CSat. 11 ) has values of r, p and g such that g>l.O and 
(r+p)/2>(n-g)j(n-1). Examining Figure 51 shows that the CII 
region ((r+p)/2>(n-g)j(n-1) and g<l.O) results in an 
unsatisfactory payoff to the individual, even though 
cooperation is the natural outcome. Recall that for this 
Category II region cooperation is individually rational but 
collectively irrational. The designer of organizational 
inducement systems should be sensitive to the problems that 
may arise from selecting an inducement system where the 
natural outcome results in an unsatisfactory payoff to the 
individual. 
Figure 52 shows the results of the satisficing analysis 
for initial defectors. The cross-hatched area (dark 
background, light cross-hatching) shows the region where 
cooperation is the natural outcome and where defectors could 
receive a positive outcome. This region (labeled 11 DSat. 11 ) 
has values of r, p and g such that (r+p)/2>(n-g)j(n-1) and 
(r+p)/2<g. As an example, consider the inducement system 
with r=1.5, p=l.S, g=2.0, n=lO. The payoff for defection 
(d=l) is 0.45 utiles when all others cooperate (c=9). This 
payoff is positive, though it is less than the payoff for 
cooperation (c=lO), 1.0 utiles. According to Simon's theory, 
individuals receiving satisfactory outcomes may fail to act 
in accordance with the accepted norms of rationality. If an 
individual is currently a defector, he may continue to 
defect even though the norms of rationality would predict 
157 
cooperation. This outcome is of importance to organizational 
practitioners. It illustrates how the presence of 
satisfactory outcomes for defection can undermine the 
effectiveness of an organization's inducement system. 
Table VII summarizes the results from the satisficing 
analysis based on initial cooperation and initial defection. 
Class 
AbSOlute 
Rewards 
Penalties 
Both 
competitive 
Rewards 
Penalties 
Both 
TABLE VII 
SATISFICING REGIONS 
FOR INITIAL COOPERATORS AND DEFECTORS 
BASED ON N-PERSON GROUPS 
Satisficing Regions 
Initial 
Cooperators 
g>1.0 
r+g/n>1.0 
g>1.0 
p+g/n>1.0 
(r+p)/2+g/n>1.0 
r+p+g/n>1.0 
g>1.0 
r>g(n-g)/(n-1) 
g>1.0 
p>g(n-g)/(n-1) 
g>1.0 
(r+p)/2>g(n-g)/(n-1) 
Initial 
Defectors 
g>1.0 
r+g/n>1.0 
p<g(n-1)/n 
p+gjn>1.0 
(r+p)/2<g(n-1)/n 
r+p+g/n>1.0 
g>1.0 
r>g(n-g)/(n-1) 
g<p 
p>g(n-g)/(n-1) 
g<p 
(r+p)/2>g(n-g)/(n-1) 
The table shows the boundaries of the regions where 
1) cooperators receive a positive payoff (c=n), and 
2) defectors receive a positive payoff (d=1 to d=n). Results 
are listed for all six classes of inducement systems. The 
analysis assumes no change in base pay. The regions would 
change if changes in base pay were considered. 
This analysis makes it possible to utilize two 
additional criteria for selecting inducement systems. 
Namely, that 1) inducement systems should result in a 
satisfactory payoff for cooperators, and 2) inducement 
systems should result in an unsatisfactory payoff for 
defectors. 
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Of particular interest to organizational practitioners 
is the least cost inducement system meeting the two 
satisficing criteria. These two criteria are satisfied for 
those inducement systems that fall within the csat. region 
but which lie outside the DSat. region. As an example, the 
region meeting the two satisficing criteria for inducement 
systems using competitive rewards and penalties has values 
of r and g such that g>1.0 and (r+p)/2>g. The least cost 
inducement system for this region occurs when r=1.0, p=1.0 
and g=1.0. The cost of this system would be 1.0 utiles. Note 
that the cost of the least cost inducement system jumps from 
o.o utiles to 1.0 utiles when these criteria are added to 
the analysis of the Individual motive. Table VIII shows the 
boundaries of the regions where cooperation is the natural 
outcome and where the above two criteria are satisfied. 
For inducement systems using competitive rewards only, 
there is no region that meets the two satisficing criteria. 
This is because defectors always receive a positive payoff 
when there are no penalties and because the competitive 
TABLE VIII 
REGIONS MEETING SATISFICING CRITERIA 
FOR N-PERSON GROUPS 
Class 
Absolute 
Rewards 
Penalties 
Both 
Competitive 
Rewards 
Penalties 
Both 
Regions 
r>1.0 
g=1.0 
g>1.0 
p>g(n-1)/n 
(r+p)/2+g>1.0 
(r+p)/2>g(n-1)/n 
none 
g>1.0 
p>g 
g>1.0 
(r+p)/2>g 
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reward is equal to o.o when each individual cooperates. For 
inducement systems based on absolute rewards only, the 
inducement systems meeting both criteria have g=O.o. When 
g>O.O defectors receive a positive payoff. This problem can 
be partially resolved by lowering base pay by g(n-1) utiles 
and increasing the reward factor to 1+g(n-1)/n utiles. 
Lowering base pay by g(n-1)/n utiles ensures that defectors 
do not receive a positive payoff. 
The results shown in Table VIII provide a useful 
summary of the work done in Phase I. Based on the Individual 
motive, six classes of inducement systems were investigated 
to identify those regions where cooperation is the natural 
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outcome. These regions were broken down into the four 
categories of symmetric games and the least cost inducement 
system identified for each region. These regions of interest 
were further reduced by applying two additional criteria 
based on the theory of satisficing. 
Phase II Results 
Phase I is based on the analysis of the Individual 
motive. In phase II, five additional social motives are 
considered 1) Collective, 2) Competitive, 3) Altruism, 
4) Equity, and 5) Aggression. Each of these motives is based 
on the payoffs to others in comparison with payoffs to self 
(see Table III and Figure 8). 
The analysis of these social motives uses the same 
methods used to analyze the Individual motive. For each 
class of inducement systems, the payoff functions are 
analyzed to determine whether cooperation or defection is 
the natural outcome for the motive being considered. Regions 
of cooperation and defection are further classified 
according to the category of game which represents 
inducement systems from those regions. A complete set of 
results showing the natural outcomes and game categories for 
the five social motives and the six classes of inducement 
systems is shown in Appendix B. 
Collective Motive. The Collective motive reflects a 
preference for maximizing joint payoffs to the group. In 
most cases, joint maximization follows from individual 
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maximization. Regions with cooperation as the natural 
outcome for the Individual motive also have cooperation as 
the natural outcome for the Collective motive. The opposite 
is also true; namely, that regions where defection is the 
natural outcome for the Individual motive typically have 
defection as the natural outcome for the Collective motive. 
The only exception occurs for those regions that are 
represented by category II games. These are the prisoner's 
dilemma games where what is rational for the individual is 
collectively irrational. Given the nature of these games, it 
is not surprising that games that fall into Category II for 
the Individual motive have the opposite natural outcome when 
the Collective motive is considered. 
Figure 53 shows the results for the Collective motive 
and inducement systems based on competitive rewards and 
penalties. When these results are compared with the results 
for the Individual motive (see Figure 46), two changes are 
apparent, 1) the DII region for the Individual motive 
becomes part of the CI region for the Collective motive, and 
2) the CII region for the Individual motive becomes part of 
the DI region for the Collective motive. 
While the regions where cooperation is the natural 
outcome are similar for the Individual and Collective 
motives, the game categories that result are not necessarily 
the same. Regions that fall into Category I for the 
Individual motive will also fall into Category I for the 
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Collective motive. For other categories of games, no clear 
correspondence exists. 
One important result from the analysis of the 
Collective motive is the difference that exist between the 
Individual and Collective motives for Category II regions. 
This is particularly true for the class of inducements based 
on competitive rewards and penalties. While it is possible 
to select a low cost inducement system with cooperation as 
the natural outcome for the Individual motive (e.g. r=l.5, 
p=l.5, g=O.O), this Category II inducement system will have 
defection as the natural outcome for the collective motive. 
Conversely, an inducement system from region DII for the 
Individual motive would fall into region CI for the 
Collective motive. In this case, a strong Collective motive 
might lead to group cooperation, even though it is 
irrational for the individual. 
The CI region for the Collective motive occurs for all 
six classes of inducement systems. This region does not 
require the use of any individual incentives. If there is a 
strong organizational culture that supports the Collective 
motive, it may be possible to fashion a low cost inducement 
system that results in a high level of organizational 
cooperation. This type of inducement system can be fashioned 
using group incentives only. Examples of this type of 
inducement system occur in employee-owned companies, where 
based pay is often supplemented by a major profit sharing 
plan. While these companies often have no individual bonuses 
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or merit pay, the strength of the Collective motive helps 
these companies to operate using group rewards tied to the 
overall performance of the company. 
The use of group incentives only, may also make sense 
in organizations where there is a high level of intrinsic 
motivation or a critical need for cooperation between 
individuals or work groups. Deci (1971) has questioned the 
use of extrinsic rewards because of their adverse impact on 
intrinsic motivation. The underlying theory is that the use 
of extrinsic rewards shifts the locus of control from the 
individual to his environment. If intrinsic motivation is 
high, it may be preferable to use group incentives rather 
than individual incentives. While group incentives may also 
undermine intrinsic motivation, the fact that the choice is 
tied to the Collective motive and not to the Individual 
motive might reduce the shift in the locus of control away 
from the individual. Similarly, if group incentives are used 
exclusively, it may cause individuals to see their actions 
as being based on maximizing collective payoffs rather than 
payoffs to self. This could result in a general preference 
for cooperation over individualistic or competitive 
behaviors. More research is needed to understand the effects 
of group (versus individual) incentives on the level of 
intrinsic motivation and the individual's preferences for 
social outcomes. 
Competitive Motive. The competitive motive reflects a 
preference for doing better than others. This is an 
~ 
important motive, particularly in the world of business. 
While competition can be a positive force in motivating 
individuals, it can also lead to dysfunctional behavior. 
This can occur when an individual puts his own interests 
ahead of those of the group. 
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For each of the six classes of inducement systems 
studied, the combined area where cooperation is the natural 
outcome for the Collective motive is slightly smaller than 
the regions of cooperation for the Individual motive. 
Figure 54 shows the results for the Competitive motive for 
inducement systems based on absolute rewards. Comparing this 
with the results for the Individual motive (see Figure 30) 
shows that the region of cooperation has changed from 
r+g/10>1.0 to r>l.O. 
The differences between the Individual and Competitive 
motives reflect the problem mentioned above. An individual 
can improve his relative payoff by defecting, even though 
cooperation is rational for both the Individual and 
Collective motives. Figure 55 illustrates this problem for a 
2-person inducement system using absolute rewards (r=0.75, 
g=2.0). Defection is a dominating strategy for the 
Competitive motive, while cooperation is a dominating 
strategy for the Individual and Collective motives. 
Designers of organizational inducement systems should be 
cautious when using inducement systems that fall into this 
region. Such inducement systems may cause dysfunctional 
behavior due to the presence of the Competitive motive. 
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One feature of the competitive motive that should be 
noted is that the boundaries of regions do not depend on the 
value of the group incentive factor (g). This result is 
obvious, since group incentives apply to all parties equally 
and, therefore, do not result in a change in the difference 
between the payoffs to self and others. Because this motive 
is based on differences between self and others, the size of 
the group incentives does not affect the payoffs for this 
motive. 
From a design standpoint, cooperation is the natural 
outcome for this motive for inducement systems based on 
absolute rewards and/or penalties whenever (r+p)>1.0. For 
inducement systems based on competi~ive rewards andjor 
penalties, cooperation is the natural outcome whenever 
(r+p)>2.0. Unless these minimum values of r+p are reached, 
cooperation is never the natural outcome for this motive. 
Conversely, cooperation is always the natural outcome of 
this motive when the value of r+p exceeds these minimum 
values. 
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Altruism Motive. The Altruism motive is based on a 
preference for maximizing the payoffs to others, without 
consideration of the payoff to self. The rational basis for 
this motive is that others will engage in reciprocal acts of 
altruism (Trivers, 1964). While altruism based on kinship 
relations is common in nature, there is a question about the 
extent to which altruism operates in business organizations. 
The importance of this motive in organizational settings is, 
therefore, unknown. 
The analysis of the Altruism motive for inducement 
systems based on absolute rewards and/or penalties is 
relatively straightforward. Cooperation is always the 
natural outcome, since cooperation increases the payoff to 
others whenever group incentive are used in conjunction with 
absolute rewards and/or penalties. The DII region for the 
Individual motive becomes a CI region for the Altruism 
motive. The DI regions for the Individual motive become CII 
regions for the Altruism motive. An interesting result 
occurs for the CII region for the Altruism motive. For the 
Individual motive, the corresponding region (r+p+g<1.0) has 
defection as a dominating strategy and the equilibrium 
outcome (d=10) is Pareto optimal (Category I). For the 
Altruism motive, this region falls into Category II and 
cooperation is the natural outcome. This is another example 
of a prisoner's dilemma. The presence of the group incentive 
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leads each individual to help the other group members, even 
though this results in an inferior outcome for each 
individual. 
The analysis of the Altruism motive for inducement 
systems based on competitive rewards andjor penalties is 
somewhat more complex. For these inducement systems, the 
choice to cooperate or defect influences the size of the 
rewards and penalties.that others receive. For inducement 
systems that use either competitive rewards or penalties, 
the regions of cooperation includes those areas which have 
cooperation as the natural outcome for the Individual motive 
plus the DII region and a portion (r<g or p<g) of the DI 
region for the Individual motive. The only regions which do 
not have cooperation as the natural outcome for the Altruism 
motive are 1) the region with r>g and g<l.O for inducement 
systems based on competitive rewards, and 2) the region with 
p>g and g<1.0 for inducement systems based on competitive 
penalties. 
A still more interesting result occurs for the class of 
inducement systems based on competitive rewards and 
penalties as shown is Figure 56. Comparing these results 
with those for the Individual motive (see Figure 46) shows a 
new region of defection (DII) with values of r, p and g such 
that (r+p)/2>g and g>l.O. Defection is rational for this 
region because the increases in the payoffs to others from 
the high reward and penalty factors outweigh the increases 
from group incentives that result from cooperation. 
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Figure 56 . Map of natural outcomes for the Altruism motive 
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The results from the Altruism motive show that while 
this motive leads to cooperation as the natural outcome in 
most cases, caution should be exercised when dealing with 
competitive rewards andjor penalties. When the reward factor 
is too high, individuals may engage in game playing (e.g. 
working on someone else's behalf) or self-sacrifice (e.g. 
defecting) based on a desire to increase the competitive 
rewards to others. 
Eguity Motive. The Equity motive is the social motive 
which has received the most attention in the literature on 
motivation. This motive is based on a preference for 
minimizing the difference between the payoff to self and the 
payoff to others. This motive differs from the other motives 
in several aspects. 
First, all of the regions that occur for this motive 
fall within Category III. This is the only motive that has a 
single category of games. Figure 57 shows the results for 
inducement systems using absolute rewards. 
Second, this motive always has at least two Pareto 
equilibria. This is true because the best possible outcome 
(no difference between self and other) occurs when either 
all of the players cooperate (c=10) or all of the players 
defect (d=10). This result is similar to the result 
predicted by Equity theory with regard to High-High and 
Low-Low outcomes (Adams, 1963). 
Additionally, for inducement systems based on absolute 
rewards and/or penalties and inducement systems using 
1.72 
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Figute 57. Map ofnatutal outcomes for the Equity motive 
based on absolute rewards. 
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competitive rewards and penalties (r=p), the minimum payoffs 
for cooperation and defection are also equal. Consider as an 
example, the inducement system based on competitive rewards 
and penalties shown in Figure 58. This figure shows the 
payoffs for the Equity motive. Notice that the payoffs for 
both equilibria (c=10 and d=10) are equal. As a result, 
there is no basis for choosing between the two Pareto 
optimal equilibria and there is no unique maximin outcome. 
An individual with the Equity motive is, therefore, 
indifferent to cooperation and defection as the natural 
outcome for these classes of inducement systems. This result 
is noted on Figure 57 (i.e. "Defect=Cooperate"). 
Category III games with two Pareto equilibria do not 
occur in the taxonomy of Rappaport and Guyer (1966). Because 
those authors use ordinal outcomes (Best>Second Best>Third 
Best>Worst), two outcomes can never be equal to one another. 
This is another example of where the game categories 
developed by Rappaport and Guyer differ slightly from those 
developed in this study. 
Another interesting feature of these classes of 
inducement systems is the equity line. The equity line 
includes all inducement systems that result in equal payoffs 
to cooperators and defectors for all levels of cooperation. 
For these inducement systems the payoff curves for 
cooperation and defection are identical. As a result, 
individual receives their best possible outcome (Equity 
motive) regardless of the level of cooperation. 
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Figure 58. Payoffs for the equity motive based on 
competitive rewards and penalties (r=l.O, g=1.0). 
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In this study, the comparison between self and others 
used to formulate the Equity motive is based on the average 
payoff to others. The group, as opposed to any specific 
individual, is used as the referent for determining equity. 
As such, the Equity motive leads to cooperation whenever the 
majority of the group chooses to cooperate. However, when a 
single individual is the referent, the group will adopt this 
referent individual's level of contributions. In such cases, 
equity might lead to defection even though it would not be 
predicted on the basis of this analysis. 
Aggression Motive. The Aggression motive reflects the 
preference for outcomes that minimize the payoff to others. 
This payoff is the opposite of the Altruism motive. Wherever 
the Altruism motive has a natural outcome of cooperation, 
the Aggression motive has a natural outcome of defection. 
The game categories are also the same expect that Category 
III games become Category IV games and category IV games 
become Category III games. 
As might be expected, the Aggression motive tends to 
run counter to the other social motives. For inducement 
systems based on absolute rewards and/or penalties, there is 
no region where cooperation is the natural outcome for the 
Aggression motive. For inducement systems based on 
competitive rewards or penalties, the Aggression motive 
generally leads to cooperation only when the other social 
motives do not. However, for inducement systems based on 
competitive rewards and penalties, there are two large 
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regions (CI & CII) where cooperation is the natural outcome 
and where the Individual motive and the Competitive motive 
also have cooperation as the natural outcome. Figure 59 
shows the results for the Aggression motive for inducement 
systems based on competitive rewards and penalties. This 
class of inducement systems may be of interest in 
organizations desiring aggressive behavior by selected 
employees. Competitive rewards are sometimes used in sales 
organizations (O'Dell, 1987). Aggressive sales-related 
behavior may be beneficial in these organizations, since 
there is often a limited need for cooperation between 
individual sales representatives. In general, however, the 
Aggression motive runs counter to the organization's need 
for coordinated actions and common goals. As such, most 
organizations will prefer to select inducement systems where 
the Altruism motive (versus Aggression motive) has 
cooperation as the natural outcome. 
Implications for Organizations. The results of phases 
I & II define the regions where cooperation is the natural 
outcome for the Individual motive and the five social 
motives. In an empirical study by McClintock, Messick, 
Kuhlman and Campos (1974) the frequency of cooperation was 
found to increase as the number of social motives satisfied 
by cooperation increased. Their work considered four 
motives: 1) Individual, 2) Collective, 3) Competitive, and 
4) Aggression. The fact that behavior was influenced by the 
degree to which social motives were satisfied has important 
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Figure 59. Map of natural outcomes for the Aggression motive 
based on competitive rewards and penalties. 
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implications for organizations. Namely, that inducement 
systems should be selected that have cooperation as the 
natural outcome for as many motives as possible. 
178 
One way to apply the results of phases I & II is to map 
the regions where cooperation is the natural outcome for 
each of the motives being considered. Figures 60 thru 65 are 
summary maps showing the overlapping regions of cooperation 
for the Individual motive and the five social motives. These 
figures can be used to select inducement systems from 
regions where cooperation is the natural outcome for several 
motives. These inducement systems can be expected to result 
in cooperation over the widest range of social motives. This 
should lead to an increased level of cooperation when 
compared with regions where fewer motives have cooperation 
as the natural outcome. 
The regions shown in Figures 60-65 do not differentiate 
between game categories. Because some game categories are 
preferable to others (e.g. Category I), it is important to 
look at the actual game categories for each social motive 
before selecting an inducement system. As an example, an 
organizational practitioner might want to select an 
inducement system from a CI region for the Individual motive 
to ensure that cooperation is as stable as possible for this 
important motive. 
To illustrate the use of these figures, consider the 
results shown in Figure 60 for inducement systems using 
absolute rewards. When the value of the reward factor is 
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Figure 60. Map of the overlapping regions of cooperation for 
inducement systems using absolute rewards. 
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greater than 1.0, four motives (Individual, Collective, 
Competitive and Altruism) have cooperation as the natural 
outcome. Recall that neither cooperation or defection can be 
the natural outcome for the Equity motive for this class of 
inducement systems, and that the Altruism and Aggression 
motives can not both have cooperation as the natural 
outcome. As a result, the region with r>1.0 has cooperation 
as the natural outcome for the maximum number of social 
motives. Since altruism is likely to be preferred over 
aggression in an organization, this region is probably 
optimal for this class of inducement systems. 
A number of real-world inducement systems are based on 
absolute rewards. Sales commissions or piece rates are 
examples of absolute reward systems. Provided that the size 
of the reward is sufficient to compensate for the added 
effort, these inducement systems should be effective for the 
Individual, Collective, Competitive and Altruism motives. 
Another application of the results of phase II is in 
aligning the inducement system with the business strategy or 
culture of the organization. Lawler (1983), in particular, 
has argued for designing inducement systems based on the 
goals of the organization. Consider, as an example, a 
business that wants an aggressive and competitive sales 
force for gaining market share in a new area. Reviewing 
Figure 65 shows that for the class of inducement systems 
based on competitive rewards and penalties, there is a 
region (g<1.0, r>(10-g)/9) where cooperation is the natural 
~----
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outcome for the Individual, Competitive, and Aggression 
motives. An inducement system from this region has the 
potential for rewarding and reinforcing the behaviors that 
the business wishes to see in its sales force. This result 
is consistent with the finding that outside sales 
organizations often make use of special cash incentive and 
noncash incentive and recognition programs based on 
competition (Colletti, 1988). 
Another organization may require a high degree of 
cooperation and an absence of internal competition to 
succeed. such an organization might chose to use group 
incentives alone in or in combination with a low level of 
rewards and/or penalties to form an inducement system that 
results in cooperation for the Collective and Altruism 
motives. One such region is shown in Figure 63 (l.O<g<10.0, 
r<(lO-g)/9) for inducement systems based on competitive 
rewards. This type of inducement system could be formed 
using a special cash incentive program for exceptional 
performance in combination with a gainsharing plan. This 
combination of incentives might be acceptable even in a 
unionized setting, where it is normally difficult to have 
any significant amount of employee compensation tied to 
individual performance. 
The results from phases I and II should be viewed as a 
starting point in the selection of an inducement system for 
a real-world organization. The results are valuable from a 
heuristic standpoint in identifying the classes of 
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inducement systems that should be examined in greater 
detail. Of course, many other factors need to be considered 
before selecting an inducement system for real-world 
application (e.g. external job market, administration, 
senior management approval, degree of unionization, employee 
attitudes, etc.) 
Phase III Results 
The analysis performed in phases I and II is a static 
analysis. The natural outcomes that are given are based on 
the analysis of a single motive. Phase III extends the 
analysis by considering how the populations or frequencies 
of the six motives might evolve and how this evolution would 
affect the overall level of cooperation. 
An analysis of the evolution of social motives requires 
that specific inducement systems be selected for modeling. 
The results of phases I and II were used to select the 
inducement systems to be modeled. These inducement systems 
were chosen based on costs and the number of social motives 
with cooperation as the natural outcome. Table IX shows the 
inducement systems selected for modelling, the motives that 
had cooperation as the natural outcome and the costs of the 
inducement system. 
Fitness versus satisfaction. Two models were developed 
for studying the evolution of social motives. One model 
takes the view that social motives evolve based on their 
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success in gaining material payoffs that increase the 
fitness of the individual. These are the payoffs which are 
TABLE IX 
INDUCEMENT SYSTEMS SELECTED 
FOR MODELING IN PHASE III 
Class Motives Costs 
r p g (utiles) 
Absolute 
0 1.5 0 1,2,3,4 0.0 
0.5 0 1.0 2,4 1.5 
1.25 0 0.25 1,2,3,4 1.5 
Comgetitive 
2.5 0 0 3,6 0.0 
0 2.5 0 3,5,6 o.o 
1.25 1.25 0 1,3,6 0.0 
2.5 0 0.5 3,6 0.5 
0 2.5 0.5 3,5,6 0.5 
1.25 1.25 0.5 1,3,6 0.5 
1.5 0 1.5 1,2,4,5 1.5 
0 1.5 1.5 1,2,4 1.5 
0.75 0.75 1.5 2,4 1.5 
2.5 0 1.5 1,2,3,4 1.5 
0 2.5 1.5 1 thru 5 1.5 
1.25 1.25 1.5 1,2,3,4 1.5 
2.5 2.5 1.5 1,2,3,6 1.5 
Groug Incentives Onl~ 
0 0 0 none 0.0 
0 0 0.5 4 0.5 
0 0 1.5 2,4 1.5 
!)Individual, 2) Collective, 3) Competitive, 4) 
Altruism, 5) Equity, 6) Aggression 
reflected in the Individual motive. This model is labeled 
the "Fitness" model. 
The second model treats the outcome preferences 
reflected by the motive as ends in themselves. The success 
of a motive is viewed in terms of its ability to gain 
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payoffs that satisfy the preferences of the motive. 
Preferences are assumed to be satisfied when the best 
possible (maximum available) outcome is achieved. Satisfying 
this preference is considered to be intrinsically rewarding. 
This model is labeled the "Satisfaction" model. 
These models reflect two alternative explanations of 
how learning occurs within an organizational setting. The 
first model reflects the traditional approach of 
evolutionary game theory. The second is an attempt to 
fashion an alternative model that breaks from the normal 
assumptions of game theory, that individuals act to maximize 
their self-interests. The purpose of this portion of the 
study is to explore a new form of analysis made possible by 
the use of game theory. These models and their results 
should be viewed as a speculative attempt to widen our 
conceptual knowledge of motivation. 
Results of Modeling. The two models (Fitness and 
Satisfaction) were used to analyze each of the inducement 
systems shown in Table IX. All of the analysis in phase III 
was made using a 10-person group. The initial frequencies 
(f) of each social motive were set equal (f=0.167) and the 
simulation models were run until the equilibrium frequency 
for each social motive was reached. The results from the 
simulations were plotted to show the evolution of the 
frequencies of the social motives and the level of 
cooperation. These graphs were prepared for each of the 
inducement systems shown in Table IX and are included in 
Appendix c. The results from this phase of analysis are 
quite diverse. While it is not possible to review the 
results for each inducement system in detail, general 
observations can be made regarding the results for the 
various classes of inducement systems. 
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It is useful to begin with the three inducement systems 
based on group incentives only. As discussed earlier, these 
inducement systems are the limiting case (r=O, p=O) for the 
other classes of inducement systems. When the group 
incentive factor is also equal to zero, we have the base 
case inducement system. The only compensation to the 
individual is that which comes from base pay. This motive 
does not have cooperation as the natural outcome for any of 
the six social motives. For both the Fitness model and the 
Satisfaction model, the level of cooperation is zero 
throughout the simulation. Note that the frequencies of the 
motives change in the Satisfaction mode, but not in the 
Fitness model. In the Fitness model, the payoffs for the 
Individual motive are used to adjust the frequencies of all 
six motives. Because each motive defects, each motive 
receives the same payoff and the frequencies are unchanged 
from round to round. For the Satisfaction model, each motive 
uses the payoffs from its own motive (see Table III) to 
define its satisfaction relative to the other social motives 
(i.e. (PC(i)-Pmax(i))/(Pmax(i)-Pmin(i))). Since the degree 
of satisfaction is different for each motive, the 
.. --
frequencies evolve from round to round even though each 
motive defects. 
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The other two inducement systems using group incentives 
are somewhat more interesting. While neither of these 
inducement systems result in cooperation for the Fitness 
model, the inducement system with g=0.5 does result in a 
partial level of cooperation (cjn=0.28) for the Satisfaction 
model. The results for the Satisfaction model (r=O.o, p=o.o, 
g=0.5) are shown in Figure 66. Note that the Individual and 
Altruism motives displace the other motives, even though one 
motive cooperates and the other motive defects. The steady-
state level of cooperation is based on cooperation by the 
Altruism motive. The reason that this motive cooperates is 
that cooperation increases the payoff to others. The same 
rationale does not lead to cooperation, however, when the 
group incentive factor is increased to 1.5. The reason for 
this apparently contradictory result is that the payoff for 
altruism becomes relatively less satisfying than the payoff 
for aggression when g is increased to 1.5. As a result, the 
Aggression motive displaces the Altruism motive for this 
inducement system. 
Three inducement systems using absolute rewards and 
penalties were also considered. Only three inducement 
systems were considered because the results for any two 
inducement systems are equivalent when the value of g and 
the sum of r and p are equal (e.g. r=O.O, p=1.5, g=0.5 is 
equivalent to r=1.25, p=0.25, g=0.5). Two of the inducement 
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Figure 66. Evolution of social motives for the 
satisfaction model based on group incentives 
(r=O.O, p=O.O, g=0.5). 
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systems have cooperation as the natural outcome for the 
Individual, Collective, Competitive and Altruism motives. 
For these inducement systems, both the Fitness and 
Satisfaction models lead to total cooperation (c/n=1.0) as 
the steady-state outcome. 
A number of inducement systems based on competitive 
rewards andjor penalties were modeled. The four inducement 
systems using competitive rewards each resulted in an 
intermediate level of cooperation for both the Fitness model 
and the Satisfaction model. For the Fitness model, the 
steady-state level of cooperation was reached when 
cjn=l-1/r. This is the point where the payoffs for 
cooperation and defection are equal. When the simulation 
reaches this point, no further evolution of motives occurs. 
How quickly the model evolves to this point determines what 
motives remain. Figure 67 shows the results for r=2.5, 
p=O.O, g=0.5. Note how the level of cooperation fluctuates 
before settling down at the equilibrium frequencies. For the 
inducement system with r=2.5, p=o.o, g=1.5, the dynamics of 
the system are such that no steady-state was reached, even 
though several hundred rounds were eventually ran. 
For the Satisfaction model, the steady-state outcome 
for three of the four inducement systems based on 
competitive rewards and penalties involved a cycle between 
two levels of cooperation. Figure 68 shows the results for 
the Satisfaction model and an inducement system based on 
competitive rewards (r=2.5, p=O.O, g=O.O). For this 
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inducement system, the level of cooperation jumps between 
o.o and 0.5 in successive rounds. The motive associated with 
this cyclic behavior is the Altruism motive. When the level 
of cooperation is low (cjn=O.O), the altruist increases the 
payoff the others by cooperating. When the level of 
cooperation is higher (cjn=0.5), the altruist improves the 
payoff to others by defecting. This cyclic behavior is 
unlikely in a real organization, since it is improbable that 
the actions of a large portion of the group would be 
synchronized. 
Four inducement systems using competitive penalties 
were also analyzed. For these inducement systems, the 
steady-state levels of cooperation were found to vary 
depending upon the starting levels of cooperation. Recall 
that the payoffs for cooperation and defection for the 
Individual motive are equal when cjn=1/p. When the level of 
cooperation is less than 1/p, then the payoffs for defection 
are greater than the payoffs for cooperation. This causes 
the frequencies of defecting motives to increase and 
ultimately results in complete defection (cjn=O.O) as the 
steady-state outcome. The converse occurs when the level of 
cooperation is greater than 1/p. The frequencies of motives 
that cooperate increase and the steady-state outcome is 
total cooperation (c/n=1.0). 
Figures 69 & 70 show the results for the Fitness model 
when r=O.O, p=1.5, g=1.5. Figure 69 has an initial level of 
cooperation of cjn=0.5, based on the natural outcomes for 
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Figure 69. Evolution of social motives for the 
fitness model based on competitive rewards 
(r=O.O, p=1.5, g=1.5) and an initial level of 
cooperation of cjn=0.5. 
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Figure 70. Evolution of social motives for the 
fitness model based on competitive rewards 
(r=o.o, p=1.5, g=1.5) and an initial level of 
cooperation of cjn=0.83. 
199 
the six social motives. In Figure 70, the initial level of 
cooperation was increased to 0.83 by making two additional 
motives first round cooperators. These motive would normally 
begin as defectors, since they have defection as the natural 
outcome. Observe how the change in the initial level of 
cooperation affects the steady-state level of cooperation. 
The use of the natural outcome to define the initial level 
of cooperation follows from the analysis done in phases I 
and II. Organizational practitioners should be sensitive to 
the fact that the success of a particular inducement system 
might depend on the starting level of cooperation in the 
organization. When the existing level of cooperation is low, 
it may not be practical to use competitive penalties to 
increase contributions. 
Five inducement systems using competitive rewards and 
penalties were modeled. Each of these inducement systems had 
cooperation (c=10) as the steady-state outcome for the 
Fitness model. All but one of the inducement systems also 
had cooperation as the steady-state outcome for the 
Satisfaction model. Figures 71 & 72 show the results for an 
inducement system using competitive rewards and penalties 
(r=2.5, p=2.5, g=1.5). Figure 71 is based on the Fitness 
model and Figure 72 on the satisfaction model. This 
inducement system is from a region where cooperation is the 
natural outcome for the Individual, Collective, Competitive 
and Aggression motives. Note that the Altruism motive has 
defection as the natural outcome for this region. 
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Figure 71. Evolution of social motives for the 
fitness model based on competitive rewards and 
penalties (r=2.5, p=2.5, g=1.5). 
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Figure 72. Evolution of social motives for the 
satisfaction model based on competitive rewards 
and penalties (r=2.5, p=2.5, g=1.5). 
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In Figure 71 (Fitness model), the level of cooperation 
quickly rises to 1.0. As discussed earlier (phase II), the 
high reward and penalty factors of this inducement system 
lead the Altruism motive to defect so that others will 
receive these rewards. This causes the frequency of this 
motive to rapidly diminish as the penalties decrease its 
payoffs. By contrast, the Equity motive immediately begins 
to mimic the behavior of the other motives in order to 
minimize the difference between its payoff and the payoffs 
others. This is an example of the tendency of this motive to 
follow the group norm. 
In Figure 72 (Satisfaction model), the level of 
cooperation initially fluctuates and then returns to its 
starting level of 0.667. In the process, the frequency of 
the Altruism motive jumps to f=0.33. over an extended period 
of time, the increased level of satisfaction for the 
Individual, Equity and Altruism motives displace the other 
motives entirely. In this example, the Equity and Altruism 
motives both succeed in establishing themselves in the final 
equilibrium populations. The fact that one defects while the 
other cooperates results in a partial level of cooperation 
as the steady-state outcome. Similar results occur whenever 
the reward and penalty factors exceed the group incentive 
factors. When this happens, the Altruism motive has 
defection as the natural outcome and this results in less 
than total cooperation as the steady-state outcome. As a 
result, it may be inadvisable to use competitive rewards and 
r---
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penalties unless the group incentive factor is equal to or 
larger than the reward (andjor penalty) factor. 
Implications to organizations. The inducement systems 
analyzed in phase III show how the two models of 
organizational learning (Fitness and Satisfaction) can lead 
to different predictions about the stability of social 
motives. One way in which this study is useful is in 
identifying inducement systems where both models predict a 
high (or acceptable) level of cooperation as the steady-
state. This is an additional criteria which can be used when 
selecting an inducement system. Inducement systems which 
lead to high levels of cooperation for both learning models 
should be more successful in gaining the cooperation of 
individuals within an organization. Table X shows the 
steady-state levels of cooperation for the Fitness model and 
the Satisfaction model for each of the inducement systems 
being studied. The most desirable inducement systems are 
those where the steady-state level of cooperation results in 
total cooperation (c/n=l.O) for both models. As an example, 
for inducement systems based on absolute rewards and/or 
penalties, the inducement system with r=O.O, p=l.5 and g=O.O 
is preferred over the inducement system with r=0.5, p=O.O 
and g=l.O, since only the former has steady-state values of 
c;n equal to 1.0 for both models. 
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TABLE X 
EQUILIBRIUM LEVEL OF COOPERATION 
FOR FITNESS AND SATISFACTION MODELS 
Class F;!tness Satisfaction 
r p g (c/n) (c/n) 
Absolute 
0 1.5 0 1.0 1.0 
0.5 0 1.0 0.0 o.o 
1.25 0 0.25 1.0 1.0 
Com~etitive 
2.5 0 0 0.6 0.25 
0 2.5 0 0.0 1.0 
1.25 1.25 0 1.0 1.0 
2.5 0 0.5 0.6 0.33 
0 2.5 0.5 1.0 1.0 
1.25 1.25 0.5 1.0 1.0 
1.5 0 1.5 0.33 0.75 
0 1.5 1.5 0.0 0.0 
0.75 0.75 1.5 0.0 0.0 
2.5 0 1.5 0.45 
0 2.5 1.5 1.0 1.0 
1.25 1.25 1.5 1.0 1.0 
2.5 2.5 1.5 1.0 0.68 
Grou~ Incentives Only 
0 0 0 0.0 0.0 
0 0 0.5 o.o 0.28 
0 0 1.5 0.0 0.0 
CHAPTER V 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS 
This chapter summarizes the practical implications and 
theoretical significance of the results and methods and 
provides recommendations regarding further empirical and 
theoretical work. The results from the preceding analysis 
(see Chapter IV) are used to develop criteria for selecting 
inducement systems which should be effective in motivating 
individuals to make discretionary contributions towards the 
goals of the organization. Inducement systems meeting these 
criteria are identified for each of the six classes of 
inducement systems being studied. The most efficient 
inducement systems from these regions are identified based 
on the costs of the inducement system to the organization. 
Suggestions are made for applying the results to real-world 
organizations. The limitations of the study are discussed 
and suggestions are given for future empirical and 
analytical work. 
This chapter also discusses the theoretical 
significance of the application of game theory to the study 
of inducement systems and social motives. The relationship 
of this work to expectancy theory and other theories based 
on social motives is presented and recommendations are given 
regarding further work needed to build an integrated theory 
of motivation - one capable of incorporating a range of 
social motives. 
Inducement System Design 
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Organizations are concerned with designing inducement 
systems which are both effective and efficient (Barnard, 
1938). Inducement systems are effective when they motivate 
individuals to contribute their efforts towards the goals of 
the organization. Inducement systems are efficient when they 
use a minimum of organizational resources. 
The results of the three phases of analysis given in 
Chapter IV can be used as selection criteria for design~ng 
inducement systems which motivate individuals to contribute 
to the organization. Many inducement systems will not meet 
all of these criteria. Those that do meet these criteria 
should be good candidates for consideration by 
organizational practitioners. They should not be used 
blindly, however. Inducement systems that meet all of the 
criteria may not fit a given organization, while other 
inducement systems might work very well. As noted by Lawler 
(1983), inducement systems should be designed so that they 
are congruent with the organization's structure, management 
philosophy, and decision making and communications styles. 
The first phase of analysis was based on the Individual 
motive and the belief that individuals will seek to maximize 
their self-interest. Self-interest is one of the core 
assumptions of most theories of motivation. The importance 
~-
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of the Individual motive leads to a selection criterion that 
requires inducement systems to have cooperation as the 
natural outcome for the Individual motive. The results from 
phase I give the regions where cooperation is the natural 
outcome for the six classes of inducement systems being 
considered. These results are summarized in Table V (see 
Chapter IV) and shown graphically in Appendix A. Inducement 
systems from these regions meet the criterion being 
discussed - that cooperation is the natural outcome for the 
Individual motive. 
Two additional criteria from phase I can also be used 
to screen inducement systems. These are the satisficing 
criteria that: 1) cooperators receive satisfactory outcomes, 
and 2) defectors receive unsatisfactory outcomes. When these 
criteria are met, satisficing behavior (Simon, 1976) should 
not interfere with the natural outcome. The regions where 
these two criteria are met depend upon the level at which 
base pay is set. As such, organizational practitioners 
should be open to modifying base pay to meet these 
satisficing criteria. Table VIII shows the regions where 
both satisficing criteria are met, assuming no change in 
base pay. These regions are graphically depicted in 
Appendix A. 
In phase II, five additional social motives were 
considered: 1) Collective, 2) Competitive, 3) Altruism, 
4) Equity, and 5) Aggression. While the business goals of an 
organization may dictate a preference for some motives over 
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others (e.g. Collective vs. Competitive) in shaping the 
. 
culture of the organization, most organizations would prefer 
an inducement system that promotes cooperation across as 
many social motives as possible. The general exception is 
the Aggression motive, which can be dysfunctional in many 
organizations. This is partly because a motive based on 
minimizing the payoffs to others is likely to have negative 
impacts that effect other areas of the business (e.g. 
customer relations, interpersonal communications, team-
orientation). Additionally, inducement systems that have 
cooperation as the natural outcome for the Aggression motive 
typically have defection as the natural outcome for the 
other motives. 
Given the potential problems with the Aggression 
motive, an appropriate criterion for selecting inducement 
systems is the number of social motives (excluding 
Aggression) that have cooperation as the natural outcome. 
Figures 60-65 summarize the natural outcomes for the social 
motives for the six classes of inducement systems being 
considered (see Chapter IV). These figures present the major 
results from phase II of the analysis. Other factors being 
equal, inducement systems from regions where cooperation is 
the natural outcome for the largest number of motives 
(excluding Aggression) are preferred. 
In phase III, selected inducement systems were analyzed 
to determine the possible evolution of social motives. Two 
learning models were used to model candidate inducement 
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systems. One model (Fitness Model) interprets social motives 
as strategies for maximizing material payoffs. The other 
(Satisfaction Model) treats social motives as reflecting 
genuine preferences for social motives. Where both models 
lead to cooperation as the steady-state outcome, this 
outcome can be thought of as robust (i.e. a high level of 
cooperation would continue over many payoffs). The criterion 
that both models evolve to cooperation as the steady-state 
outcome is the final effectiveness criterion used in this 
study. A summary of the results from phase III for selected 
inducement systems are shown in Table X (see Chapter IV). 
Each of the three phases of analysis provide possible 
selection criteria for choosing an organizational inducement 
system. These criteria are concerned with the potential 
effectiveness of inducement systems in gaining the 
cooperation of individuals with the goals of the 
organization. Each of these criteria can be used to screen 
inducement systems based on the ability of the inducement 
system to promote individual cooperation with the goals of 
the organization. The effectiveness criteria that were 
developed from each phase of the analysis are summarized in 
Table XI. Inducement systems that meet each of these 
criteria have the potential to be effective in promoting 
individual cooperation with the goals of the organization. 
While primarily concerned with the issue of 
effectiveness, this study also examines the issue of 
efficiency. Efficiency is viewed in terms of the costs of 
the inducement system to the organization. From the 
perspective of the organization, an inducement system is 
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efficient if it promotes cooperation at the lowest cost to 
the organization. Cost curves for each of the classes of 
TABLE XI 
SUMMARY OF RECOMMENDED CRITERIA 
FOR SELECTING ORGANIZATIONAL INDUCEMENT SYSTEMS 
Phase I 
Inducement systems should have cooperation as the 
natural outcome for the Individual motive. 
The payoffs to cooperators for the Individual 
motive should be satisfactory when every 
individual cooperates. 
The payoffs to defectors for the Individual motive 
should be unsatisfactory for all levels of 
cooperation by others. 
Phase II 
Inducement systems are preferred which have 
cooperation as the natural outcome for the largest 
number of social motives (excluding the Aggression 
motive). 
Phase III 
Inducement systems should evolve to total 
cooperation as the steady-state outcome for both 
the Fitness and Satisfaction models. 
inducement system were developed earlier and are shown in 
Figures 48-50 (see Chapter IV). These cost curves can be 
used to find the least cost inducement system meeting the 
effectiveness criteria shown in Table XI. The inducement 
system meeting each of the effectiveness criteria and having 
the lowest cost should be of interest to organizations. 
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The least cost inducement system is, of course, not 
necessarily the best inducement system. The methods used in 
this study depend on an accurate measure of the costs that 
the individual assigns to their discretionary contributions 
and the utility of various inducements to the individual. 
Additionally, this study makes no allowances for differences 
among individuals. As a result, the organization is faced 
with significant uncertainties when setting the optimum 
values of the group and individual incentive factors. 
Organizations may, therefore, wish to select inducement 
systems with somewhat higher costs to ensure the cooperation 
of the majority of individuals in the face of these 
uncertainties. 
The cost curves given in Figure 48 & 49 represent the 
costs of incentives given by the organization to 
cooperators. The units are based on the utility of those 
incentives to the cooperating individuals. In determining 
the costs that the organization is willing to pay to gain 
the cooperation of individuals, the organization must 
determine 1) the value of the discretionary contributions 
these incentives gain, and 2) the ability of the 
organization to pay those incentives. Organizations may be 
willing to pay a great deal for highly valued or scarce 
contributions. On the other hand, the organization may look 
to restructure its inducement systems to lower costs during 
times of financial emergency. These decisions depend on the 
specific conditions facing the organization. 
The effectiveness and efficiency criteria described 
above can be applied to each of the six classes of 
inducement systems to select candidate inducement systems 
for use in an organization. Table XII summarizes the 
recommendations of this study regarding the selection of 
organizational inducement systems. This table indicates 
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1) the regions where each of the effectiveness criteria are 
met, 2) the parameters of the least cost inducement system, 
and 3) the costs of the least cost inducement system. The 
results for each class of inducement systems are discussed 
below. 
Absolute Rewards. For inducement systems based on 
absolute rewards, the only inducement systems where each of 
the selection criteria is satisfied occur when the values of 
the reward factor (r) and the group incentive factor (g) are 
r>1.0 and g=O.O (assuming no change in base pay). When g>O.O 
this class of inducement systems fails to meet the 
satisficing criteria which requires that defectors receive 
an unsatisfactory payoff. Fortunately, there is a relatively 
simple solution to this problem. By reducing base pay by 
g utiles, defectors will always receive an unsatisfactory 
payoff. The value of the reward factor (r) can then be 
adjusted to ensure that cooperators always receive a 
satisfactory payoff. This value is determined as follows: 
C(n)=g(n/n)+r-1-g>O.O 
r>1 
TABLE XII 
SUMMARY OF RECOMMENDATIONS 
FOR SELECTING INDUCEMENT SYSTEMS 
BASED ON EFFECTIVENESS AND EFFICIENCY CRITERIA 
Class Effectiveness 
Absolute 
Rewards r>1.0 
g=O.O 
or 
g>O.O 
(assuming base pay is lowered 
Penalties p>1.0 
g>1.0 
p>g(n-1)/n 
Both (r+p)>1.0 
r+g>1.0 or 
(r+p)/2>g(n-1)/n 
Competitive 
Rewards none 
Penalties p>2.0 
g>1.0 
p>g 
Both (r+p)/2=g 
g>1.0 
r=rewards factor 
g=group incentive factor 
Efficiency: 
r p g 
1.0 0.0 
1.0 g 
by g utiles) 
1.0 0.0 
1.0 1.0 0.0 
0.5 0.5 0.5 
N/A N/A N/A 
1.0 1.0 
1.0 1.0 1.0 
p=penalty factor 
n=group size 
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Cost 
1.0 
1.0 
1.0 
1.0 
1.0 
N/A 
1.0 
1.0 
Figure 73 shows the regions where the effectiveness 
criteria are met for inducement systems based on absolute 
rewards. The cross-hatched area (r>1.0) includes systems 
meeting each of effectiveness criterion listed in Table XI. 
These results are based on reducing base pay by g utiles. 
Inducement systems based on absolute rewards fall into this 
Reward 
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r 
1.0 
0 
I 
0 1.0 5.0 
Group Incentive Factor (g) 
Region meeting effectiveness criteria 
(assuming base pay is reduced by g utiles). 
10.0 
Figure 73. Map of the tegion meeting effectiveness criteria fot 
absolute rewards. 
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region when r>1.0. When this condition is met four social 
motives have cooperation as the natural outcome, 1) 
Individual, 2) Collective, 3) Competitive, and 4) Altruism. 
Recall that the Equity motive has no unique solution for the 
natural outcome for this class for inducement systems. 
However, when r=1.0 the inducement system falls on the 
equity line and payoffs will be equitable for all levels of 
cooperation. Also note that cooperators always receive a 
satisfactory outcome when r>1.0. 
The two inducement systems from this region which were 
analyzed in phase III resulted in cooperation (cjn=1.0) as 
the steady-state outcome for both the Fitness and the 
Satisfaction models. These two inducement systems had design 
parameters of p=1.5, g=O.O and r=1.25, g=0.25. As discussed 
in Chapter IV, the inducement system with p=1.5, g=O.O is 
equivalent to an inducement system with r=1.5, g=O.O for 
inducement systems based on absolute rewards andjor 
penalties. 
Two types of absolute rewards used in organizations are 
sales commissions and piece rates. These incentives can be 
used with or without group incentives. A recent survey of 
sales and marketing organizations found that 65% of 
organizations with outside sales personnel used sales 
commissions to reward individuals (O'Dell, 1987). The median 
reward was 25% of base compensation. Incentive pay has also 
been used successfully in manufacturing businesses. Lincoln 
Electric has paid its employees on a piecework basis for 
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decades (Perry, 1988). In addition employees receive a 
year-end bonus based on their dependability, quality and 
output. Employee bonuses average 97.6% of regular earnings 
and Lincoln has not had a losing quarter in 54 years. 
Commissions and piece rates benefit from the fact that 
they both have objective and measurable outputs. Because 
commissions and piece rates are generally set in advance, 
individuals have a high degree of certainty that their 
performance will result in known outcomes. This results in 
clearly defined goals and high performance-outcome 
expectancies (P-->0). 
Another common form of individual rewards is merit pay. 
In many organizations, employees receive merit increases 
based on meeting established goals and objectives. These 
goals and objectives are often tailored to the specific 
tasks and responsibilities of the individual and can include 
both objective and subjective measures. A problem with merit 
pay incentive systems is that merit pay tends to become 
viewed as a part of base compensation. As a result, pay is 
rarely reduced, even when performance falls. Employees often 
receive annual merit increases until they reach the top of 
their salary range. "Topping out", as it is known, leads to 
morale and motivation problems for long-term employees in a 
given pay classification. 
Lawler (1983) has recommended that organizations 
consider using lump sum merit increases to help preserve the 
effectiveness of incentive rewards. Lump sum merit increases 
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reward individuals based on their individual performance. 
Unlike most merit pay systems, these rewards do not add to 
the individual's base pay but are paid as a separate bonus. 
By requiring that individuals earn their bonus each 
performance period, lump sum merit increases help preserve 
the effectiveness of the reward. 
If base pay is not reduced, the addition of group 
incentives increases the cost of the inducement system over 
the least cost inducement system. However, when no group 
incentives are used, individuals are indifferent between 
defection and cooperation for the Altruism motive. As a 
result, individuals may be more likely to sacrifice group 
interests for individual interests. Organizations using 
absolute rewards may wish to include group incentives in 
order to reinforce cooperation by this motive. This can be 
done without increasing costs if base pay is reduced by g 
utiles. One of the gainsharing type group incentives could 
be effective for this purpose (e.g. Rucker, Improshare, 
Scanlon). The use of group incentives would also increase 
the salience of the Collective motive. When group incentives 
are built around an employee participation process, they can 
be very effective in promoting teamwork and cooperation 
(Doyle, 1983). 
Absolute Penalties. The region where each of the 
selection criteria are satisfied for inducement systems 
using absolute penalties has values of p and g such that 
p>1.0, p>g(n-1)/n and g>1.0 (see Table XII). The penalty 
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factor must be greater than 1.0 to ensure cooperation by the 
Individual, Collective, Competitive and Altruism motives. 
The penalty factor must also be greater than g(n-1)/n to 
ensure that defectors receive an unsatisfactory payoff. 
Because there are no rewards for cooperation, the group 
incentive factor must be greater than 1.0 to ensure that the 
natural outcome results in a satisfactory payoff for 
cooperators. 
Figure 74 shows the region where the effectiveness 
criteria are met for inducement systems based on absolute 
penalties. The higher group factor (g>1.0) for this class of 
inducement systems causes the least cost inducement system 
to have the same costs per cooperator that were found for 
inducement systems using absolute rewards. In general, the 
minimum cost per cooperator must be at least 1.0 utiles to 
offset the costs to the individual from cooperating. 
Inducement systems meeting the above criteria have 
cooperation as the natural outcome for the Individual, 
Collective, Competitive and Altruism motives. The higher 
level of group incentives needed for this class of 
inducement systems should be beneficial to organizations 
trying to promote the Collective and Altruism motives. Note 
that the high penalty factors would also act to eliminate 
defectors from the organization due to the unsatisfactory 
outcomes that they would receive. 
One important observation about this class on 
inducement systems is that unless the group incentive factor 
~--
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is greater than one (g>l.O), cooperators will be 
dissatisfied. This dissatisfaction might affect overall 
performance, even though the individual cooperates with 
respect to the parameter used to measure contributions. 
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Another difficulty with the use of penalties is that 
many supervisors are unable to use them effectively. 
Confronting an employee and taking away compensation is a 
difficult supervisory task. Too little attention has been 
given to the communication, interpersonal and psycho-social 
skills needed to effectively implement various inducement 
systems, particularly those involving penalties. The use of 
any monetary penalties (absolute or competitive) should only 
be considered if their use is consistent with the level of 
training and skills of supervisors. 
The problems associated with lowering pay may lead some 
organizations to consider using noncash penalties. For 
example, posting production or sales records or using a 
progressive discipline procedure are penalties that could be 
used in lieu of monetary penalties. These types of 
incentives might be particularly effective in eliminating 
low performers from the organization while preserving a 
major portion of total compensation for group incentives. 
Absolute Rewards and Penalties. The region of interest 
for inducement systems using absolute rewards and penalties 
has values of r, p and g such that (r+p)>l.O, 
(r+p)/2>g(n-1)/n and (r+p)/2+g>l.O (see Table XII). This 
region is shown in Figure 75. A number of least cost 
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inducement systems can be selected from this region. This is 
because inducement systems along the boundary where 
(r+p)/2+g=l.O all have costs of 1.0 utiles per cooperator. 
The practitioner can, therefore, choose whether or not to 
include group incentives without increasing the costs to the 
organization. As an example, the inducement systems r=l.O, 
p=l.O, g=O.O and r=0.5, p=0.5, g=0.5 each have a cost of 
1.0 utiles. 
Organizations should give consideration to basing their 
inducement systems on absolute rewards and penalties. This 
class of inducement systems has many of the best features on 
inducement systems based on absolute rewards or penalties. 
As an example, lump sum merit increases could be combined 
with noncash penalty systems (e.g. discipline) and a 
gainsharing program. This type of inducement system would 
encourage defectors to improve their performance or leave 
the organization while providing strong motivation for 
individual and group performance. 
Competitive Rewards. Inducement systems using 
competitive rewards have no region where each of the 
selection criteria are met. This result occurs because there 
are no penalties to defectors and because there are no 
rewards to cooperators when each individual cooperates. For 
inducement systems using absolute rewards, this problem was 
corrected by decreasing base pay by g(n-1)/n utiles. Because 
there are no competitive rewards when each individual 
cooperates (i.e. reward=r(1-cjn)=O), a positive payoff for 
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cooperators can only be achieved by increasing the group 
incentive such that g>l.O. For this category of games, it is 
impossible to meet both of the satisficing criteria, since g 
must be greater than 1.0 (g>l.O) for cooperators to receive 
a satisfactory payoff and g must be o.o (g=O.O) for 
defectors to receive an unsatisfactory payoff. 
This class of inducement systems also fails to meet the 
criterion that both learning models lead to cooperation 
(c=n) as the equilibrium outcome. None of the four 
inducement systems modeled (g<n) resulted in cooperation as 
the equilibrium outcome for either the Fitness Model or the 
satisfaction Model. 
The use of competitive rewards should not be discarded 
entirely. These types of rewards can be particularly 
effective because of their high visibility within an 
organization. Public awards based on outstanding performance 
have symbolic as well as motivational impacts on the 
organization. Competitive rewards can also be used in 
conjunction with absolute rewards and/or penalties to form 
hybrid inducement systems. In general, it may be preferable 
to use competitive rewards on an unannounced basis to reward 
past performance, rather than using them as the basis of 
contests for future rewards. While this would lower the 
motivational value of these rewards, it would increase their 
symbolic value and avoid situations where competition 
between individuals damages group performance. 
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Despite the problems with competitive rewards noted by 
others (Kohn, 1987), this type of incentives has gained some 
acceptance in sales organizations (O'Dell, 1987; Colletti, 
1988). These inducement systems take the form of special 
cash incentives, noncash incentives and recognition 
programs. The basis of the payment can be competing against 
others or competing against the past performance level of 
the individual. These incentives are often based on 
subjective measures such as supervisory or peer rankings. In 
general, only 5-10% of individuals receive rewards under 
these programs (O'Dell, 1987). It should be noted that sales 
organizations often have limited need for cooperation 
between outside sales representatives. 
One problem with competition based on management 
discretion is that individuals may have a low expectation 
that a given level of performance will result in the payment 
of the rewards. This reduces the performance-outcome 
expectancy and may limit the effectiveness of this type of 
reward (O'Dell, 1987). Peer rankings generally have a higher 
degree of accuracy and reliability (Latham & Wexley, 1981) 
and should improve the [P-->0] expectancy. One such 
inducement system would be a merit pool where payoffs are 
based on peer rankings and where the size of the merit pool 
is tied to group performance. This is a hybrid type of 
system including elements of group and individual 
incentives. 
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The use of internal competition to improve productivity 
has been quite controversial. Kohn (1987) has argued 
strongly against all forms of internal competition and has 
stressed the importance of cooperation and coordination in 
improving performance. Based on the research reviewed by 
Kohn (1987), he states that competition: 1) increases 
anxiety, 2) decreases innovation, 3) restricts the flow of 
information, and 4) limits the sharing of resources. Other 
management authors (Kanter, 1987: and Peters, 1988) see 
competition as potentially useful in certain situations, 
particularly those involving competing work groups. Peters 
cites the excellent results achieved by General Motors at 
their New Unified Motor Manufacturing Inc. (NUMMI) auto 
plant, based in part on competing work groups. 
The results from this study indicate partial support 
for Kohn's position. By themselves, competitive rewards did 
not result in cooperation as the natural outcome for the 
Individual, Collective or Altruism motives. Instead, the 
only motives with cooperation as the natural outcome were 
the Competitive and Aggression motives. When no group 
incentives are used, this class of inducement systems is 
ineffective in promoting cooperation. With the exception of 
sales organizations, where cooperation between individuals 
is not required, the use of competitive rewards is likely to 
lead to dissatisfied workers and at best a partial level of 
group cooperation. In fairness to Peters, this study did not 
consider inducement systems based on group competition. The 
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results do, in fact, point to the need for group incentives 
when competitive rewards and penalties are used. Further 
work is needed to determine the effectiveness of incentives 
based on group competition. 
Competitive Penalties. For inducement systems based on 
competitive penalties, the region meeting the two 
satisficing criteria has values of p and g such that g>l.O, 
p>2.o, and p>g. This region is shown in Figure 76. Because 
costs depend only upon the size of the group incentive 
factor, the practitioner can choose differing levels of 
penalties without incurring any added costs. This is 
important in selecting an inducement system that has 
cooperation as the natural outcome for the largest number of 
social motives. Figure 64 (see Chapter IV) shows the summary 
map of social motives for inducement systems using 
competitive penalties. When p>2.0 all of the motives, except 
the Aggression motive, have cooperation as the natural 
outcome. However, when p<2.0 then only three motives have 
cooperation as the natural outcome, 1) Individual, 
2) Collective, and 3) Altruism. 
Some caution should be given regarding the use of high 
competitive penalty factors. First, managers are often 
reluctant to administer penalties. The effectiveness of the 
inducement system will be severely undercut if managers fail 
to deliver these penalties. Second, errors in determining 
cooperators from defectors might result in cooperators being 
unfairly penalized. This could have undesirable consequences 
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Figure 76 . Map of the region meeting effectiveness criteria for 
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on future motivation. The need for well-trained managers and 
accurate evaluation systems cannot be overemphasized when 
penalties are used as part of the inducement system. In 
general, the problems noted for inducement systems using 
absolute penalties are also applicable to inducement systems 
using competitive penalties. 
Another point which should be made about these 
inducement systems is that when g<n the equilibrium outcome 
(cooperation or defection) depends on the initial level of 
cooperation. When the level of cooperation is less than 
1/n+(1-g/n)/p, defection is the natural outcome. This result 
is consistent with the results for the two simulation models 
used in phase III. Complete cooperation (cjn=1.0) was the 
steady-state outcome only when the initial level of 
cooperation was greater than 1/n+(1-g/n)fp. Note that when 
the level of group cooperation is less than 1/n+(1-g/n)/p, 
it may be inadvisable to introduce competitive penalties. 
Competitive penalties are not generally included as a 
formal part of inducement systems. Instead, they tend to be 
part of the informal inducement system of the organization 
and take the form of discipline, demotion and layoffs. A 
novel program for improving attendance is based on providing 
attendance coaching to the workers with the worst attendance 
each month. Attendance records are posted each month and the 
employees with the worst attendance sent to the manager's 
office for a discussion of how the employee can improve his 
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attendance. Failure to improve can result in discipline and 
eventual termination. 
Competitive penalties also operate in consulting 
organizations and universities where low performers are 
often forced to leave the organization. Advancement or 
tenure are often based on competing against others in 
similar positions. These informal penalty systems are 
reflected in sayings like "up or out" and "publish or 
perish". 
Competitive Rewards and Penalties. The inducement 
systems meeting the two satisficing criteria for the class 
of inducement systems based on competitive rewards and 
penalties have values of r, p and g such that (r+p)/2>g and 
g>l.O (see Table XII). Because costs are independent of the 
size of the reward and penalty factors when cjn=l.O, the 
practitioner can set these values without being overly 
concerned about costs. 
Unfortunately, when (r+p)/2>g the Satisfaction model 
has a steady-state level of cooperation of less than 1.0 
(c/n<l.O). Additionally, when (r+p)/2>g the motives that 
have cooperation as the natural outcome include the 
Aggression motive. If the inducement system designer wishes 
to avoid the Aggression motive, then he needs to set the 
value of (r+p)/2 less than g. The Altruism motive then 
becomes one of the motives with cooperation as the natural 
outcome. However, when (r+p)/2<g the payoff to defectors is 
positive. The compromise is to set (r+p)/2=g. Inducement 
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systems meeting these criteria are shown in Figure 77. These 
inducement systems then are indifferent to both the 
Aggression and Altruism motives. In practice, the use of 
competitive rewards and penalties requires that the 
organization abandon either the criterion that defectors 
receive an unsatisfactory outcome or the criterion that both 
simulation models lead to total cooperation as the 
steady-state outcome. 
One interesting feature of this class of inducement 
systems is that even when g<l.O the natural outcome is 
cooperation, provided that (r+p)/2>(n-g)j(n-l). Reducing g 
to less then 1.0 results in negative payoffs to cooperators, 
but cooperation remains the natural outcome for this 
Category II region. These are reverse prisoner's dilemma 
games. While this region does not meet the criterion that 
cooperators receive a satisfactory outcome, these inducement 
systems have cooperation as the natural outcome for the 
Individual, Competitive and Aggression motives and have 
costs of less than 1.0 utiles. This region may be of 
interest to organizations that can tolerate a high degree of 
turnover or wish to promote the Competitive and Aggression 
motives. Another potential use of these types of rewards and 
penalties is to combine them with absolute rewards and 
penalties. More work is needed to investigate these hybrid 
classes of inducement systems. 
In general, the problems which were noted for 
competitive rewards or competitive penalties also hold for 
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inducements systems based on competitive rewards and 
penalties. The use of penalties is problematic in most 
organizations. Penalties, particularly monetary penalties, 
require a high level of supervisory training and skills. As 
noted by Kohn (1987), competition has serious side-effects 
which can cause performance problems in organizations. 
organizational Implications. Based on the results for 
the six classes of inducement systems, the use of absolute 
rewards and/or penalties is recommended over the use of 
competitive rewards and/or penalties. No inducement systems 
were found which met all of the selection criteria for 
inducement systems based on competitive rewards. For 
inducement systems based on competitive rewards and 
penalties, the organization must choose between a partial 
level of cooperation and allowing defectors to receive a 
satisfactory outcome. While inducement systems based on 
competitive penalties met each of the selection criteria 
when p>2.0, g>l.O and p>g, there are problems in 
administering penalties and general concerns over the side-
effects of competition. While competitive rewards and 
penalties can be effective in cases where high turnover is 
acceptable and where there is little need for the 
coordination of activities (e.g. outside sales 
representatives), the general use of competitive rewards and 
penalties is not recommended. More work is needed to look at 
hybrid systems of absolute and competitive rewards and 
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penalties and other form of competition, particularly group 
competition. 
Inducement systems based on absolute rewards andjor 
penalties were found to be quite effective in gaining the 
contributions of individuals. A broad range of inducement 
systems were found that meet each of the selection criteria, 
although some adjustment in base pay was required for 
inducement systems based on absolute rewards. This class of 
inducement systems allow the designer a great deal of 
discretion in balancing individual and group incentives. 
One attractive option would be to lower base pay by 
g utiles and use gainsharing plus lump sum merit increases 
as the basis of the group and individual incentives. Base 
pay would need to be lowered by g utiles and the reward 
opportunity set at greater than 1.0 utiles. In sales or 
piece work organizations, where a high degree of 
coordination is not required, the group incentive factor 
could be dropped and lump sum merit increases replaced by a 
sales commission or piece rate. If penalties are desired, 
they could be noncash penalties, such as coaching and 
discipline, rather than monetary penalties. 
Motivation Theory 
The work done in this study has applicability beyond 
the analysis of organizational inducement systems. The 
addition of game theoretic methods represents a potentially 
powerful expansion of motivation theory. These methods make 
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possible an analysis of the motivation of groups of 
individuals rather than being restricted to dealing only 
with single individuals. These methods also provide a 
framework for integrating expectancy theory, equity theory 
and other theories of motivation based on social motives. 
The approaches of expectancy theory and game theory are 
closely related. Both approaches assume that individuals 
will make choices that maximize their self-interest. In 
expectancy theory, the expected value or payoff from actions 
are based on the conditional probabilities 
(i.e. expectancies) that a chosen level of effort will 
result in outcomes of differing preferences (i.e. valences). 
Two sets of probabilities are involved: 1) the probability 
that a level of effort will result in a specified level of 
performance (E-->P), and 2) the probability that the level 
of performance will result in certain outcomes (P-->0). The 
general formulation of expectancy theory is that the 
motivational force is equal to [E-->P][P-->O]V, where Vis 
the valence of the outcomes to the individual (Vroom, 1964). 
This study has assumed that the individual's choice to 
contribute discretionary effort results in the outcomes 
specified by the inducement system. This implies means that 
the motivational force depends only upon the valence of the 
outcomes and that [E-->P]=1.0 and [P-->0]=1.0. The 
simplified approach used in this study can be modified to 
incorporate the [E-->P] and [P-->0] probabilities of 
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expectancy theory. The payoffs for cooperation and defection 
become: 
c(c)=[Ec-->Pc][Pc-->Oc]Vc 
D(c)=[E0-->Po][P0-->o0 ]v0 
The term [Ec-->Pc] is the expectancy or probability 
that cooperation (an effort of 1.0 utiles) will result in 
the level of contributions (i.e. performance) defined as 
cooperation. Since there is no discretionary effort 
associated with defection, [E0-->Po] is equal to 1.0. The 
term [Pc-->Oc] is the expectancy that the level of 
performance defined as cooperation will result in the 
specified payoffs for cooperation. The term [P0-->0o] is the 
expectancy that the level of performance defined as 
defection will result in the specified payoffs for 
defection. The terms Vc and v0 are the valences or utilities 
of the outcomes from cooperation (including the cost of the 
effort to cooperate) and defection. These are the payoffs 
shown in Table II for the six classes of inducement systems. 
While this study considers only two levels of effort, a more 
complete analysis would consider a number levels of effort 
and contributions. With these additions, the game theoretic 
approach used in this study is consistent with expectancy 
theory. 
As noted by Pfeffer (1982), expectancy theory takes the 
individual as the unit of analysis. A criticism of 
expectancy theory is that it ignores the organizational and 
social environment. Defenders of expectancy theory might 
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argue that these influences are reflected in the 
expectancies and valences that individuals assign to actions 
and outcomes. However, absent a theoretical basis for 
predicting how the social and organizational environment 
influences expectancies and valences, expectancy theory will 
have limited applicability in real-world organizations. This 
is an important and fundamental criticism of expectancy 
theory. 
The application of game theory to the study of 
organizational inducements provides a framework for 
expanding expectancy theory to incorporate elements of the 
social and organizational environment. The approach outlined 
in this study does this in two ways. First, it incorporates 
the choices of others into the decision making model. By 
including the effects of choices by others on the payoffs to 
self, the individual is able to make choices that reflect 
the interdependencies present in organizations. Game theory 
provides a richer and more realistic framework for 
understanding individual choice within organizations. 
Second, game theory expands expectancy theory by 
incorporating additional social motives that can arise in 
organizations. Expectancy theory is unable to provide an 
explanation for the socially motivated behaviors that occur 
in organizations. The development of equity theory is an 
attempt to incorporate social motives into motivation 
theory. The application of game theory to the study of 
organizational inducements provides a common framework for 
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integrating a variety of social motives into the general 
approach of expectancy theory. Identifying a framework for 
integrating two of the important cognitive theories of 
motivation is an important outcome from this study. 
It should be noted that the use of payoff matrices and 
curves does not change the assumption that motivation is a 
within-person process. Individuals still make choices 
between alternative actions based on their personal analysis 
of the payoffs to self and others. 
Future Research 
The work done in this study breaks new ground in the 
areas of inducement system design and motivation theory. The 
results of this study also point out the need for further 
empirical and theoretical research. 
Empirical work is needed to 1) test the recommendations 
on inducement system design, and 2) determine whether the 
use of game theory and incorporation of social motives 
increase the predictive ability of expectancy theory. Before 
adopting the inducement systems recommended earlier, it 
would be appropriate to determine whether existing data 
support those recommendations. A broad survey of the 
relative success of companies and the type of inducement 
systems being used in those companies is needed. 
The application of this study to the design of 
inducement systems will also require that a common utility 
scale for measuring both contributions and efforts be 
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developed. Initially, it may be expedient to equate a 
percentage increase in contributions with a percentage 
increase in total compensation (e.g. a 10% increase in 
contributions is just offset by a 10% increase in total 
compensation). This approach will probably be satisfactory 
when the contributions equate to added hours of work or a 
higher piece rate. Problems are likely to be encountered 
when the discretionary effort involves issues like quality, 
customer interaction, or innovation. In the long run, more 
information about the relative value of contributions to 
various inducements is needed. Additionally, the work of 
Deci (1971) makes it clear that further work is needed to 
deal with the potential effect of extrinsic rewards (e.g. 
pay) on the individual's level of intrinsic motivation. 
While these problems are common to any theory of 
organizational inducements, they limit the application of 
the results from this study in designing organizational 
inducement systems. 
Another needed piece of empirical work is to determine 
whether the incorporation of social motives increases the 
predictive ability of expectancy theory. This work will 
require that instruments be developed to measure the 
relative weights of the various social motives within 
individuals. The use of before and after tests might also 
shed some light on the evolution of social motives. Like 
past research on motivation, this research should begin with 
laboratory testing to refine instruments and methods. 
Research could then be expanded to experiments outside of 
the laboratory. 
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In addition to empirical research, further theoretical 
research is needed. Several simplifying assumptions were 
used in this study. In particular, only two level of 
contributions were considered in the analysis. Expanding the 
analysis to include additional levels of cooperation would 
show whether the results are affected when individuals are 
free to contribute at a variety of performance levels. 
A second simplifying assumption used in phases I & II 
was to treat each individual as having identical 
preferences. A more realistic but less tractable assumption 
would be to treat individuals as having differing 
preferences. Such an analysis can become quite complicated 
when more than two individuals are considered. It may be the 
case, however, that individuals assign one set of 
preferences to themselves while attributing another set to 
others. If a single set of preferences could be attributed 
to others, the analysis of the n-person case would be 
manageable. The attribution of different motives to others 
is consistent with attribution theory, and might be 
significant in organizational settings. 
Further analysis is also needed to look into other 
forms of inducements. In particular, additional analysis is 
needed to investigate hybrid inducement systems using both 
competitive and absolute rewards andjor penalties. 
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Inducement systems based on competition between group rather 
than individuals should also be investigated. 
Additional work is also needed to integrate the various 
social motives into a single theory of motivation. The work 
done in this study provides a common framework for analyzing 
social motives. The results of phase II indicate the number 
of social motives with cooperation as the natural outcome. 
Further work is needed to integrate these motives into a 
common scale representing the motivational force on the 
individual. 
One approach would be to treat the motives as separate 
attributes of the possible outcomes. If the relative 
importance of each of the motives to an individual was 
known, then the relative motivational force of the various 
outcomes could be developed using an approaches like 
multiutility attribute theory or multiple criteria decision 
making (Zelany, 1982). Both of these approaches would treat 
the social motives as attributes of the decision to 
cooperate or defect. In multiutility attribute theory, the 
utility of each attribute (i.e. social motive) is treated 
separately. The attributes are assumed to be independent, so 
that the utility of any outcome is equal to the sum of the 
utilities from the individual attributes. The utility 
functions for cooperation and defection for each attribute 
are given by the payoff functions for each social motive, 
Ci(c) and Di(c) (see Table III). Following the approach of 
expectancy theory, the motivational force for cooperation 
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and defection would be represented by the combined utility 
functions Sum(wici(c)) and Sum(wiDi(c)), where: 
wi=relative weight of motive i. 
In multiple criteria decision making, the best values 
of each attribute (i.e. Pmax> are determined from the set of 
possible outcomes. These best or ideal values are used to 
construct the hypothetical displaced ideal or bliss point. 
Each outcome is then evaluated based on its distance from 
the displaced ideal. These distances are weighted for the 
importance of the social motives to the individual. The 
motivational force for an outcome could then be based on the 
weighted distance of the available outcomes from the 
displaced ideal. The closer the outcome, the greater its 
motivational force. Additionally, it might be possible to 
use this approach to include attributes associated with 
intrinsic motivation. This could shed light on the problem 
of the interaction of extrinsic and intrinsic motivation 
(Deci, 1971). 
The portion of this study that could most benefit by 
additional theoretical research is the work done in Phase 
III on the evolution of social motives. This exploratory 
work only begins to scratch the surface of the work that 
might be done in developing a dynamic model of motivation 
and social motives. one extension would be to incorporate a 
memory factor into the simulation models. This would allow 
individuals to make predictions about the future based on a 
more complete history of prior outcomes. This might 
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eliminate some of the cycling behavior noted in the 
simulation models. The inclusion of a memory factor would 
also make the model consistent with the relative payoff sum 
model developed by Harley (1981). 
Another logical extension of the work done in phase II 
would be to integrate the two learning models (Fitness and 
Satisfaction) into a single model. This integration could be 
accomplished by assigning weighting factors to each of the 
social motives. The strength of the weighting factors for 
the Individual motive would represent the importance of the 
material payoffs (Fitness model) to the individual. The 
weights of the other social motives would represent the 
individual's genuine preferences for the other social 
outcomes (Satisfaction model). These weights could then be 
assumed to evolve based on how well the motives preferences 
are satisfied. The measure of "satisfaction" could be 
defined using an interval scale based on the maximum and 
minimum values of the attribute for the set of possible 
outcomes. Such an approach would allow individuals to adjust 
the importance they assign to motives based on a need to 
reduce the dissonance between actual and desired outcomes. 
This approach would mesh nicely with methods and assumptions 
used in multiple criteria decision making. It would also be 
consistent with the individual's need to reduce their 
cognitive dissonance (Festinger, 1957). 
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Summary 
The methods of game theory have been used in this study 
to analyze organizational inducement systems and social 
motives. Starting with the concept of the inducements-
contributions contract, six classes of inducement systems 
were formulated into mathematical terms. These inducement 
systems cover a broad range of individual and group 
incentives that organizations might use to gain the 
cooperation of individuals with the goals of the 
organization. 
The classification scheme developed by Rappaport and 
Guyer (1966) for 2-person games was modified for use in 
determining the natural outcome for uniform n-person games. 
Beginning with the Individual motive, based on maximizing 
self-interest, the classification scheme was used to analyze 
the six classes of inducement systems and determine the 
values of the individual reward and penalty and group 
incentive factors that would result in cooperation as the 
natural outcome. An additional analysis of this motive was 
done based on the satisficing theory of Simon (1976). 
This game theoretic analysis was repeated for five 
additional social motives, 1) Collective, 2) Competitive, 
3) Altruism, 4) Equity, and 5) Aggression. The combined 
results indicate the values of the individual reward, 
penalty and group incentive factors needed to achieve 
cooperation as the natural outcome for these social motives. 
For the idealized inducement systems treated in this study, 
these results allow the determination of the inducement 
systems parameters that will promote cooperation with the 
organization over a range of social motives. 
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Two dynamic learning models were developed to determine 
whether cooperation would be stable and to explore the 
possible evolution of social motives within a given 
inducement system. One model assumes that social motives are 
strategies for maximizing material payoffs. The other model 
treats social motives as genuine preferences for social 
outcomes. These two simulation models were run until 
equilibrium conditions were reached. Together with the 
earlier results from the study, these simulations were used 
to recommend inducement systems of potential interest to 
organizational practitioners. 
The work described above was used to develop a set of 
selection criteria (see Table XI) for choosing inducement 
systems which should be effective in promoting individual 
cooperation with the goals of the organization. These 
criteria were applied to the six classes of inducement 
systems to determine the values of the reward, penalty and 
group incentive factors required for an inducement system to 
meet each of the effectiveness criteria. These results are 
shown in Table XII, along with the least cost inducement 
system. The practical implications of the results were 
discussed for each class of inducement systems. In general, 
inducement systems based on absolute rewards and/or 
penalties were found to be more effective than were 
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inducement systems based on competitive rewards and/or 
penalties. Suggestions were given for applying the results 
to the design of organizational inducement systems. 
In addition to providing insights into the design of 
organization inducement systems, this study makes 
contributions to the theory of motivation. The application 
of game theory allows the general approach of expectancy 
theory to be expanded to include the outcomes and decisions 
of others in the organization. This extends the unit of 
analysis beyond the individual to include others in the 
organization. 
A second theoretical contribution of the study is the 
incorporation of social motives into a framework consistent 
with expectancy theory. The expansion of expectancy theory 
to include social motives is a potentially powerful 
expansion of the theory. The analytical framework provided 
by this study should allow for a common scale of 
motivational force to be developed which incorporates a 
range of social motives. Multiple criteria decision making 
(Zelany, 1982) is suggested as a method for building this 
integrated theory of motivation. 
A third theoretical contribution of the study is the 
application of methods from evolutionary game theory to the 
development of two learning models of motivation. These 
models are dynamic models of motivation that allow the level 
of cooperation and frequencies of social motives to evolve. 
These models should be viewed as a speculative effort 
towards developing a dynamic model of motivation. 
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Lastly, this study illustrates how game theory can be 
used to integrate ideas from organization theory, social 
psychology and theoretical biology to explore questions 
about social motives and the design of organizational 
inducements. This illustrates the ability of general systems 
theory to contribute to the knowledge base at the levels of 
both theory and practice. 
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APPENDIX A 
PHASE I RESULTS 
This appendix contains maps showing the natural outcome 
and game category for six classes of inducement systems 
based on the Individual motive. These are followed by maps 
showing the results of the satisficing analysis for initial 
cooperators and initial defectors. 
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APPENDIX B 
PHASE II RESULTS 
This appendix contains maps showing the natural outcome 
and game category for six classes of inducement systems 
based of five social motives: 1) Collective, 2) Competitive, 
3) Altruism, 4) Equity, and 5) Aggression • 
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APPENDIX C 
PHASE III RESULTS 
This appendix contains graphs showing the evolution of 
social motives for selected inducement systems based on the 
results from two simulation models: 1) Fitness model, and 
2) Satisfaction model. 
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